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This dissertation interrogates the phenomenon of disaffection in post-World War II 
democracies and, in doing so, offers a theory of the affective dimension of democratic 
politics. Although many countries have formally democratized after World War II, 
they suffer from political apathy, withdrawal, and disillusionment—in short, 
disaffection. Why have democratic institutions failed to inspire popular support 
necessary to sustain democratic forms of life? A dominant strand of democratic theory 
represented by Rawls and Habermas is not well-equipped to address this vital question, 
insofar as it fails to consider how affect works with reason, not as a subsidiary but an 
equally constitutive force, in establishing and realizing norms of democratic politics. 
This is theoretically blinding since a unique frame of democracy that became 
dominant in the postwar era (which I call “instrumental democracy”) has systemic 
tendencies to produce democratic disaffection. Instrumental democracy reduces 
democracy to an instrument that merely legitimizes, rather than contests or 
renegotiates, political goals predetermined by elites and technocrats. I trace the origins 
of instrumental democracy to the Cold War when anti-totalitarianism, market 
capitalism, and a highly insulted technocracy concomitantly emerged to the effect of 
dissolving the collective, public dimension of democracy. I scrutinize the logics of 
instrumental democracy by analyzing behavioralism and rational choice theory as 
symptomatic articulations of Cold War imperatives, and investigate its evolution in the 
 late twentieth century by examining democratization in Chile and South Korea. 
Bringing my empirical analysis into theoretical focus, I reinterpret Hannah Arendt’s 
political theory through the prism of her creative, if underdeveloped, appropriation of 
two supposedly incompatible themes: Heidegger’s concern with affect and Marx’s 
critique of alienation. Thus interpreted, Arendt’s theory helps us recognize that 
people’s affective disposition toward democracy is closely connected to the structure 
and distribution of power. By engaging in a mutually constitutive dialogue between 
theory and history, I aim to identify and challenge one of the most formidable yet 
underappreciated trends of our time that threatens to impoverish our understanding 
and practice of democracy. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Challenge of Democratic Disaffection 
 
 
“The food of feeling is action … Let a person have nothing to do for his 
country, and he will not care for it. … Leaving things to the 
Government, like leaving them to Providence, is synonymous with 
caring nothing about them, and accepting their results, when 
disagreeable, as visitations of Nature. … [T]he intelligence and 
sentiments of the whole people are given up to the material interests, 
and when these are provided for, to the amusement and ornamentation, 
of private life.” 
--John Stuart Mill (1861)1 
 
One of the most remarkable changes in the postwar era is the global spread of 
democracy. In 1941, there were only eleven democracies in the entire world. By the 
end of the twentieth century, however, 119 out of 192 countries could be described as 
electoral democracies. The worldwide trend in favor of democracy has been so 
striking that a recent Freedom House report declared the twentieth-century as 
“democracy’s century.”2 Indeed, the appeal of democracy now seems virtually 
irresistible: all countries in the world claim to be democracies with the exception of 
only four countries: Brunei, Burma, Saudi Arabia, and Vatican City.3 Not surprisingly, 
this remarkable change invited a number of celebratory accounts. Perhaps most 
famously, Francis Fukuyama declared as early as in 1989 that Western liberal 
                                                 
1 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), 240-241. 
2 Freedom House, Democracy’s Century: A Survey of the Global Political Change in the 20th Century 
(New York: Freedom House, 2000). 
3 http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/peace/democracy_map/production/index.html. 
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democracy was “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and “the final form 
of human government.”4 
This triumphant narrative, however, has been seriously challenged by the 
subsequent course of history. People in many newly democratized countries show 
signs of political apathy, withdrawal, and disillusionment—in short, disaffection.5 
Voting rates are declining. People hold a dim view of political parties, do not trust 
major political institutions such as Congress, and support anti-establishment figures 
for public office. Interestingly enough, old democracies, too, are plagued by similar 
signs in the same period.6 The trend of growing disaffection is particularly 
conspicuous in the United States, where both turnout and people’s confidence in the 
government have gradually and remarkably fallen since the 1960s.7 Alarmed by this 
troubling phenomenon, a number of prominent scholars began to identify it as the 
major source of a crisis of democracy.8 
To be sure, these signs are not entirely self-evident or coherent. But they are 
pervasive enough to raise concerns as to whether democratic disaffection—people’s 
affective detachment from democratic institutions and, more generally, democratic 
                                                 
4 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), 4. 
5 On Latin America, see Marta Lagos, “How People View Democracy: Between Stability and Crisis in 
Latin America,” Journal of Democracy 12(1) (2001): 137-145. On East Asia, see Yun-han Chu, Larry 
Diamond, and Doh Chull Shin, “Halting Progress in Korea and Taiwan.” Journal of Democracy 12(1) 
(2001): 122-136. On Eastern Europe, see William Mischler and Richard Rose, “Trust, Distrust, and 
Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies,” 
Journal of Politics 59(2) (1997): 418-451. 
6 Russell J. Dalton, “Political Support in Advanced Industrial Countries,” in Critical Citizens: Global 
Support for Democratic Governance, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 57-77; 
Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg, “Confidence in Political and Private Institutions,” in Citizens and the 
State, eds. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 304-
305. 
7 Thomas E. Patterson, The Vanishing Voter: Public Involvement in an Age of Uncertainty (New York: 
Knopf, 2002); Joseph S. Nye, Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King, eds., Why People Don’t Trust 
Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Everett C. Ladd and Karlyn H. 
Bowman, What’s Wrong: A Survey of American Satisfaction and Complaint (Washington, D.C.: AEI 
Press, 1998). 
8 Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral 
Countries? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
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ways of life—is coming into being. If fully realized, democratic disaffection 
constitutes a fundamental threat to democracy. Democracy can exist only as a 
permanent reform project because, if nothing else, its ultimate foundation—“the 
people”—is a constantly changing entity. For that reason, democracy, more than any 
other form of political life, relies on the concern and the thoughtful participation of its 
members. For people to care about and participate in this project, however, they must 
have a level of confidence that their demands will be heard and realized through 
democratic institutions and practices. If people feel that democratic institutions are too 
flawed to respond to their concerns and social structures impervious to their demands, 
they will, in the long run, cease to make efforts to preserve and improve those 
institutions and, worse, begin to lose their faith in the normative validity and the 
practical efficacy of democratic claims-making itself. When, as in John Stuart Mill’s 
disturbing description in the epigraph of this Introduction, people are inclined to 
accept whatever result produced, without their input, by elites as “visitations of Nature” 
and are completely immersed in the “amusement and ornamentation of private life,” 
democracy is dying a slow death. Affection is what makes us vigilant and, without that 
vigilance, democracy is always vulnerable to becoming an empty name and turning 
into its ultimate nightmare—despotism. 
I am not claiming that some of the empirical indicators of disaffection noted 
above (declining voting rates or falling trust in democratic institutions) verify that we 
are in this dismal state. Rather, my suggestion is that those indicators provoke us to 
reflect on the possibility that we might be moving toward the direction of democratic 
disaffection. (This is the kind of possibility, I also want to suggest, that threatens to be 
ignored if we insist, as some social scientists do, on studying empirical reality only 
when it can be verified and made operationalizable by allegedly scientific measures.) 
In other words, I approach democratic disaffection as an emergent phenomenon. By 
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emphasizing its emergent nature, I intend to distinguish democratic disaffection from 
such similar terms as “democratic disillusionment” or “democratic disappointment,” 
which are often invoked to suggest, rather lightheartedly, that disaffection is merely a 
temporary phenomenon. This tendency is especially pronounced among some of the 
prominent scholars of recent democratization in developing countries. Samuel 
Huntington, for example, argues that people’s disillusionment with political leaders in 
recently democratized countries is “in a sense, a measure of their success,” because it 
shows that leaders of anti-authoritarian movements learned to moderate their 
demands.9 Referring to the same phenomenon, Ronald Inglehart and Gabriela 
Catterberg wittily call it a “post-honeymoon period of decline” that reflects “a period 
effect rather than a persisting value shift.”10 
This line of diagnosis is not only inadequate (it can explain neither why 
disaffection persists after twenty years after democratization in many new democracies 
nor why it plagues old democracies like the Unites States) but also blinding insofar as 
it distracts out attention away from a more enduring and coherent historical dynamic 
working behind democratic disaffection. My major contention, which I will unfold in 
the course of my dissertation, is that a unique frame of democracy that emerged and 
evolved in the postwar era has systemic tendencies to produce democratic 
disaffection.11 I term this frame “instrumental democracy” to denote how democracy 
                                                 
9 Samuel Huntington acknowledges that the third wave is often met with people’s disillusionment, 
stating, “Few political leaders who put together the compromises creating [democratic] regimes escaped 
the charge of having ‘sold out’ the interests of their constituents.” According to Huntington, however, 
popular disaffection is “in a sense, a measure of their success,” because it demonstrates that leaders of 
the opposition learned to moderate their demands to gain power. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1991), 165, 169, 171. 
10 Ronald Inglehart and Gabriela Catterberg. “Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend 
and the Post-Honeymoon Decline,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 43(3) (2002): 300-
316, 306. 
11 I use the term “the postwar era” more broadly than its common usage: it includes not only the years 
immediately following the end of World War II but the period going well into the late twentieth century. 
This somewhat unconventional periodization is intended to highlight the continuity of historical 
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is reduced to an instrument that merely legitimizes, rather than contests or renegotiates, 
political goals predetermined by elites and technocrats who lack democratic legitimacy 
as well as accountability. Instrumental democracy perceives democratic demands from 
below as a threat to political stability and represses those demands, creating a gap 
between democratic institutions and democratic aspirations. It hinges on centralization 
of power and, as its correlate, demobilization of the demos. Within its framework, 
security and economic freedom always work together as the organizing―or more 
precisely, disorganizing―principles of democratic politics. My primary objective is to 
draw a blueprint, as it were, of instrumental democracy as a system and to show 
democratic disaffection exists as an effect inherent to its working. In other words, the 
connection between instrumental democracy and democratic disaffection I draw is a 
systemic, not empirical, one. Unlike social scientists, I do not aim to isolate 
instrumental democracy as a controllable variable independent of history or to 
establish empirical causal chains between it and democratic disaffection. Doing so 
would run the risk of reifying and distorting reality for the sake of theoretical 
consistency, the danger to which positivism often succumbs. I approach instrumental 
democracy not as a preconceived idea that simply explains the world but as a historical 
force that constitutes the world and democratic disaffection its systemic effect. And I 
examine the empirical unfolding of instrumental democracy not to “prove” my 
“hypothesis” but to trace the working of instrumental democracy in history, namely, in 
the realm of inevitable contingencies. 
Constitutive elements of instrumental democracy I identify in the postwar era 
are by no means unprecedented. Ever since Plato likened the demos to a lawless and 
easily manipulated beast whose endless desire for freedom drags democracy into a 
                                                                                                                                            
conditions and forces giving rise to and sustaining instrumental democracy. Thus understood, the 
postwar era has not come to an end yet. 
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tyranny, students of democracy struggled to devise ways of taming that beast to save it 
from its own destructive tendencies. James Madison, to take one prominent example, 
famously wrote in The Federalist Papers: “In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable 
the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself.”12 All the intricate institutional mechanisms Madison installed into American 
democracy, then, may be seen as his attempt to instrumentalize democratic politics. 
However, if the desire to make the demos manageable is as old as democracy itself, 
never before the postwar era did that desire materialize so systematically and with 
such a focus so as to form a coherent frame of democracy. Technological, 
socioeconomic, and cultural resources necessary for that materialization were acquired 
only by undergoing the great wars of the twentieth century, especially the Cold War. 
Individual elements of instrumental democracy have not gone unnoticed. In 
fact, the arguably dominant strand of democratic theory today—which I call the 
“rationalist paradigm” for its valorization of rational deliberation—can be seen as a 
critical response to a certain instrumental vision of democracy.13 But by focusing on 
the development of normative guidelines for democratic deliberation, the rationalist 
paradigm fails to construct a comprehensive picture of instrumental democracy as a 
powerful historical force. As a result, the rationalist paradigm blinds us to the arguably 
most serious pathology of instrumental democracy, which, as I have suggested, 
involves the systematic production of democratic disaffection. Even when it is forced 
to recognize the crucial role of affect in the functioning of reason, the rationalist 
                                                 
12 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kraminck 
(New York: Penguin, 1987), No. 51, 320. 
13 For example, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, two prominent advocates of deliberative 
democracy, distinguish their theory from what they call “aggregative theories of democracy.” 
According to Gutmann and Thompson’s description, aggregative theories reduce democracy to voting 
or calculating mechanisms that question neither people’s preferences nor the methods of aggregation. 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 13-21. 
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paradigm simply presumes the sound existence of affective qualities required for 
deliberation. But my analysis of the history of postwar democracy indicates that it is 
exceedingly difficult to sustain such a presumption, as the ascendance of instrumental 
democracy not only makes the working of democracy increasingly irrelevant to 
ordinary people but also undermines people’s disposition to cultivate democratic ways 
of life. These historical findings, then, compel us to undertake a more sustained 
conceptualization of the affective dimension of democratic politics. I take on that task 
by reinterpreting the work of Hannah Arendt. Reading her insightful yet vague claims 
in light of the theories of Heidegger and Marx, I reconstruct a critique of democratic 
disaffection as a major symptom of instrumental democracy. By engaging in a 
mutually constitutive dialogue between theory and history, I aim to identify and 
challenge one of the most formidable yet underappreciated trends of our time that 
impoverishes the understanding and practice of democracy. 
This introduction is divided into three parts. In the first section, I discuss how 
contemporary democratic theory has yet to fully explore the concept of affect. The 
limited or failed understanding of affect makes some of the dominant accounts of 
democracy theoretically incoherent and keeps them from interrogating historical 
conditions upon which they rest. I address this problem throughout my dissertation, 
and here I explain my own approach to affect that frames it. In the second section, I 
outline my analysis of the affective basis of democracy in the postwar era. I examine 
the historical emergence of instrumental democracy during the Cold War and 
demonstrate, through an analysis of behavioralism and rational choice theory, that 
instrumental democracy has systematic tendencies to produce democratic disaffection. 
I then trace how instrumental democracy evolves in the later phase of the postwar era. 
Taking democratization in Chile and South Korea as exemplary cases, I investigate 
how the global spread of democracy in the late twentieth century was dictated by the 
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terms of a new world order, namely, neoliberalism. That democracy was 
instrumentalized by the neoliberal restructuring of social relations, I contend, accounts 
for widespread disaffection plaguing post-transition politics in Chile and South Korea. 
In the last section, I sketch how I develop a theoretical account of the affective basis of 
democratic politics. Elucidating Arendt’s central yet enigmatic concepts “world 
alienation” and “the social” through the lens of Heidegger’s anti-foundational 
ontology and Marx’s analysis of capitalism, I interpret Arendt to illustrate, insightfully 
yet incompletely, that democracy fundamentally relies on a specific set of affective 
dispositions toward publicness and that those dispositions are structurally displaced in 
the postwar world. I end with a brief summary of the organization of my dissertation. 
 
Democratic Theory and the Claims of Affect 
The looming manifestation of democratic disaffection not only challenges the 
uncritical celebration of Western liberal democracy as the final destination of human 
history but makes us question some of our deeply held theoretical premises about 
democracy. Reflecting the skepticism, if not hostility, toward the affective dimension 
of human life that has a long history in political philosophy,14 the rationalist paradigm 
in democratic theory has focused almost exclusively on reason as the normative 
foundation of democracy, while paying marginal attention to the category of affect. 
Represented by such influential neo-Kantians as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, the 
rationalist paradigm tends to shun affect as an unpredictable matter and, at best, treats 
affect as a subsidiary that should be tamed and guided to support the working of 
reason. In consequence, the rationalist paradigm fails to understand how affect works 
with reason, not as a subsidiary but as an equally constitutive force, in establishing and 
                                                 
14 Cheryl Hall, Trouble with Passion: Political Theory Beyond the Reign of Reason (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), chap. 3. 
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realizing norms of democratic politics. Also, the rationalist paradigm is oblivious to 
how affect—and reason, too, insofar as its working is inextricably intertwined with 
affect—is structured by historically specific institutions, norms, and practices. By 
failing to interrogate the historical ground of their theoretical premises, the rationalist 
paradigm runs the risk of building a sand castle. 
While recent years are witnessing almost an explosion of interest in the 
concept of affect in various fields, political implications of affect have yet to be fully 
explored.15 In moral and political theory, the debate over affect takes place, roughly, 
around two related clusters of themes. On the one hand, some scholars are concerned 
primarily with explicating the nature of affect as compared to reason. For example, 
                                                 
15 In philosophy, there are various schools of thought that emphasize different aspects of affect. Some 
highlight cognitive capacities of affect. Martha Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990); idem., Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Robert C. Solomon, The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human 
Emotion (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1976); Jerome Neu, A Tear is an Intelligent Thing: The 
Meaning of Emotion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Others focus on how affect shapes 
our perception. Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); 
Amélie Rorty, “Explaining Emotions,” in Explaining Emotions, ed. Amélie Rorty (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1980). Still others emphasize the visceral aspect of affect. Silvan Tomkins, “What 
Are Affects?” in Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader, eds. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and 
Adam Frank (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 33-74; Robert Zajonc, “On the Primacy of 
Affect,” in Approaches to Emotion, eds. Klaus R Scherer and Paul Ekman (Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum 
Associates, 1984), 259-270. In neuroscience, Antonio Damasio’s pioneering work has brought to light 
the affective dimension of consciousness. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, 
and the Human Brain (New York: HarperCollins, 2000); idem., The Feeling of What Happens: Body 
and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (New York: Harcourt, 2003); see also Joseph LeDoux, 
The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1996). In political science, there are attempts to incorporate affect into the theory of political 
judgment. Most notable is the collaborative work of George Marcus, W. Russell Neuman, and Michael 
Mackuen. See their two edited volumes: The Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000); The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and 
Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). In rational choice theory, see Jon Elster, 
Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
In the humanities, notable works include, among many others: Brian Massumi, Parables of the Virtual 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), esp. 23-45; Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2005); Charles Altieri, The Particulars of Rapture: The Aesthetics of the 
Affects (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); William Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A 
Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Rei Terada, 
Feeling in Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Sara Ahmed, The Cultural 
Politics of Emotion (New York: Routledge, 2004); Jonathan Flatley, Affective Mapping: Melancholia 
and the Politics of Modernism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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Martha Nussbaum, one of the most influential defenders of emotion, emphasizes the 
cognitive or rational nature of emotions. As she puts it, “emotions always involve 
thought of an object combined with thought of the object’s salience or importance … 
[T]hey always involve appraisal or evaluation.”16 In contrast, William Connolly 
highlights the pre-cognitive or visceral nature of affect that translates sensorial 
material into “new things” that disrupt existing forms of representation and 
conceptualization, thereby challenging reason to expand its boundaries or to transform 
its organizing principles. As he states, “affect is involved in that tricky process by 
which the outside of thought is translated into thought.”17 On the other hand, a 
growing number of moral and political theorists begin to pay increasing attention to 
the role of affect. A number of feminist scholars, for instance, champion “care” as 
opposed to impartiality as the governing principle of moral life.18 Simon Blackburn 
emphasizes the principal role of passion, especially what he calls “concern,” in 
practical reasoning.19 Michael Walzer recognizes the inexorable and crucial 
involvement of passion in politics.20 And Sharon Krause examines the role of affect in 
democratic deliberation.21 
While these are important contributions to which I am indebted in developing 
my own account of affect, I depart from them by highlighting the social configuration 
                                                 
16 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 23. 
17 William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 64-77, quote at 71. 
18 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Virginia Held, Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, 
and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
19 Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998). 
20 Michael Walzer, “Passion and Politics,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 28(6) (2002): 617-633; idem., 
Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2004). 
21 Sharon Krause, Civil Passions: Moral Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008). See also Michael E. Morrill, Empathy and Democracy: Feeling, 
Thinking, and Deliberation (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2010); Cheryl Hall, 
“Recognizing the Passion in Deliberation: Toward a More Democratic Theory of Deliberative 
Democracy,” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 22(4) (2007): 81-95. 
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of affect. Before explaining my own approach to affect, however, a clarification of the 
term “affect” is in order. At the present moment, it is almost impossible to find a clear, 
let alone agreed-upon, definition of affect. Different theorists who are broadly 
interested in the affective dimension of politics tend to use various analogous terms 
such as feeling, emotion, affect, mood, and passion without sufficient conceptual 
clarity. To make matters worse, conceptual distinctions are sometimes drawn too 
sharply—a tendency that seems to be driven more by broad theoretical persuasions 
than by conceptual necessities—causing unproductive confusion. A particularly murky, 
if heated, dispute seems to be going on with regard to the distinction between the 
terms “emotion” and “affect.” Nussbaum, a champion of emotion, offers a cognitive 
definition of the term, contrasting it to the view that understands emotions as “bodily” 
or “un-reasoning” movements.22 Advocates of affect, such as Brian Massumi, define 
affect as “intensity” which is “unassimilable” in contradistinction to emotion as 
“intensity owned and realized” or “the conventional, consensual point of insertion of 
intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable 
action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning.”23 To the best of my knowledge, 
there is little evidence to support this confusing splitting of the affective into emotion 
and affect.24 And I fail to see any legitimate reason or practical use for this bifurcated 
conceptualization. As I understand it, the affective is significant precisely because it 
bridges cognitive and visceral registers; it does not warrant a privileging of one in 
favor of the other. 
                                                 
22 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 24-25. 
23 Brian Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect,” in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. Paul Patton (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996), 221. 
24 To get a sense of the terminological confusion plaguing the current debate, consider the following 
fact: William James, who is often cited as the pioneering theorist of affect (with an emphasis on the 
visceral), used the term “emotion.” William James, “What is an Emotion?” in What is an Emotion? 2nd 
edition, ed. Robert C. Solomon (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 65-76. 
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Throughout my dissertation, I define affect as vitality produced in reaction to 
sensorial stimuli, empirical and imagined, that initiates, directs, and sustains 
movements of thought—cognition, reflection, and evaluation—and produces 
tendencies toward action.25 The theory of Silvan Tomkins, a pioneer of affect theory 
in psychology, helps articulate some of the key attributes of affect. Challenging 
Freud’s then dominant theory of the drives as an account of “human nature,” Tomkins 
posits that affect exists as a primary motivational system in addition to, and 
independently of, biological drives. Babies cry for attention, for example, not simply 
because they are hungry but because they wish to form a communion. Thus 
understood, the concept of affect constitutes a breakthrough in our understanding of 
human freedom. If we can only accept or reject drive theory, human existence is either 
completely bound by natural needs (radically determinate) or totally free from such 
needs (radically contingent). But with affect, which allows us far more freedom than 
the drives do (e.g., we cannot stay long without food, but can withstand the absence of 
excitement for quite some time), we can understand the complexity of our freedom, 
which involves interaction with and adaptation to the environment.26 Illustrating this 
concept of freedom for learning and adaptation, Tomkins asks an interesting question: 
“How does the burnt child learn to avoid the flame in the absence of the pain which is 
presumably what he is avoiding?” His answer is “anticipation” which he describes to 
be a fundamentally affective process. Remembering what happened in the past is not 
enough for the child to complete his learning process. As Tomkins puts it, “[w]hat is 
remembered must be compelling here and now. The individual must care, if he is to 
act on his anticipation.”27 In this sense, “[a]nticipation necessarily requires the linking 
                                                 
25 For the sake of consistency, I primarily use the term “affect” throughout my discussion but, when 
necessary, I do not refrain from using the term “emotion” synonymously. 
26 Silvan Tomkins, “What Are Affects?,” 46-48. 
27 Ibid., 52. 
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of past experience with present affect. The burnt child can shun the flame only if he is 
now afraid of it.”28 
Tomkins’ theory of affect provides powerful insights into the nature and role of 
affect. But as briefly noted above, I am interested additionally in the social or 
relational existence of affect.29 To illustrate, suppose that a driver sees a policeman 
and is afraid. We would not say that this fear is intrinsic to the driver or to the 
policeman. Fear comes into being only when the driver catches the policeman in her 
sight. In other words, specific affects do not belong to us (subject) or to the stimuli 
coming from the external world (object) as some kind of property. Rather, it is a 
movement that occurs through the encounter between the subject and the object. And 
insofar as the encounter between the subject and the object is socially structured 
(though not determined), so is affect. This, of course, is not to suggest that affects are 
newly created by our social environment. Undoubtedly we are naturally capable of 
experiencing such affects as excitement, fear, surprise, anger, and so on.30 Rather, it 
means that we experience particular affects in relation to certain situations and objects. 
In other words, affects are reflective of our socially structured relationship to the world 
and, to that extent, socially distributed or configured.31 To experience fear, the driver 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 53. 
29 Tomkins, too, suggested (though never developed) the idea that affect is socialized. “The 
Socialization of Affect and the Resultant Ideo-Affective Postures Which Evoke Resonance to the 
Ideological Polarity,” in Silvan Tomkins, Exploring Affect: The Selected Writings of Silvan S. Tomkins, 
ed. E. Virginia Demos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 168-195. 
30 Tomkins identifies nine basic affects: shame, disgust, excitement, joy, fear, anger, surprise, distress, 
and contempt. But I am not concerned with determining which affects are basic and which are 
derivative. 
31 The “social constructivist” approach in social psychology and anthropology highlights this aspect of 
affect. For notable accounts, see: James R. Averill, “A Constructivist View of Emotion,” in Emotion: 
Theory, Research, and Experience, Vol. 1: Theories of Emotion, eds. Robert Plutchik and Henry 
Kellerman, (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 305-339; Rom Harré, ed., The Social Construction of 
Emotions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Arlie Russell Hochschild, “Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, and 
Social Structures,” American Journal of Sociology 85 (1979): 551-575; Catherine Lutz, Unnatural 
Emotions (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1988); Richard A. Shweder and Robert Alan LeVine, 
eds., Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1984). 
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must have a deeply entrenched sense as regards when one is supposed to be fearful of 
the policeman, let alone what a policeman is or how to tell if someone is a policeman. 
If she grew up in a neighborhood where crimes were rampant and the police presence 
constant, she might be more readily fearful. Thus, the driver’s fear evidences that she 
has internalized, among other things, legal institutions, social norms, and her past 
experiences. Affect, in short, acknowledges the affectedness of our being.32 
In failing to fully appreciate the socially configured nature of affect, the current 
literature on affect stops short of addressing what I take to be the most fundamental 
problem of the rationalist paradigm. While growing interest in affect shifts the focus of 
analysis from reason to affect, it has yet to challenge the frame of analysis that 
constructs an idealized theory upon a transhistorical category. As noted, and as I will 
discuss in more detail in Chapter 1, the rationalist paradigm’s universal, reasonable 
norms rely on specific affective qualities. Despite this essential reliance, however, the 
rationalist paradigm does not pay sufficient attention to the power-laden process 
surrounding the (re)structuring of its affective basis, blinding us to the working of 
power relations and thereby compromising the strength of its normative principles. To 
develop a more rigorous theory of democracy, we need to examine affect not only as a 
theoretical category but also as a historical category—how it is mobilized, 
demobilized, circulated, reoriented, or displaced by historically specific social 
conditions and political practices. 
 
A Genealogy of Postwar Democracy 
I interrogate the affective basis of democracy with a specific focus on the 
postwar era because, as I will explain shortly, democracy underwent a profound 
                                                 
32 This does not mean that affect is merely a passive indicator of our affectedness. As I will elaborate in 
Chapter 1, affect is also an active force that reinforces or challenges our relationship to the world. 
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reconstruction in that period. Unearthing the postwar reconstruction of democracy 
requires a great deal of historical work, but my investigation is not concerned 
exclusively with searching for what happened in the past. As I understand it, history 
and theory are inextricably intertwined with each other and thus historical analysis 
cannot be divorced from philosophical inquiry—and vice versa. As I will demonstrate 
throughout my dissertation, both normative and empirical theories of democracy rely 
on specific assumptions and judgment about history, whereas historical “facts” about 
postwar democracy take effect and survive oblivion to the extent that they are 
incorporated into, and made coherent by, theories. History and theory, in short, are 
mutually constitutive. 
In trying to weave theory and history, I draw insights from Michel Foucault 
and Walter Benjamin. Foucault develops a historical method that he calls “genealogy.” 
Challenging the conventional historical method that constructs a linear progressive 
line that extends seamlessly from the past to the present, he suggests we study how the 
past contains multiple paths that had a potential to become the present and yet were 
suppressed by power relations. Thus understood, genealogy enables us to interrogate 
the assumptions that are taken for granted in the present. As Wendy Brown has put it, 
“[t]he political value of genealogy lies in its ability to call into question the most 
heavily naturalized features and encrusted relations of the present, to expose as a 
consequence of power what is ordinarily conceived as divinely, teleologically, or 
naturally ordained.”33 By constructing a genealogy of postwar democracy, I trace the 
process through which particular assumptions about democracy—which hold, among 
others, that democracy is a mechanism that aggregates individual preferences—
become naturalized as the definition of democracy and, in doing so, reexamine their 
validity. Benjamin also refuses to view history as a linear progression, which, for him, 
                                                 
33 Wendy Brown, Politics Out of History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 118. 
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is but a myth created by the victors of history. He envisions an approach to history that 
recuperates previously suppressed, forgotten, and underrepresented voices in order to 
create tensions within existing power relations and open up room for alternative 
visions. My analysis of the Third World movement and the struggle for democracy in 
Chile and South Korea is informed and motivated by my understanding of Benjamin’s 
method. 
My genealogy of postwar democracy begins with political changes during and 
immediately after the Second World War. The unexpectedly formidable rise of 
Fascism and Nazism created a tremendous sense of threat among advocates of 
democracy. Unlike traditional dictatorships, Fascism and Nazism seemed, at least 
initially, capable of eliciting (rather than mobilizing through coercion) popular support 
even as they perpetrated atrocious violence against large segments of the population. 
The term “totalitarianism” was newly coined to grapple with the novel and puzzling 
character of these regimes, and many came to regard the people—often called, 
derisively, “the masses” in the postwar years—as the source of totalitarianism. As 
noted, students of democracy have always been wary of the people. And 
commentators began to note the dangers of mass society as early as in the eighteenth 
century and especially in the early twentieth century.34 However, it was the 
association of the masses with totalitarianism that effected a fundamental 
reconstruction of democracy in a way that systematically excludes and displaces 
people from the political arena. This imperative to dissolve the demos, I suggest, 
constitutes a major driving force of instrumental democracy. Of course, there are other 
significant factors that contributed to the emergence of instrumental democracy. Two 
                                                 
34 For a discussion of how the concept of “the masses” took shape during the French Revolution, see 
Stefan Jonsson, “The Invention of the Masses: The Crowd in French Culture from the Revolution to the 
Commune,” in Crowds, eds. Jeffrey T Schnapp and Matthew Tiews (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2006), 47-75. 
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of them merit special attention. First, in the postwar years, intellectual arguments as 
well as a network of people were formed around the idea that correlates, if not equates, 
democracy with unfettered capitalism. Second, the Second World War and the ensuing 
Cold War gave rise to highly sophisticated theories and technologies that treat society 
as a self-adjusting mechanism and individuals its units, both of which can and should 
be managed “scientifically” by experts. While there were no immediate affinities 
between these factors and, indeed, they were sometimes in conflict with each other, 
anti-totalitarianism fused them into a frame of instrumental democracy. 
While these historical forces do reveal certain tendencies of instrumental 
democracy, their combined working is neither readily clear nor entirely coherent 
because other historically contingent factors operated to suppress or delay their 
complete manifestation. The postwar economic boom, for example, made possible a 
broad consensus on modestly regulated capitalism, restraining the forces in favor of 
unfettered capitalism for decades. Anti-totalitarianism, too, was challenged in the 
midst of the protests against the Vietnam War and subsided during Détente, if only to 
aggressively reappear in the 1980s. Thus in order to understand ramifications of 
instrumental democracy more precisely, we need to examine a more systematic 
articulation of its logics. I suggest that self-proclaimed “scientific” theories of 
democracy, which gained enormous influence in the postwar years, provide such 
systematic accounts of instrumental democracy. Treated not as methodological 
orientations but as symptomatic articulations of Cold War imperatives, two most 
prominent theories in this period—behavioralism and rational choice theory—help 
elucidate the logics of instrumental democracy. In stark contrast to democratic theories 
in earlier decades, behavioralism and rational choice theory discount the significance 
of political participation and concern with public matters. They not only fail to 
interrogate but, in fact, legitimize political apathy, either as a means to restrain the 
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irrational force of the masses or as the outcome of individuals’ rational calculation. 
Translating historically contingent and normatively charged assumptions into 
“scientific” postulates upon which an allegedly factual account of democracy is 
constructed, behavioralism and rational choice theory effectively serve to naturalize 
instrumental democracy. This is not simply a matter of academic discourse, as the 
formalized model of instrumental democracy assumed a significant place in the 
broader project of modernization which defined American foreign policy toward 
developing countries during the Cold War. To be sure, the modernization project (and 
behavioral and rational choice accounts of democracy as part of it) experienced serious 
setbacks and failures and encountered formidable challenges and critiques. 
Nonetheless, basic suppositions about democracy codified by behavioralism and 
rational choice theory would remain essentially intact, as I will show with theories of 
democratization and social capital. 
Woven into the genealogy of postwar democracy, social science discourses on 
democracy serve to crystallize the otherwise muddled development of instrumental 
democracy and give us insights into its future direction. Moreover, my analysis of the 
social sciences compels us to reflect on the nature of social inquiry. If the rationalist 
paradigm fails to examine the empirical assumptions upon which its endeavor relies at 
the risk of undermining the validity of its normative principles, scientific theories of 
democracy seem to commit an exact opposite fallacy: they fail to interrogate 
normative assumptions guiding their study, effectively promoting the normative vision 
growing out of specific historical conditions in their apparent effort to explain 
empirical reality. 
Having emerged in the mid-century, instrumental democracy evolves in the 
late twentieth century. I trace this evolution by comparing the “Third World” and the 
“Third Wave.” The term “Third World” denotes revolutionary movements in post-
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colonial societies and gained prominence after the 1955 Asian-African conference in 
Bandung, Indonesia. The term “Third Wave,” popularized by political scientist 
Samuel Huntington, refers to the global spread of democracy that occurred between 
1974 and 1990. The comparison of the Third World and the Third Wave, both of 
which were characterized by strong popular demands for self-rule in their initial stage, 
makes us wonder, because the reaction of the United States to those events was 
curiously different. Up until the early 1980s, the United States frequently intervened in 
the Third World to maintain its hegemony and was not reluctant to do so against 
democratically elected governments, as evidenced in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), 
Indonesia (1958), Chile (1973), and Nicaragua (1981). Why, then, did the United 
States not suppress democratic demands expressed in the Third Wave? Why did the 
United States suddenly decide to assume the role of democracy-promoter in the 1980s? 
Had democracy somehow become “safe” for freedom and the world order? 
In part, this shift can be attributed to the fact that the Vietnam War and the 
Iran-Contra affair made U.S. foreign intervention morally unpalatable and politically 
costly. But more importantly, the diverging fate of the Third World and the Third 
Wave is indicative of broader geopolitical change in the late twentieth century. In this 
respect, it is significant that the Third Wave coincided with another decisive historical 
event: neoliberal globalization. As I will examine more closely in Chapter 4, 
neoliberalism was not a change in the economic realm alone. It marked a radical 
departure from the New Deal vision of society that aspires to link the public control of 
capital, social welfare policies, and democratic politics. Once adopted by developed 
countries and multilateral lending institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, 
neoliberalism quickly became a global doctrine, in part because Third World 
economies became at once more vulnerable to the fluctuation of transnational capital 
and dependent on lender countries. Third Wave governments’ vulnerable and 
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dependent position in the neoliberal world order severely constrained their ability to 
respond to popular demands and circumscribed their newly established democracy. If 
anti-totalitarianism worked as the major driving force of instrumental democracy 
whereas unfettered capitalism remained a less palpable factor during the Cold War, in 
the late twentieth century the neoliberal strand of global capitalism came to play a far 
more central role in reinforcing and disseminating instrumental democracy. 
I illustrate the instrumentalization of Third Wave democracies by examining 
democratization in Chile and South Korea. A comparison of Chile and South Korea is 
particularly useful in analyzing the intertwinement of democracy and neoliberalism in 
the late twentieth century. They are often touted as two of the most successful cases of 
Third Wave democratization in terms of implementing and maintaining stable 
democratic institutions.35 Their experience is all the more dramatic because they 
peacefully transitioned to democracy from probably two of the most draconian and 
powerful authoritarian regimes. Also, democratization in Chile and South Korea went 
hand in hand with remarkably successful capitalist development. Chile and South 
Korea are outward-oriented economies dependent on transnational finance capital and 
open markets for their exports to advanced countries. In other words, they were under 
great pressure to liberalize their economy in accordance with the hegemonic 
international norm—i.e., neoliberalism—and they complied thoroughly. Thus, they 
provide helpful venues through which to assess the political consequences of 
integration into the neoliberal phase of global capitalism. Moreover, Chile and South 
Korea allow us to explore two different modes of neoliberalism’s global diffusion. If 
                                                 
35 According to the Freedom House ratings most widely used by scholarship to measure the level of 
democratic consolidation, Chile and South Korea are the “freest” among the Third Wave countries both 
in terms of political rights and civil liberties (http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363). 
Discussing the deteriorating quality of third wave democracies in the 1990s, Larry Diamond pointed out 
South Korea and Chile as “notable exceptions.” Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave over?” Journal of 
Democracy 7(3) (1996), 27-28. 
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Chile shows a more conventional Cold War path in adopting neoliberal policies under 
the counter-revolutionary local government backed by the United States, South Korea 
illustrates a characteristic post-Cold War pattern in undergoing a neoliberal makeover 
under the guidance of the IMF.  
The experiences of Chile and South Korea compel us to question the allegedly 
happy marriage of electoral democracy and capitalism that is widely celebrated after 
the end of the Cold War. In both countries, the combined process of democratic 
institutionalization and the neoliberal restructuring of social relations produced a 
reality at odds with the popular vision of democracy formed, if incompletely, during 
the anti-authoritarian struggle. Chile and South Korea prove to be illuminating 
examples in analyzing this disjuncture, as democratization in both countries was 
driven by arguably the highest level of popular mobilization. Forming an alliance with 
intellectuals, workers, students, and dissident politicians, people in Chile and South 
Korea did not passively receive but actively demanded democracy with a vision of 
their own. But after their demand for democracy has seemingly been realized, they 
show signs of widespread disaffection.36 I argue that this curious transformation of 
democratic aspirations into democratic disaffection stems primarily from the gap 
between the vision of democracy formed during the struggle for democracy and the 
reality of democracy experienced after the transition. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 
4, what emerged at the end of the fraught struggle for democracy in both Chile and 
South Korea was a variant of instrumental democracy that alienates and displaces, 
rather than accommodates, people’s democratic demands. 
 
                                                 
36 For Chile, see Paul W. Posner, State, Market, and Democracy in Chile: The Constraint of Popular 
Participation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 83-87. For South Korea, see Doh Chull Shin, 
“Mass Politics, Public Opinion, and Democracy in Korea,” in Korea’s Democratization, ed. Samuel 
Kim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 47-78. 
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A Theory of the Affective Basis of Democracy 
The genealogy of postwar democracy shows that, as opposed to the rationalist 
paradigm’s presumption, the affective basis of democracy is seriously undermined in 
the postwar era by the ascendance of instrumental democracy. This recognition, then, 
compels us to develop a theoretical perspective that acknowledges the affective 
dimension of democratic politics. For that purpose, I turn to the work of Hannah 
Arendt. Arendt was one of the few thinkers who lived the Cold War and yet refused to 
succumb to its binaries and imperatives. Like many of those who lived in the traumatic 
aftermath of World War II, Arendt’s thought was profoundly influenced by her 
experience of totalitarianism. But the lesson she gleaned from that experience was 
radically opposed to what was fashionable in Cold War America: she identified a 
specific kind of depoliticization—the disappearance of the public sphere, the 
dissolution of collectivities, and crucially, the decline of people’s democratic 
dispositions—as the most serious threat to democratic politics. While she first gave 
shape to this problem through her analysis of totalitarianism, Arendt believed 
depoliticizing tendencies that gave rise to, and were exploited by, totalitarianism did 
not disappear along with the demise of totalitarian governments but plagued the 
modern world more generally. And her principal concern, I suggest, was to understand 
the nature and the origin of that depoliticization—two integral yet underexplored 
themes figuring, respectively, in her concepts of “world alienation” and “the social.” 
Elaborated with a focus on these two concepts, Arendt’s political theory offers an 
insightful, if underdeveloped, critique of instrumental democracy that can help us 
come to terms with, and challenge, the still ongoing development of instrumental 
democracy and, as one of its major symptoms, democratic disaffection. 
Inasmuch as Arendt helps us explore the connection between instrumental 
democracy and democratic disaffection with theoretical generality, the genealogy of 
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postwar democracy provides an essential interpretative lens through which to elucidate 
vague and enigmatic aspects of her thinking. In particular, reconstructing her political 
theory as a critique of instrumental democracy and democratic disaffection enables us 
to navigate the tension at the center of her political theory—the tension reflected in a 
rather bifurcated reception of her work. On the one hand, Arendt is known as a theorist 
of “action” which is, for her, synonymous with freedom and politics as such.37 
Focusing on her unique conceptualization of action, some valorize Arendt’s political 
theory as a defense of participatory and agonistic politics,38 while others charge that 
her “dramaturgical” view of action is ultimately of “decisionistic” or irrational nature 
and “aestheticizes” politics, namely, promotes politics for the sake of politics without 
considering morality or justice.39 In highlighting the dynamic dimension of Arendt’s 
theory, however, admirers and detractors alike tend to underplay or bypass the 
emphasis she consistently places on what she calls the “common world.” On the other 
hand, some of her readers who do recognize Arendt’s emphasis on the common world 
tend to interpret her theory exlusively as an attempt to seek consensus or preserve 
public institutions at the risk of ignoring her distinct contributions to political theory 
including her concepts of plurality and natality (unexpected beginnings).40 In my view, 
                                                 
37 The action-freedom-politics triad appears time and again throughout Arendt’s corpus. For a 
particularly concise formulation, see: “The raison d’être of politics is freedom, and its field of 
experience is action.” Hannah Arendt, “Politics and Freedom: A Lecture,” Chicago Review 14(1) 
(1960), 28. 
38 For the participatory reading of Arendt, see Jeffrey C. Isaac, “Oases in the Desert: Hannah Arendt on 
Democratic Politics,” American Political Science Review 88(1) (1994): 156-168; Maurizio Passerin 
d’Entrèves, The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt (London and New York: Routledge, 1994). For 
the agonistic interpretation of Arendt, see the critical exchange between Dana R. Villa and Bonnie 
Honig in Political Theory. Dana R. Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the 
Aestheticization of Political Action,” Political Theory 20(2) (1992): 274-308; Bonnie Honig, “The 
Politics of Agonism: A Critical Response to Dana R. Villa,” Political Theory 21(3) (1993): 528-533. 
39 Martin Jay, “Political Existentialism of Hannah Arendt (1978),” in Permanent Exiles: Essays on the 
Intellectual Migration from Germany to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 237-
256. This critique is closely related to another line of criticism that sees in Arendt’s political theory 
“elitist” and “anti-democratic” elements. Sheldon S. Wolin, “Hannah Arendt: Democracy and the 
Political,” Salmagundi 60 (Spring-Summer 1983): 3-19. 
40 For the consensual reading of Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, “Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power 
(1976),” in Philosophical-Political Profiles (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), 171-187. 
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both participatory/agonistic and consensual readings of Arendt highlight one aspect of 
her thought and suppress the other, failing to fully explore the productive tension or 
symbiotic relationship between the political continuity grounded in the common world 
and the unpredictability generated by human action. 
I suggest that, in Arendt’s political thinking, public institutions and public 
actions are not fundamentally opposed but mediated by public sentiments and 
dispositions.41 For Arendt, both institutions and actions are sustained and animated by 
the same set of dispositions to preserve and recreate publicness, which she variably 
calls “the common world,” “the public sphere,” or “the space of appearance.” From 
this perspective, the counterproductive opposition between institutions and actions are 
not a theoretical necessity but a historically contingent phenomenon caused by the 
decay of public sentiments and dispositions, namely, democratic disaffection.42 And 
Arendt’s critique of the “the social” points to a historically specific structural dynamic 
that produces democratic disaffection—a dynamic inherent in modernity and 
manifesting itself aggressively in the postwar era. 
For those who are familiar with Arendt’s work, my effort to find a theory of 
democratic disaffection and its structural origin in her ideas might seem ill-advised. 
For one thing, my claim that Arendt’s political theory is centered on an affective 
dimension might sound odd, given that she notoriously criticized one of the most 
influential affective concepts in the history of political thought—Rousseau’s 
                                                 
41 For a recent effort to relax the opposition between orderly and disruptive dimensions of democratic 
politics through a reading of Arendt, see Patchen Markell, “The Rule of the People: Arendt, Archê, and 
Democracy,” American Political Science Review 100(1) (2006): 1-14. While Markell is interested 
primarily in challenging the opposition itself, my chief aim is to examine how the opposition is 
mediated by affective qualities and how that affective mediation is structured in a specific historical 
context. 
42 Arendt herself seems to indicate this point in the following remark: “Perhaps the very fact that these 
two elements, the concern with stability and the spirit of the new, have become opposites in political 
thought and terminology—the one being identified as conservatism and the other being claimed as the 
monopoly of progressive liberalism—must be recognized to be among the symptoms of our loss [of the 
revolutionary spirit consisting of public freedom, public happiness, and public spirit]” Hannah Arendt, 
On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 1990 [1963]), 223. 
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“compassion”—for being partially responsible for the perceived failure of the French 
Revolution.43 Also, my attempt to extrapolate an account of the structural origin of 
democratic disaffection from her work might seem equally misguided. Arendt is 
reputed, as noted, for her celebration of the unpredictability produced by human action. 
She often resists, if not rejects, structural thinking, as she believes it threatens to 
overlook and repress human spontaneity. With these objections in mind, I want to be 
clear about my argument. I do not claim that Arendt has a systematic theory of affect 
or of structural forces behind the social configuration of affect. Rather, my contention 
is that she advances and relies on a set of ideas that together enables us to 
conceptualize the affective basis of democratic politics. These ideas, however, exist in 
Arendt’s thinking only in a vague and underdeveloped fashion, and I enlist two 
external sources to flesh out and articulate them: Martin Heidegger and Karl Marx. 
Heidegger’s anti-foundational ontology proves to be a key to understanding 
Arendt’s puzzling conceptualization of world alienation. Defining world alienation as 
the “decline of the common world,” Arendt never clarifies what she means by the 
“common world.” Sometimes she refers to tangible institutions and shared objects, but 
she also implies that the common world has an important affective dimension by 
positing that our experience of the common world requires what she calls “common 
                                                 
43 Arendt wrote: “[T]he actual experiences underlying … Robespierre’s ‘terror of virtue’ cannot be 
understood without taking into account the crucial role [Rousseau’s notion of] compassion had come to 
play in the minds and hearts of those who prepared and of those who acted in the course of the French 
Revolution.” Ibid., 79. But this should not be taken as a wholesale rejection of the entire realm of affect. 
Arendt’s critique of compassion stems from her view (with which I disagree) that it is inherently 
introspective and thus privatized. “Passion and emotions,” Arendt stated, “certainly are located in the 
human heart … The qualities of the heart need darkness and protection against the light of the public to 
grow and to remain what they are meant to be, innermost motives which are not for public display.” 
Ibid., 95-96. Suggestively, however, while saying that the American Revolution could be successful 
partly because it was never put to “the test of compassion,” Arendt argued that this “lack of experience 
gives [American revolutionaries’] theories, even if they are sound, an air of lightheartedness, a certain 
weightlessness, which may well put into jeopardy their durability.” The Founding Fathers, Arendt 
insisted, thought only in terms of “bring[ing] ‘irrationality’ of desires and emotions under the control of 
rationality” which is “wanting in many respects, especially in its facile and superficial equation of 
thought with reason and of reason with rationality.” Ibid., 95. 
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sense” as its precondition. Here Arendt’s thinking unmistakably resembles 
Heidegger’s in its structure. Heidegger postulates that our existence is not defined by 
foundational qualities such as reason but by our practical involvement with people and 
things around us. Crucially, he also claims that this involvement is premised on our 
primary affective attunement with the world. We get involved with the world, he 
writes, when we “become affected in some way (Betroffenwerdens).” Of course, 
Heidegger’s ontology has deeply apolitical, if not anti-political, implications, and 
Arendt is keenly aware and severely critical of them. Nonetheless, Heidegger’s 
account of the fundamentally affective nature of human existence explicates world 
alienation not simply as an institutional deterioration but as a dispositional and 
affective decay. 
Arendt traces the origin of this dispositional and affective decay in her account 
of the rise of the social. But as in the case of world alienation, her discussion is 
confusing and indeterminate even when it is insightful. Arendt laments that political 
freedom becomes rarified in the modern world as the social dominates human 
activities. In line with her discussion of world alienation, Arendt discusses the 
detrimental impact of the social in affective and dispositional terms, insisting that 
“care for the world” is overshadowed by “care about the self” in the modern world. 
What is not clear is how, exactly, the social generates this regrettable situation. While 
Arendt has often been understood to claim that the rise of the social blurs the 
distinction between the public and private realms, letting private qua economic matters 
intrude on public concerns, she makes clear that the social is a unique force that 
transforms both the public and private realms. In her sparse yet suggestive remarks on 
the unique nature of the social, Arendt clearly points to modern capitalism, 
highlighting in particular the imperative of wealth accumulation and the system of 
exchange value. But she remains exceedingly vague as to how wealth accumulation 
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becomes such a formidable social ideal, how exchange value fragments collective 
subjectivities into isolated individuals, and how both processes facilitate the 
ascendance of self-care as the dominant disposition. Despite Arendt’s attempt to draw 
a sharp distinction between her ideas and Marx’s, I suggest Marx’s analysis of 
capitalism helps elucidate Arendt’s account of the social by showing how the 
imperative of capital accumulation and the universalization of exchange value—two 
essential dynamics of capitalism—produce a specific form of social relations that 
structurally turn people’s disposition away from the cultivation of their collective 
power to the endless and purposeless expansion of their private interest. 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
My dissertation is divided into three parts consisting of five chapters. Part I 
(Chapter 1) examines the affective deficit of the rationalist paradigm. Through a close 
reading of the works of Rawls and Habermas, I demonstrate that the attempt to 
conceptualize democratic politics in terms of reason alone is bound to fail, because 
affect is always and already involved in the working of reason. Rational deliberation—
the central mechanism to which both Rawls and Habermas turn in constructing the 
norms of democratic politics—is in fact predicated on empathic imagination which 
requires a great deal of affective engagement. Neglecting the role of affect, therefore, 
runs the risk of impoverishing the ideal of rational deliberation itself. In their attempt 
to address the problem of motivation, Rawls and Habermas do reveal the extent to 
which the rationalist paradigm relies on specific affective qualities. However, they 
simply presume the existence of those qualities, failing to recognize that those affects 
are closely intertwined with historically specific social structures and power relations. 
Due to this presumptive gesture toward affect, the rationalist paradigm is unable to 
account for the problem of disaffection—the possibility that the affective qualities it 
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(implicitly) requires are eroded by shifting power relations and thus no longer 
congruent with the experience of people. 
Part II (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) constructs a genealogy of postwar democracy. 
Chapter 2 examines the historical emergence of instrumental democracy in the Cold 
War context. Anti-totalitarianism played a powerful role in dissolving collectivities 
into isolated individuals and rendering the idea of the common good inimical to 
democratic politics. This reconstruction of democracy was complemented and 
accelerated by the increasingly influential tendency to correlate democracy with the 
capitalist economy. While this correlation was advertised to protect individual 
freedom, individuals became less free in the political realm as their capabilities for 
determining and renegotiating the goals of society were diminished. Some of the most 
pressing issues such as war and the economic system were often precluded from 
democratic contestation and decided by a small group of elites. Theories and 
technologies grown out of the experience of war, both hot and cold, justified and 
facilitated this elite-centric decision-making process and, further, the “scientific 
management” of individuals by “experts.” Together, these various forces gave rise to a 
form of democracy that is no longer a collective pursuit of the common good but an 
instrument merely legitimizing predetermined goals. 
Chapter 3 examines the logics of instrumental democracy by analyzing 
behavioralism and rational choice theory as symptomatic articulations of Cold War 
imperatives. Behavioralism and rational choice theory, otherwise quite different and 
contending approaches, converge in constructing their accounts of democracy on the 
assumptions deeply entrenched in the Cold War. They conceptualize the common 
good as a sum of completed and unchallengeable individual preferences, and 
democracy as a mechanism that merely aggregates and calculates those preferences. 
Based on this shared premise, behavioralism and rational choice theory clearly 
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illustrate two distinct dynamics of instrumental democracy, both of which produce 
disaffection. Behavioralism constricts the scope of democratic contestation even as it 
celebrates pluralism, alienating those who do not conform to the value consensus 
presumed to exist in postwar America. Rational choice theory reduces citizens to 
rational individuals perpetually engaged in cost-benefit analysis. Thus defined, 
individuals have no reason to participate in democratic politics at all, as it is shown by 
rational choice theory to be an eminently inefficient way of realizing the preferences 
of those individuals. 
Chapter 4 traces the evolution of instrumental democracy in the late twentieth 
century. A comparison of the Third Wave and the Third World suggests that the global 
spread of democracy in the late twentieth century marks not a linear progress toward 
Western liberal democracy as “the end of history,” but the ascendance of a specific 
form of political life conforming to a new world order—neoliberal globalization. The 
political development of Chile and South Korea brightly illustrates this point. During 
the struggle against authoritarianism, people in both countries envisioned and 
demanded a fundamental transformation of the system of exclusion and 
depoliticization on which authoritarianism relied. In this respect, democratic 
institutionalization was not an isolated goal but a symbol of deeper social, economic, 
and cultural transformations. But in both Chile and South Korea, this holistic vision of 
democratization went unrealized. While the authoritarian regimes were dismantled by 
popular struggles, the transition to democracy was negotiated among the elite with 
virtually no contributions from the popular sector. Despite the adoption of electoral 
institutions, the system of exclusion and social fragmentation that undergirded 
authoritarianism persists, if in a new form, as the neoliberal restructuring of social 
relations dissolve collective subjectivities into politically deprived individuals. 
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Finally, Part III (Chapter 5) develops a theoretical account of democratic 
disaffection by reinterpreting Arendt’s political theory. As opposed to the Cold War 
appropriation of her work, I suggest that Arendt’s primary concern was not to 
condemn the masses as such but to understand underlying factors that produced the 
masses as the dominant, and dangerous, form of political existence. She found the root 
cause of “massification” in a specific kind of depoliticization. Believing that this 
depoliticizing tendency is not peculiar to totalitarianism but inherent in modernity 
itself, Arendt developed more general, if incomplete, accounts of the nature and origin 
of that depoliticization with her concepts of “world alienation” and “the social,” 
respectively. I elucidate these crucial yet underexplored concepts by drawing on the 
insights of Heidegger and Marx. Heidegger’s claim that our involvement with the 
world presupposes primary affective attunement clarifies Arendt’s world alienation as 
the decline of people’s affective disposition to create and preserve publicness. Marx’s 
analysis of capitalism enables us to reconstruct Arendt’s account of the social as a 
historical critique of the double-sided structural dynamic—consisting of the 
imperative of capital accumulation and the universalization of exchange value—which 
displaces people’s public disposition and thereby suppresses the realization of political 
freedom. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
The Claims of Affect: The Affective Deficit of the Rationalist 
Paradigm 
 
 
“[The French] revolution has aroused in the hearts and desires of all 
spectators who are not themselves caught up in it a sympathy which 
borders almost on enthusiasm, although the very utterance of this 
sympathy was fraught with danger.” 
--Immanuel Kant (1798)1 
 
After decades of decline, normative democratic theory began to flourish again in the 
1970s.2 And this revival of political theory has been driven by a renewed interest in 
the concept of reason and, in democratic theory, by an attempt to ground democratic 
politics in citizens’ reasonable deliberation.3 Inspired by Kantian moral philosophy, 
proponents of this rationalist paradigm have been searching for universally valid 
norms that could provide a foundation for a society defined by complexity and 
plurality, relying primarily, if not exclusively, on reason. Speaking to its influence, the 
rationalist paradigm has received wide-ranging criticisms from “communitarians,”4 
                                                 
1 Immanuel Kant, “The Contest of Faculties (1798),” in Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. 
H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 182, emphasis in original. 
2 For a discussion of the decline of political theory in the 1950s and the 1960s, see John G. Gunnell, 
The Descent of Political Theory: The Genealogy of an American Vocation (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
3 Observing this trend, one commentator announced a “definitive deliberative turn” in political theory. 
John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), v. For notable accounts of “deliberative democracy,” see, among many others, 
Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of 
the State, eds. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 17-34; Jürgen Habermas, 
“Three Normative Models of Democracy,” in Democracy and Difference, ed. Seyla Benhabib 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 21-30; and Samuel Freeman, “Deliberative 
Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 29(4) (2000): 371-418. 
4 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, ID: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); Michael 
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Charles 
Taylor, Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Michael Walzer, 
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feminists,5 advocates of “identity politics,”6 and poststructuralists.7 While building 
on these valuable contributions, I approach the rationalist paradigm with a more 
specific objective: understanding the role of affect in democratic politics. The 
rationalist paradigm considers affect unreliable, obscure, and even threatening to 
reason and treats it as a marginal issue. To the extent that democratic disaffection 
means the absence of affect, it seems to characterize not only postwar democracies but 
also one of the most influential strands of democratic theory today. But can we really 
bracket or dispense with affect in conceptualizing and undertaking democratic politics? 
Is affectless theorization of democracy sustainable? What problems, if any, does it 
generate? 
Taking Rawls and Habermas as the representative figures of the rationalist 
paradigm, this chapter demonstrates that the attempt to conceptualize democratic 
politics in terms of reason alone is bound to fail.8 As my analysis of Rawls’s and 
                                                                                                                                            
Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983). The term 
“communitarian” is loose and somewhat misleading to do justice to the variety and the complexity of 
these critiques. In fact, all the prominent “communitarians” listed here have expressed their 
disagreement with the label in one way or another. 
5 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Rawls and Feminism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, ed. Samuel 
Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 488-520; Nancy Fraser, “What’s Critical 
about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender,” in Feminism as Critique, eds., Seyla 
Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 31-55; Jean 
Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1981); Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in 
Western Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); Susan Moller Okin, Justice, 
Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 
6 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1990). 
7 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000). 
8 My discussion in this chapter has important resonances with Sharon Krause’s recent work that also 
uncovers the significance of affect through an engagement with the work of Rawls and Habermas. But 
while Krause is concerned primarily with conceptualizing affectively informed impartiality, I am more 
interested in the role of affect in the undertaking of democratic politics and the formation of political 
subjectivities. Sharon R. Krause, “Desiring Justice: Motivation and Justification in Rawls and 
Habermas,” Contemporary Political Theory 4(4) (2005): 365-385, reprinted in her Civil Passions: 
Moral Sentiment and Democratic Deliberation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), chap. 
1. For another recent study of affect that includes a broad survey of deliberative democracy, see 
Michael E. Morrell, Empathy and Democracy: Feeling, Thinking, and Deliberation (University Park, 
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010). 
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Habermas’s account of rational deliberation will make clear, affect is always and 
already involved in the working of reason.9 In developing this argument, I build on 
the definition of affect advanced in the Introduction and draw a distinction between 
reproductive and performative modes of affect in its relation to social structures.10 On 
the one hand, when it is fully invested in existing social structures, affect plays a 
reproductive role and attaches us to those structures. In this case, affect depends on 
and expresses, however implicitly, preexisting cognitive categories. In our imaginary 
scene discussed in the Introduction (a driver sees a policeman and is afraid), fear 
reproduces the driver as a legal subject that voluntarily stays away from trouble and 
the legal system (represented by the policeman) as a binding and possibly legitimate 
structure. On the other hand, when we fail to find and maintain fitting affect in our 
relationship to the world, this “ill-fitting” affect can play a performative role and 
detaches us from current social structures, stimulating alternative ideas and practices 
and calling for a change. One day the driver sees the policeman and, all of a sudden, 
she is outraged. It is as if her body refuses to endure the feeling of fear—bouncing 
heart, contracting muscles, and nervous twitches—that is yet again overtaking her. Her 
outrage, then, incites her memory of a newspaper article about protesters being 
brutally suppressed by the police, which she read a while ago only in passing and 
                                                 
9 The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio finds that patients whose ability to experience emotion is 
impaired due to brain damage have trouble reasoning, especially in personal and social matters, even 
though their cognitive and intellectual abilities remain intact. According to Damasio’s suggestive 
hypothesis, affective signals that the brain receives from the body (or what Damasio calls “somatic-
markers”) are integrated into emotions that then operate, say, to alleviate uncertainties involved in 
reasoning by reducing the number of options from which we choose or to keep knowledge necessary for 
reasoning active and in focus for an extended time. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, 
Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994), esp. 83-113, 165-201. 
10 George Marcus’s distinction between the “disposition system” and the “surveillance system” as two 
sub-categories of emotion seems to resonate with my discussion. According to Marcus, both the 
disposition system and the surveillance system are ways of processing emotional markers. The 
difference lies in the fact that the disposition system attends to the familiar and induces us to repeat 
behaviors learned in the past, whereas the surveillance system registers the unfamiliar and alerts us to 
the inappropriateness of the present situation. George E. Marcus, The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in 
Democratic Politics (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 71-75. 
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never registered. She now feels as if she was one of those protesters, and takes an 
urgent and intense interest in their situation. She starts questioning, for the first time in 
her life, whether it is right for a citizen to be afraid of the state. The world, for her at 
least, is already changed. Thus understood, the performative affect captures the side of 
affect that cannot be reduced to cognition. If we subsume all the affective states under 
the cognitive categories, we lose sight of the possibility that affect not only supports 
but transforms our normative expectations.11 
The distinction between the reproductive affect and the performative affect 
helps us analyze the nature of the rationalist paradigm’s affective deficit more 
precisely. The rationalist paradigm does not entirely ignore affect; rather, it contains 
affect within the reproductive mechanism of the norms already established by reason. 
In other words, the rationalist paradigm takes into account only the reproductive affect. 
The rationalist paradigm’s selective approach to affect creates significant problems 
that cannot be navigated within its own framework. For example, the rationalist 
paradigm is hard pressed to explain how reason alone can establish norms in the first 
place. In fact, a close reading of Rawls and Habermas reveals that they do depend on 
certain affective qualities in establishing norms. But they presume, rather than theorize, 
the existence of those performative affects. It is this presumption that leaves Rawls 
and Habermas vulnerable to the problem of disaffection. People could be disaffected 
with the rationalist paradigm if the affective qualities it (implicitly) requires are not 
congruent with their experiences. Or the rationalist paradigm’s own affective basis 
                                                 
11 Nussbaum’s reluctance to embrace the performative or transgressive dimension of affect reflects the 
old and formidable concern about affect, which she eloquently describes as follows: “[I]f emotions are 
just unthinking forces that have no connection with our thoughts, evaluations, or plans, then they really 
are just like the invading currents of some ocean. And they really are, in a sense, nonself.” Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought, 26-27. Legitimate as this concern is, I think confounding the affective and the 
cognitive is theoretically untenable and seriously constrains our understanding of the matter. The 
inexplicable experience of nonself might be what we must undergo in order to realize, and transform if 
needed, our deep-seated normative boundaries. 
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could be eroded by changes in socioeconomic structures and power relations. What 
happens, then? 
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first section recounts the rationalist 
paradigm as a prominent strand of contemporary democratic theory. Despite 
significant differences, both Rawls and Habermas draw out a deontological and 
cognitivist approach from Kant. But Kant himself was drawn to affect while trying to 
resolve an impasse within his moral philosophy. Kant ultimately failed to come to 
terms with affect on its own terms, leaving his impasse unresolved. In developing his 
insights, Rawls and Habermas bracket Kant’s unsuccessful engagement with affect 
and do so, I claim, at their peril. The rest of the chapter unfolds this claim. The second 
section analyzes how Rawls and Habermas run the risk of impoverishing rational 
deliberation by neglecting the crucial role of affect in the construction of norms. I 
demonstrate that the central mechanism of rational deliberation—Rawls’s “original 
position” and Habermas’s “principle of universalization”—rests on empathic 
imagination, which is impossible without a great deal of affective engagement. The 
third section discusses how Rawls and Habermas try to address the problem of 
motivation and, in doing so, reveal the extent to which the rationalist paradigm does 
rely on certain affective qualities. In spite of this essential reliance, Rawls and 
Habermas simply presume the existence of those performative affects. The last section 
discusses the implications of this presumption. Analyzing Habermas’s early work on 
the bourgeois public sphere as an example, I discuss how the rationalist paradigm’s 
universal, reasonable norms are in fact based on affective qualities produced in 
relation to historically specific social structures and power relations. By failing to 
interrogate the historical and power-laden formation of affect, the rationalist paradigm 
exposes its performative affects to the whim of changing power relations. Moreover, 
the rationalist paradigm’s universal rationalism denies a performative role to any other 
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affects except for its own, thereby suppressing new normative sources of democratic 
politics. As a result, the rationalist paradigm is unable to address, and possibly, if 
unintentionally, complicit with, the situation where people are not disposed to engage 
reasonable norms. 
 
The Rationalist Paradigm and Its Dilemma 
Rawls and Habermas come from quite different intellectual backgrounds, but 
they share a desire to construct a philosophical basis for consensus in a society marked 
by deep and fundamental disagreements. Rawls states that a modern society is 
characterized by a “plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines” 
(which he terms the “fact of reasonable pluralism”) and argues that the major task of 
political philosophy is “to uncover the conditions of the possibility of a reasonable 
public basis of justification on fundamental political questions.”12 Likewise, while 
acknowledging disagreements over the “grammar of forms of life,”13 Habermas 
believes that such disagreements can be “resolved convincingly from the perspective 
of participants on the basis of potential justifications that are equally accessible to all” 
in a “moral language game.”14 What moral philosophy should do, Habermas insists, is 
to “identify the kinds of reasons and interpretations that can lend the moral language 
game sufficient rational force” (IO 8). Thus Rawls and Habermas are on the same 
quest for establishing the rules of the game, so to speak, by which various individuals 
might play democracy, and diverge only when it comes to where those rules should 
                                                 
12 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007 
[1993]), xvi-xvii, xix. Hereafter cited in the text as PL. See also John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 2-5. Hereafter cited in 
the text as JFR. 
13 Jürgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 576, 579.  See also his 
Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, trans. Thomas 
McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 339-403. 
14 Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1998), 4. Hereafter cited in the text as IO.  
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apply. Rawls focuses on political, social, and economic institutions, or the “basic 
structures” of society (PL 11), whereas Habermas is more interested in everyday 
contexts of communication. Seen in this light, it is not entirely surprising that 
Habermas calls his disagreement with Rawls a “family quarrel,” saying that he 
“admire[s] [Rawls’s] project, share[s] its intentions, and regard[s] its essential result as 
correct.”15 Indeed, as I will demonstrate, the theories of Rawls and Habermas mirror 
each other in important respects, and suffer from similar problems. 
In developing their projects, both Rawls and Habermas turn to Kant. Their 
immediate purpose is different. While Rawls aims to challenge utilitarianism as the 
“predominant systematic theory” in moral philosophy,16 Habermas attempts to 
salvage the emancipatory potential of modernity from its radical critics.17 Also, the 
way they appropriate Kant is dissimilar. Rawls relies on what he calls “Kantian 
constructivism”—the idea that the content of justice comes out of a specific procedure 
of construction upon which all can agree.18 Rawls’s famous concept of the “original 
position” by which individuals generate principles of justice is such a constructive 
procedure.19 In contrast, Habermas “reconstructs” Kant’s moral philosophy as a 
“discourse ethics.” Viewing the orientation toward “reaching understanding 
                                                 
15 Jürgen Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason,” in IO 50. This chapter was 
originally published as part of an exchange with Rawls in The Journal of Philosophy 92(3) (1995): 109-
131. 
16 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), vii. Hereafter 
cited in the text as TJ. 
17 For Habermas’s engagement with these critics, see his The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 
trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
18 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” The Journal of Philosophy 77(9) (1980), 
516. Rawls differs from Kant, however, in conceptualizing who constitutes “all.” While Kant 
presupposes a transcendental autonomous subject, Rawls situates “agents of construction” in a 
historically specific context, or more specifically, in a “democratic society under modern conditions.” 
Ibid., 518. This difference is evident in Rawls’s use of “reflective equilibrium” to justify the original 
position. Rawls insists that “the principles which would be chosen [in the original position] match our 
considered convictions of justice” (TJ 19). 
19 Rawls did not explicitly use the term “Kantian constructivism” in A Theory of Justice where the 
concept of the original position was first introduced. But as early as in 1980, he remarked that Kantian 
constructivism could show more clearly the Kantian roots of his theory that he had not examined in A 
Theory of Justice. Ibid., 515. 
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(Verständigung)” and validity claims as central to the communicative practice of 
everyday life, Habermas replaces the Kantian categorical imperative by a procedure of 
moral argumentation.20 Although Rawls and Habermas make a number of significant 
changes to this initial formulation, they maintain the basic structure of their argument, 
especially what they take to be Kant’s most important contribution to moral 
philosophy: a deontological and cognitivist approach to justice. Rawls and Habermas, 
despite their differences, prioritize the right over the good (deontological), and rely 
primarily on reason—supposedly the only cognitive faculty—to draw out and justify 
the content of the right (cognitivist). Naturally, this methodological commitment leads 
them to privilege reason as the ultimate source of the right. Hence the “rationalist 
paradigm.” 
Since Rawls and Habermas rely on Kant’s moral philosophy to develop their 
own theory, an examination of Kant may help to prefigure the problems of the 
rationalist paradigm to be discussed in the following sections. Kant famously defines 
freedom as the ability of practical reason to legislate for oneself and obey universal 
moral laws. It is only through this freedom, he claims, that human beings can initiate a 
course of history that is not predetermined by nature, or in Kant’s terms, effect 
“absolute spontaneity” or “causality through freedom.”21 Reason seeks to bring about 
the “highest good,” in a person as well as in a world, as its final purpose (CPR 137-
142). But the actualization of the highest good poses a difficulty, because the highest 
good is a twofold concept consisting of two “entirely heterogeneous” elements—
virtue/morality (independent of nature) and happiness (relying on nature)—that “very 
                                                 
20 Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lehnhart and S. Weber 
Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 197. Hereafter cited in the text as MCCA. See also 
Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. Ciaran Cronin 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), esp. chaps 1 and 2. Hereafter cited in the text as JA. 
21 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Wener S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
2002), 67-68. Hereafter cited in the text as CPR. 
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much restrict and impair each other in the same subject in order to make this [highest] 
good possible” (CPR 144-145). This creates a serious impasse within Kant’s moral 
philosophy as a whole, insofar as difficulties involved in the attainment of the highest 
good threaten the validity of the moral law that unconditionally commands us to 
pursue that good. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant attempts to resolve this 
impasse by postulating the immortality of soul and the existence of God (CPR 155-
167). These postulates are designed to convince us that, on the one hand, we are 
making an infinite progress toward the highest good and that, on the other, that the 
seemingly chaotic and contingent appearance of nature is actually guided toward the 
highest good by a supreme being. But especially because, as Kant admits, these 
postulates are not cognizable, the problem is not resolved at all but only transferred to 
a different register. If we are unable to discern these postulates, how can we develop 
faith in them? 
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant offers a different solution to this impasse. 
This time Kant tries to “throw a bridge” between the realm of nature and the realm of 
freedom by resorting to aesthetic judgment that allows us to discern and feel pleasure 
in “the beautiful (das Schöne)” exhibiting a certain lawful, moral character of nature—
what he calls “purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit)” of nature.22 Since it is tied to both 
pleasure and morality, aesthetic judgment can connect freedom and nature, morality 
and happiness. As Kant puts it, aesthetic judgment is “neither nature nor freedom, and 
yet is linked with the basis of freedom, the supersensible, in which the theoretical and 
the practical power are in an unknown manner combined and joined into a unity” (CJ 
229). More specifically, aesthetic judgment does this by enabling us to attain 
“attunement (Stimmung)” of our mind to moral duty, the state in which the mind has 
                                                 
22 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Wener S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987), 37, 
45. Hereafter cited in the text as CJ. 
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the “inclination (Neigung) to expand its moral attitude” (CJ 335). Importantly, Kant 
portrays attunement as an essentially affective process that precedes cognition. 
“[A]ttunement does actually take place whenever a given object, by means of senses, 
induces the imagination to its activity of combining the manifold, the imagination in 
turn inducing the understanding to its activity of providing unity for this manifold in 
concepts … the only way this attunement can be determined is by feeling.” 
“Attunement is the subjective condition of cognition, and without it cognition could 
not arise” (CJ 88). Kant seems to suggest, if unaware of its full implications, that 
individuals need to be affectively oriented and attached to specific objects (e.g., 
morality) before they can begin to think and act (the implications of the concept 
Stimmung will be discussed more fully with reference to Heidegger’s 
conceptualization in Chapter 5). 
Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment addresses the impasse of his moral 
philosophy in an insightful way. Still, it is not without difficulties. The major 
difficulty stems from Kant’s claim that aesthetic judgment “must have a subjective 
principle, which determines only by feeling rather than by concepts, though 
nonetheless with universal validity, what is liked or disliked” (CJ 87). But aren’t 
universality and subjectivity, like virtue and happiness, entirely heterogeneous to each 
other? How can we fulfill this rather oxymoronic requirement of subjective 
universality? Kant answers with yet another presupposition that there is a “common 
sense (sensus communis)” that makes the feeling about the beautiful common to 
everyone (CJ 87). Kant’s impasse is then not resolved and transferred, once again, to 
the following question: where does a common sense come from? Facing this question, 
Kant stops theorizing affect on its own terms and collapses the affective to the 
cognitive. In an account that anticipates Rawls’s account of the original position, Kant 
argues that we can create a common sense by performing a simple set of cognitive 
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exercises. “[W]e compare our judgment not so much with the actual as rather with the 
merely possible judgments of others, and [thus] put ourselves in the position of 
everyone else, merely by abstracting from the limitations that [may] happen to attach 
to our own judging; and this in turn we accomplish by leaving out as much as possible 
whatever is matter, i.e., sensation, in the presentational state, and by paying attention 
solely to the formal features of our presentation or of our presentational state” (CJ 
160). But if, as Kant’s own theory suggests, the cognitive is preceded by the affective, 
saying that affects can be generated by cognitive exercises does not really solve the 
problem but only sets in motion an infinite regress: where does a common sense for 
those cognitive exercises come from? 
Although Kant’s theoretical solutions are not satisfactory, he makes 
observations that could help us explore alternative ways of addressing the Kantian 
impasse. To begin, it is important to understand how, exactly, Kant asserts the 
universal validity of aesthetic judgment. His dominant disposition—which may be 
called universalist—is to presume some sort of aesthetic sensibility commonly 
possessed by humanity. Regardless of individual differences, the universalist voice 
tells us, everyone can agree on what is beautiful and what is ugly. This is probably 
why Kant treats the creation of a common sense as a simple matter of cognizing what 
we, deep in our heart, already feel. But at times Kant’s own formulation of the matter 
seems to disrupt this universalist conceptualization. Consider, for example, the 
following remark: “[W]hoever declares something to be beautiful holds that everyone 
ought to give his approval to the object at hand and that he too should declare it 
beautiful. Hence the ought in an aesthetic judgment, even when we have all the data 
needed for judging, is still uttered conditionally. We solicit everyone else’s assent 
because we have a basis for it that is common to all” (CJ 86, emphasis in original). 
Only the very last part of this passage speaks his universalist voice. The rest of it, 
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however, seems to suggest that aesthetic sensibility is something that is less cognized 
than invoked: one “declares” something to be beautiful and “requires” and “solicits” 
other people’s assent, which appears too laborious and redundant of an effort if there 
is already a strong common basis for consensus. Also, if aesthetic sensibility is given, 
it is difficult to understand why the normative claim of aesthetic judgment is always 
indeterminate, that is, why it is “uttered conditionally” even when “we have all the 
data for judging.” Affectively engaged aesthetic experience, it seems, not only invokes 
aesthetic sensibility but, in doing so, generates a new set of data, as it were, for us to 
cognize. Affect seems to claim its presence where Kant tries to deny it, indicating that 
attunement—a precondition for cognition—cannot be attained without also 
dismantling and renegotiating the existing cognitive structure, however universal it 
may seem at a particular point of history. 
Affect seems to make just such a claim in Kant’s discussion of the French 
Revolution. In The Contest of Faculties published in 1798, Kant questions whether the 
human race has been progressing (recall that this is the idea Kant tries to affirm with 
the postulate of the immortal soul in the Critique of Practical Reason), and examines 
the French Revolution as an event that “might suggest that man has the quality of 
power of being the cause and … the author of his own improvement.”23 Interestingly, 
what impresses Kant is not “those momentous deeds or misdeeds of men 
[revolutionaries]” but the “attitudes of the onlookers” that “prove[] that man has a 
moral character.” As he says, “[The French] revolution has aroused in the hearts and 
desires of all spectators who are not themselves caught up in it a sympathy which 
borders almost on enthusiasm, although the very utterance of this sympathy was 
fraught with danger. It cannot therefore have been caused by anything other than a 
                                                 
23 Kant, “Contest of Faculties,” 181, emphasis in original. 
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moral disposition within the human race.”24 Again, only the very last sentence 
reinforces Kant’s universalist view. But if a moral disposition is universal, why is its 
expression so remarkable? Moreover, how can that expression be “a form of 
improvement [of the human race] in itself,” even if “no right-thinking man would ever 
decide to make the same experiment [the French revolution]?”25 
To understand Kant’s curious endorsement of the French revolution, it is 
important to note that he uses the concept “enthusiasm” to describe the sympathy 
aroused by the French revolution. Kant defines enthusiasm as “affect that accompanies 
the idea of the good” (CJ 132). He claims that enthusiasm is “sublime aesthetically” 
and that “the sublime (das Erhabene) must always have reference to our way of 
thinking, i.e., to maxims directed to providing the intellectual [side in us] and our 
rational ideas with supremacy over sensibility” (CJ 132, 134-135). This seems like but 
another manifestation of Kant’s attempt to collapse the affective to the cognitive. But 
“having reference to” is different from being completely subsumed by cognition. 
Indeed, Kant distinguishes the sublime from the beautiful precisely because the 
sublime expands our imagination by violating existing cognitive boundaries. As he 
states, “natural beauty carries with it a purposiveness in its form, by which the object 
seems as it were predetermined for our power of judgment, so that this beauty 
constitutes in itself an object of our liking … [But] if something arouses in us, merely 
in apprehension and without any reasoning on our part, a feeling of the sublime, then it 
may indeed appear … contrapurpose for our power of judgment, incommensurate with 
our power of exhibition, and as it were violent to our imagination” (CJ 99). Whereas 
reflective judgment “finds itself purposively attuned in relation to cognition in general” 
in the case of the beautiful, the liking for the sublime is attached not to specific objects 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 182. 
25 Ibid. 
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but to the “expansion of the imagination itself” (CJ 99, 105, emphasis added). Seen in 
this light, Kant’s passionate response to the French revolution may be interpreted 
differently, pace his own account. According to Kant, ordinary people’s affective 
response to the revolution merely confirms the fact that a moral character already 
exists as a universal entity that can be exploited by reason’s cognitive functions. As 
examined above, this interpretation is unconvincing insofar as it leaves us wondering 
how a mere confirmation of what humanity already possesses can constitute a “form 
of improvement” of the human race. This puzzle can be solved, I submit, only when 
we view our moral character, like aesthetic sensibility, not as a given but as something 
to be indeterminately invoked and permanently expanded. Thus viewed, what Kant 
reports may be one of the significant moments when that indeterminate invocation gets 
responded and the scope and possibility of reason is expanded. 
As we will examine more closely in Chapter 5, my alternative interpretation of 
Kant finds resonances in Arendt’s reading of Kant’s third Critique. For now, my focus 
is to highlight that the Kantian impasse, as it were, is left unresolved because Kant 
failed to develop the insight that affective engagement (re)constitutes the purpose of 
reason and enables people to pursue that purpose even when such a pursuit is “fraught 
with danger.” As we will see in following section, a similar impasse haunts Rawls’s 
and Habermas’s search for reasonable norms of democratic politics, as they repeat 
Kant’s mistake and fail to fully acknowledge the role of affect in the construction and 
realization of norms. Like Kant, Rawls and Habermas are drawn almost inexorably to 
the realm of affect in the end, but their reluctance to theorize affect on its own terms 
perpetuates their predecessor’s dilemma. 
 
Affect in Norm Justification 
 46 
Rawls and Habermas build their theory of democracy around a procedure by 
which diverse people could undertake rational deliberation and come to an agreement 
on important moral and political issues. As noted above, in this procedure the right 
takes priority over the good, and reason over affect. Is this strict prioritization really 
necessary to establishing norms of democratic society, as Rawls and Habermas 
propose? Is it, more fundamentally, sustainable? 
Rawls understands the good in terms of interest in its broad sense (“plans of 
life”), which is something that rational people “want” (TJ 407-408). Thus the good is 
closely associated with affect he variably calls propensities, inclinations, desires, or 
aspirations. Rawls cannot exclude affect entirely from his theory, because he needs 
“assumptions about the parties’ motives in the original position” (TJ 396). But for 
Rawls affect is something to be regulated and contained by the right. As he puts it, 
“the principles of right … impose restrictions on what are reasonable conceptions of 
one’s good … [people’s] desires and aspirations are restricted from the outset” (TJ 31). 
This theoretical disposition is manifested most clearly in the conceptual center 
of Rawls’s theory—the “original position.” The original position refers to the initial 
situation where people choose the basic principles of justice. Rawls characterizes this 
initial choice environment by two distinctive features. First, people make their choices 
behind a “veil of ignorance”: “no one knows his place in society, his class position or 
social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets 
and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like … [T]he parties do not [even] 
know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities” (TJ 12, 
137). Second, the parties to the original position are “rational.” As Rawls states, those 
in the original positions are “rational and mutually disinterested.” This does not mean 
that they are egoists, but they are “concerned to advance their interests” (TJ 118) and 
“take no interest in one another’s interests” (TJ 127). Here the concept of “rationality” 
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is interpreted narrowly as that standard in economic theory, that is, as instrumental 
rationality that “tak[es] the most effective means to given ends” (TJ 14). Together, 
these assumptions are intended to purge the original position of sentiments such as 
impartiality, sympathy, or benevolence, because these affective states are “so complex 
that no definite theory at all can be worked out” (TJ 148). To attain “a kind of moral 
geometry with all the rigor” (TJ 121), Rawls argues, we must “assume as little as 
possible” and “not presuppose … extensive ties of natural sentiments” (TJ 129). 
However, Rawls’s explicitly rationalist formulation of the original position 
seems to be disrupted by its own requirement. The major problem arises from a 
tension between the two features of the original position. Recall that Rawls’s 
individuals are “rational” in the sense that they desire the good (plans of life) and 
figure out the most effective way to realize it. Rawls treats the affective attachment to 
the good simply as a matter of motivation. But what he fails to notice is how affect 
helps constitute a perspectival universe that must preexist for the reasoning to take 
place. Reasoning presupposes a stable universe that provides the boundaries as well as 
the objects of our perception. To reason, people must create the perspectival universe 
by affectively engaging with the particular good; otherwise, they cannot even begin to 
reason, because there is nothing to reason about. Now the veil of ignorance deprives 
the “rational agents” of all the information, making it impossible to make out even a 
minimal shape of their life plans. How can one fathom one’s plan of life with virtually 
no knowledge about herself? To the extent that this is not a feasible task, and that we 
presuppose life plans as the only good for rational individuals as Rawls does, the veil 
of ignorance effectively prevents the formation of the perspectival universe and thus 
the working of reason. It is, then, hard to see how those in the original position can 
choose anything, let alone principles of justice. 
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This impasse takes Rawls’s rationalist theory in an unexpected direction. For 
example, consider Rawls’s following remark: “[T]he combination of mutual 
disinterest and the veil of ignorance achieves the same purpose as benevolence. For 
this combination of conditions forces each person in the original position to take the 
good of others into account” (TJ 148; see also 187). Here, Rawls does not deny the 
status of benevolence, sympathy, or compassion as a possible source of justice. He 
simply sees no reason to rely on those affective qualities, because he is confident that 
his rationalist model can achieve the same effect. But if, as I have shown, the 
combination of rationality and the veil of ignorance fails to achieve the intended effect 
and instead results in an impasse, Rawls might have to rely on affect to establish 
principles of justice (or as he calls it, “justice as fairness”). 
In fact, Rawls’s modification of the rationality requirement in his later works 
suggests that he might indeed be drawn to affect, if reluctantly. Admitting that his 
attempt to derive the content of justice from instrumental rationality is a “very 
misleading” error,26 Rawls comes up with a notion of “the reasonable” which is 
defined as the “read[iness] to propose principles and standards as fair terms of 
cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will 
likewise do so” (JFR 6-7; PL 49). He writes that the reasonable and the rational “work 
in tandem” as independent and complementary ideas (PL 52), but “the reasonable has 
priority over the rational and subordinates it absolutely” (JFR 81-82). So those in the 
original position are now both reasonable and rational, and while they still desire their 
life plans, they care even more about social cooperation. The key aspect of this 
revision is that social cooperation is presented as the good to which people already 
have affective attachments. At one point, Rawls himself invokes the language of affect 
                                                 
26 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political, not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14(3) 
(1985), 237n20. Rawls already comes up with a distinction between the reasonable and the rational in 
his 1980 lecture. See “Kantian Constructivism,” 530. 
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to distinguish the reasonable from the rational. “What rational agents lack is the 
particular form of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage in fair 
cooperation as such” (PL 51, emphasis added). Ultimately, however, Rawls stops short 
of explicitly theorizing the affective dimension of the reasonable. He argues that the 
reasonable parallels Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative (JFR 81), and 
detaches the reasonable from impartiality that he associates with sympathy and 
altruism (PL 50). 
But Rawls’s revision makes it difficult to avoid the complex realm of affect. 
On his revised account, people deliberate primarily to propose fair terms of 
cooperation rather than to realize their individual life plans. While rational individuals 
need to think only about their own good, reasonable people have to consider the good 
of others as well to understand what others would deem fair. Seen in this light, the veil 
of ignorance takes on a different meaning. It is no longer a simple device constraining 
the information of one person, but a demand for people to reflect upon what might be 
fair or unfair from the perspective of everyone who variably lacks socioeconomic 
attributes such as religious freedom, privileged economic position, respectable social 
status, education, and so forth. This demand, then, can hardly be met by reasoning 
alone, as Rawls seems to believe. Rather, reasonable people must be able to empathize 
with what it feels like not to have all those characteristics. In other words, they need to 
imagine a concrete person who is disadvantaged with regard to, say, social status, 
reflect on fairness from that person’s viewpoint, and then do the same with all 
imaginable persons. As Susan Moller Okin puts it, the original position requires 
reasonable people to “think from the position of everybody, in the sense of each in 
turn.” What all this amounts to is a great deal of empathic imagination that requires 
serious affective engagement. “The original position requires that, as moral subjects, 
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we consider the identities, aims, and attachments of every other person, however 
different they may be from ourselves, as of equal concern with our own.”27 
Although Habermas is quite critical of parts of Rawls’s theory, a set of 
common assumptions underlie Habermas’s own rationalist theory of democracy. Like 
Rawls, Habermas constructs a strict distinction between the good and the right, or as 
he sometimes calls it, between the ethical point of view associated with personal 
value-orientations and the moral point of view concerning universal obligations (IO 
26). In fact, Habermas is even more rigid about this distinction than Rawls. Claiming 
that Rawls is mistaken to draw on people’s sense of and desire for the good in 
establishing the right, Habermas proposes a complete “uncoupling” of the right and 
the good, and insists on the absolute priority of the right over the good as the 
precondition for impartiality (IO 28). He recommends that the procedure of norm 
justification be constructed “in a more strictly procedural manner” (IO 57). For 
Habermas (as for Rawls), affect is bound to “contingent determinations” such as 
“preexisting interests and context-dependent value-orientations,” and need to be 
“assimilate[d] … to practical reason itself” to establish the categorical validity of 
moral obligations (IO 32). 
Habermas aims to construct a pure procedural model of norm justification, not 
just because it is more consistent with Kantian ethics but because he thinks that 
Rawls’s theory has undemocratic implications. Habermas criticizes Rawls for trying to 
achieve impartiality by his expert design, not by the actual contributions of 
participants in moral argumentation (MCCA 66). Rawls, Habermas charges, “imposes 
a common perspective on the parties in the original position through informational 
constraints and thereby neutralizes the multiplicity of particular interpretive 
                                                 
27 Susan Moller Okin, “Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice,” Ethics 99(2) (1989), 244, 246, 
emphasis in original. 
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perspectives from the outset” (IO 57). According to Habermas, fundamental issues of 
democratic society “cannot be handled monologically but require a cooperative effort” 
(MCCA 67). Based on this belief, Habermas attempts to show how people’s “multiple 
interpretive perspectives” could converge without substantive constraints such as the 
veil of ignorance. But Habermas’s discourse ethics does regulate moral argumentation 
with its own two cardinal principles. The first is the principle of discourse ethics: 
“Only those norms can claim to be valid that could meet with the acceptance of all 
concerned in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse” (IO 41). This 
principle clearly places a strong emphasis on reason and its cognitive function, 
because one’s beliefs and proposals must be presented and understood in rational 
terms to pass a validity test. As Habermas writes, the principle of discourse ethics 
“already presupposes that we can justify our choice of a norm” (MCCA 66, emphasis 
in original). 
However, this rationalist overtone is complicated when we examine more 
carefully what constitutes the “acceptance of all concerned.” This point is specified by 
the second principle of discourse ethics—the principle of universalization: “A norm is 
valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for 
the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all 
concerned without coercion” (IO 42, emphasis in original). This formulation quite 
explicitly states that an opinion must appeal to people’s idea of the good, and by 
implication affect associated with the good, to elicit people’s acceptance. The 
universalization principle, then, seems to call for something quite similar to what I 
have identified as an implicit requirement of Rawls’s original position: to be able to 
propose an acceptable opinion, participants in the norm justification process must 
empathize with everyone else’s position. Habermas himself seems to acknowledge this: 
“[T]he reflexive application of the universalization test calls for a form of deliberation 
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in which each participant is compelled to adopt the perspective of all others in order to 
examine whether a norm could be willed by all from the perspective of each person” 
(IO 33, emphasis in original). But like Rawls, Habermas does not acknowledge affect 
as an independent source of normativity. To be included in the process of norm 
justification, affect must be translated (i.e., transformed) into epistemic terms 
accessible to reason. “Pragmatic and ethical reasons … also play a role in these 
deliberations … but these agent-relative reasons no longer count as rational motives 
and value-orientations of individual persons but as epistemic contributions to a 
discourse in which norms are examined with the aim of reaching a communicative 
agreement” (IO 31, emphasis in original). 
We have seen how the exclusion of affect in Rawls’s and Habermas’s theory 
causes trouble for the functioning of rational deliberation. This discussion casts 
serious doubts on the view that democracy could produce binding norms without 
engaging affect; affect is involved too deeply in the working of reason to be ignored. 
Without the support of affect, reason cannot establish the goals to pursue, assign 
values and priorities to different yet equally reasonable alternatives, or reflect from 
other people’s point of view. But even when affect demands its presence at the heart of 
their theory, Rawls and Habermas are reluctant to include it in the process of norm 
justification. There is something curious about their almost nervous reluctance, 
because at times Rawls and Habermas use the concept of reason quite capaciously as if 
it already includes some affective qualities. In fact, a closer examination reveals that 
affect is not refused wholesale but presumed in the theory of Rawls and Habermas. Let 
us take up this issue in the following section. 
 
Affect and the Problem of Motivation 
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While Rawls and Habermas insist that norm justification be “affectless,” they 
realize that reason alone cannot explain why people would participate in rational 
deliberation. In other words, they realize that the rationalist paradigm might suffer 
from a motivational deficit. How can we solicit people’s allegiance and commitment 
to the process of rational deliberation, especially when “the people” is a constantly 
changing entity? As I will show, Rawls and Habermas fail to provide a theoretically 
convincing response to this question, but importantly, their unsuccessful endeavor 
reveals the extent to which their theory is built on a set of untested assumptions. 
Rawls brings up the issue of motivation to deal with the question of stability. 
He believes that even if the principles of justice are chosen in the original position, 
whether those principles can endure over time is a separate issue that needs 
justification. “One conception of justice is more stable than another … if the sense of 
justice that it tends to generate is stronger and more likely to override disruptive 
inclinations … However attractive a conception of justice might be on other grounds, 
it is seriously defective if the principles of moral psychology are such that it fails to 
engender in human beings the requisite desire to act upon it” (TJ 454-455, emphasis 
added). To show that his conception of justice “generates its own support” and that “it 
is likely to have greater stability than the traditional alternatives” (TJ 456), Rawls 
sketches various stages of moral development through which a person would acquire 
what he calls a “sense of justice” (and later a “conception-dependent desire,” PL 83-
84)—“a desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice” (TJ 474, emphasis 
added). Rawls’s account of moral psychology is itself highly controversial,28 but what 
                                                 
28 Although Rawls argues that his moral psychology does not have to be supported by psychology, he 
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Stages and the Idea of Justice (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981); Carol Gilligan, In a Different 
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is more relevant to my discussion is the way in which Rawls works affect into his 
theory. 
It is to be stressed that Rawls’s discussion of affect is introduced only to show 
how the principles of justice might reproduce themselves once they are chosen in the 
original position.29 Rawls’s flirtation with moral psychology is a way of speculating a 
socialization process that makes this reproduction possible by incorporating the 
principles of justice into one’s system of desire. Any reproductive mechanism requires 
an object of reproduction, and Rawls’s hypothetical socialization, too, presupposes a 
“well-ordered society” that is already guided by the principles of justice. In other 
words, Rawls posits that the establishment of the principles of justice precedes the 
sense of justice. Puzzlingly, however, Rawls also asserts that his theory of justice is a 
“theory of our moral sentiments” (TJ 51, 120) and “describe[s] our sense of justice” 
(TJ 48) when he discusses the establishment of the principles of justice, indicating that 
people’s sense of justice already exists. Rawls’s argument, then, is circular: people 
need the principles of justice to cultivate a sense of justice, but the principles of justice 
cannot be established without an already existing sense of justice. 
Of course, for Rawls this is not a puzzle because there is this “already existing 
sense of justice” (this may be considered the performative affect that is involved in the 
initial establishment of the rationalist paradigm’s norms). But notably, this 
performative affect is afforded from outside his theory. For example, consider Rawls’s 
remark in A Theory of Justice: “Let us assume that each person beyond a certain age 
and possessed by the requisite intellectual capacity develops a sense of justice under 
                                                                                                                                            
Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1982). As I will discuss presently, Habermas too relies on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development. 
29 Recent studies discover sentimentalist elements in Rawls’s theory. But they often fail to recognize 
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normal social circumstances” (TJ 46, emphasis added). What are these “normal social 
circumstances?” How do those circumstances lead to the development of the sense of 
justice? Rawls remains silent; as he says, he assumes.  
Rawls himself finds this assumption dissatisfactory. In fact, he says that all the 
important revisions he makes in Political Liberalism stem from his attempt to address 
this problem (PL xv-xvi). Rawls finds his treatment of stability in A Theory of Justice 
“unrealistic,” because given the “fact of reasonable pluralism” one cannot expect 
people to endorse the principles of justice presented as a “comprehensive” doctrine 
rooted in truth claims (PL xv-xvii). Rawls now understands justice as fairness as a 
“political conception of justice,” which is “freestanding” from all the comprehensive 
doctrines (PL 12). Thus revised, justice as fairness requires an additional basis for 
stability. Because citizens are likely to have different comprehensive doctrines even 
when they are successfully socialized in a well-ordered society to embody a sense of 
justice, it is necessary to show that the principles of justice can be the focus of an 
“overlapping consensus” of those doctrines (PL 141). Rawls argues this overlapping 
consensus is possible because, despite all the other irreconcilable differences, those 
living in a democratic society retain some common sense of justice, which, again, he 
assumes to exist in what he calls “public political culture.” 
 
“Since we seek an agreed basis of public justification in matters of justice, 
and since no political agreement on those disputed questions can reasonably 
be expected, we turn instead to the fundamental ideas we seem to share 
through the public political culture. From these ideas we try to work out a 
political conception of justice congruent with our considered convictions on 
due reflection. Once this is done, citizens may within their comprehensive 
doctrines regard the political conception of justice as true, or as reasonable, 
whatever their view allows” (PL 150-151, emphasis added; see also 97, 100-
101). 
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At this point, Rawls’s theory seems to take a decisive historical turn. The principles of 
justice, Rawls now says, are produced not by abstract rational agents who freely use 
the original position as a device of representation but by actual people who are deeply 
embedded in the public political culture comprising “the political institutions of a 
constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation (including those 
of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common knowledge” 
(PL 13-14). Of course, Rawls does not argue that the public political culture is 
completely homogenous or common to all members of a society. “It is inevitable and 
often desirable that citizens have different views as to the most appropriate political 
conception; for the public political culture is bound to contain different fundamental 
ideas that can be developed in different ways. An orderly contest between them over 
time is a reliable way to find which one, if any, is most reasonable” (PL 227). But 
despite Rawls’s claim that the public political culture is open to democratic 
contestation, the actual scope of that openness is dubious. Consider that Rawls makes 
a point of an “orderly contest,” by which he means that the contest between different 
fundamental ideas within the public political culture must be regulated by what he 
calls “public reason.” “The ideal of public reason is that citizens are to conduct their 
fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regards as a political 
conception of justice” (PL 226). But the political conception of justice, as Rawls 
explains in the passage cited above, is drawn from the existing public political culture. 
Upon this formulation, then, the rules of contestation seriously disadvantage, if not 
foreclose, a future public political culture in favor of a present one. 
Revisiting this issue a few years later, Rawls assures that political liberalism 
“does not try to fix public reason once and for all in the form of one favored political 
conception of justice.” He argues it is “important” that “new variations” of public 
reason are “proposed from time to time and older ones may cease to be represented,” 
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because “otherwise the claims of groups or interests arising from social change might 
be repressed and fail to gain their appropriate political voice.”30 But even this more 
democratic move comes with the “proviso.” “[R]easonable comprehensive doctrines, 
religious and nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, 
provided that in due course proper political reasons … are presented.” Rawls realizes 
that his account of the proviso invites vexing questions (e.g., what does “in due course” 
mean?), but he says that those questions must be “worked out in practice.” And “[h]ow 
they work out,” Rawls remarks, “is determined by the nature of the public political 
culture.”31 Thus Rawls’ “proviso,” while intending to make the concept of public 
reason more inclusive, does little in the way of changing the structure of that inclusion. 
To be included, comprehensive doctrines must conform to the rules premised on the 
existing public political culture. When the rules themselves are not up for contestation, 
the fact that the participants could take some time to figure out how to conform to 
those rules is hardly a consolation. Insofar as he uncritically accepts people’s affective 
attachment to certain ideas (and aversion to others) as it is, Rawls, despite his 
historical turn, still fails to ask more fundamental questions: how do people come to 
develop their affective relationship with the ideas constituting the existing public 
political culture? How is the selection of those ideas influenced by historically specific 
institutions, norms, and practices? Is that influence normatively justifiable or not? 
Although Habermas wants to keep his theory procedural and let the 
participants in the ideal speech situation decide the substance of norms, he also views 
the justification and application of norms as separate matters (as Rawls makes a 
distinction between the production and the reproduction of norms), and considers 
affect only with regard to the latter. But the problem of a motivational deficit is felt 
                                                 
30 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in PL 451-452. 
31 Ibid., 462. 
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even more acutely in Habermas’s theory, because he attempts to divorce the right 
entirely from the good in the process of norm justification. Habermas himself is aware 
of this difficulty. “[U]ncoupling morality from the questions of the good life leads to a 
motivational deficit. Because there is no profane substitute for the hope of personal 
salvation, we lose the strongest motive for obeying moral commands. Discourse ethics 
intensifies the intellectualistic separation of moral judgment from action even further 
by locating the moral point of view in rational discourse. There is no direct route from 
discursively achieved consensus to action” (IO 35; see also JA 75-76, 119-120). While 
good reasons—what our moral judgments tell us to do—can certainly stimulate our 
will to a certain extent (IO 35), Habermas finds it too weak as a motivating force. So 
he proposes an alternative, and it is remarkably similar to Rawls’s initial idea. “The … 
gap between moral judgments and moral actions needs to be compensated for by a 
system of internal behavior controls that is triggered by principled moral judgments 
(convictions that form the basis for motivations) ... [This is made possible] only by the 
complete internalization of a few highly abstract and universal principles that, as 
discourse ethics shows, follow logically from the procedure of norm justification” 
(MCCA 183).32 
Eventually, Habermas finds this “psychological” response to the motivational 
problem unsatisfying, and undertakes a rather dramatic modification. In his later major 
work, Between Facts and Norms, Habermas argues that discourse ethics alone can no 
longer serve as the basis of social integration in “modern societies” characterized by 
pluralization, individualization, and social differentiation, because the “functionally 
necessary spheres of strategic interaction” increasingly overwhelm the “integrating 
                                                 
32 See also Jürgen Habermas, “Individuation through Socialization: On George Herbert Mead’s Theory 
of Subjectivity,” in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1992 [1988]), 149-204. 
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capacity of communicative action.”33 This realization leads Habermas to turn to 
positive law for additional support.34 “A morality that depends on the accommodating 
substrate of propitious personality structures would have a limited effectiveness if it 
could not engage the actor’s motives in another way besides internalization, that is, 
precisely by way of an institutionalized legal system that supplements 
postconventional morality in a manner effective for action” (BFN 114, emphasis in 
original). The law is defined not simply by its coercive power but by normative 
validity as well, and must receive the endorsement of people who engage in 
communicative action.35 
However, there is a difficulty with this revised account of motivation, because 
Habermas now finds the normative authority of communicative action not in actual 
moral argumentation but in the impersonal, anonymous, “subjectless” flow of 
communication, the realization of which presupposes legal institutions. As he writes, 
“the success of deliberative politics depends not on a collectively acting citizenry but 
on the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of 
communication, as well as on the interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes 
with informally developed public opinion” (BFN 298, emphasis added). Habermas, 
then, faces a similar dilemma that troubles Rawls: we need the legal institutions’ 
motivating force to produce just norms, but legal institutions cannot fulfill that 
                                                 
33 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 25-26. Hereafter cited in the text as BFN. 
34 Habermas looks for an additional support, so he does not abandon the “psychological approach.” In 
his later works, Habermas develops the notion of “constitutional patriotism” that constitutes the 
background of the legal system as a supportive spirit. For Habermas’s account, see his “Citizenship and 
National Identity,” in BFN 491-515 and “The Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic State,” in IO 
203-236. For discussion, see Attracta Ingram, “Constitutional Patriotism,” Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 22(6) (1999): 1-18; Patchen Markell, “Making Affect Safe for Democracy? On 
‘Constitutional Patriotism,’” Political Theory 28(1) (2000): 38-63. 
35 Habermas terms this endorsement process “discursive rationalization,” placing it between the liberal 
notion of “legitimation” and the republican notion of the “constitution of power” (BFN 300). For 
Habermas’s discussion of the interdependence of law and democracy, see also “On the Internal Relation 
between the Rule of Law and Democracy,” in IO 253-264. 
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function unless those norms are already produced by us.36 Within his theoretical 
framework, Habermas, like Rawls, is unable to account for the performative affect that 
helps initiate this hopefully virtuous circle of law and democracy. 
In response to this potential “infinite regress,” Habermas argues that 
constitutional democracy is a “tradition-building project with a clearly marked 
beginning in time”: 
 
“All the later generations have the task of actualizing the still-untapped 
normative substance of the system of rights laid down in the original 
document of the constitution … The descendants can learn from past 
mistakes only if they are “in the same boat” as their forebears. They must 
impute to all the previous generations the same intention of creating and 
expanding the bases for a voluntary association of citizens who make their 
own laws. All participants must be able to recognize the project as the same 
throughout history and to judge it from the same perspective … The unifying 
bond thus consists of the shared practice to which we have recourse.”37 
 
So for Habermas, too, the rationalist paradigm’s performative affect is located outside 
his theory and in the presumed and uncritically accepted historical claim—the 
“unifying bond” of past and present generations directed toward the original document 
of the constitution. While revealing how fundamentally the rationalist paradigm relies 
on the affectively engaged practice tied to historical particularities, Habermas fails to 
interrogate the politically charged formation and maintenance of this originary practice. 
                                                 
36 Frank Michelman points out this problem. “[If] a validity-conferring procedure of democratic 
examination of laws must be one “that is itself legally constituted” … and if it takes a legally 
constituted democratic procedure to bring forth valid fundamental laws, then the (valid) laws that frame 
this lawmaking event must themselves be the product of a conceptually prior procedural event that was 
itself framed by (valid) laws that must, as such, have issued in their turn from a still prior (properly) 
legally constituted event. And so on, it would appear, without end.” Frank Michelman, “How Can the 
People Ever Make the Laws? A Critique of Deliberative Democracy,” in Deliberative Democracy: 
Essays on Reason and Politics, eds. James Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1997), 164, emphasis in original. 
37 Jürgen Habermas, “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?” 
Political Theory 29(6) (2001), 774-775, emphasis in original. 
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In addressing the problem of motivation, both Rawls and Habermas pay some 
attention to affect. They try, and fail, to confine affect within the reproductive 
mechanism of norms already established by reason. In doing so, however, they reveal 
that affect is involved not just in the reproduction but also in the initial production of 
norms—the process that Rawls and Haberams are at pains to keep reasonable. They 
acknowledge, in short, that affect is not only reproductive but performative. Also 
acknowledged is the fact that affect is historically and contextually situated. But 
ultimately, Rawls and Habermas fail to bring this acknowledgement into a full 
theoretical articulation as they presume, rather than theorize, the existence of the 
rationalist paradigm’s performative affect. This theoretical shortcoming generates 
serious political problems, to which we now turn. 
 
Acquiescent Democracy? 
As discussed in the previous section, the rationalist paradigm does not simply 
ignore affect but assumes the existence of certain affective qualities. By bracketing the 
question of power relations involved in the formation and maintenance of those 
performative affects, the rationalist paradigm obscures, if not conceals, the possibility 
that the fostering of its performative affects might come at the cost of marginalizing 
other performative affects. And the rationalist paradigm is complicit with that 
marginalization at its own peril because, recall, its performative affects must be 
afforded from the outside, the dynamics of which it can neither control nor predict 
fully. Suppose that the institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural conditions are 
changed so as to undermine the performative affects on which the rationalist paradigm 
has been depending. The rationalist paradigm, then, might have to look for other 
performative affects that could establish and sustain another form of rational 
deliberation. But hasn’t the rationalist paradigm been repressing the development of 
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precisely those other performative affects? The meaning of this irony will become 
clearer, I hope, when we examine the transformation of democracy in the postwar 
period in the following chapters. For now, let us anticipate that discussion by looking 
at one case that sheds light on the formation of the rationalist paradigm’s performative 
affects: Habermas’s account of the bourgeois public in The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere.38 
In this early work originally published in 1962, Habermas traces how the 
meaning of publicness was transformed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
from a system of displaying state power to the coming together of “private persons” to 
discuss “common concerns.” Once the public was thus claimed by private individuals 
or “civil society,” it began to function as an opponent and a critic of the political 
authority (STPS 23). This transformative process is significant for Habermas because 
of the way in which this new public confronted political authority. As he states, “The 
medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: 
people’s public use of their reason” (STPS 27). Incomplete as it was, the bourgeois 
public provided its participants with a parity based solely on the “authority of the 
better argument,” challenged the conventional knowledge given by church or state 
authorities, and was in principle inclusive (STPS 36-37). It is here that Habermas first 
discovers the inchoate form of rational deliberation that is later abstracted into his 
discourse ethics. Thus, going back to Habermas’s historical treatment of rational 
deliberation would allow us to bring to light some of the assumptions only implicit in 
his more abstract theorization of discourse ethics. 
                                                 
38 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: A Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). 
Hereafter cited in the text as STPS. The “public sphere” is a somewhat misleading translation, because 
it conveys a spatializing image that the German Öffentlichkeit does not have. Here I use the term 
“publicness,” or simply “the public.” 
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In contrast to the transhistorical tendency manifested in his later works, 
Habermas is keenly aware in Structural Transformation that the bourgeois public 
could realize the ideal of rational deliberation (partially and incompletely) only in a 
particular “historical constellation” (STPS xviii). For example, the development of 
commercial capitalism was crucial, as it not only shifted the focus of the economy 
from the state (as well as from the household) to “private persons,” but also 
necessitated various communication systems, which accelerated the formation of 
private persons as “the public” (STPS 14-26). Habermas also emphasizes the 
institutional setting for critical discourse such as coffeehouses, reading societies, and 
concert halls, the development of the family as the incubator of private autonomy, and 
the rise of art, music, and literature that informed people’s judgment. But in the end, 
Habermas is not telling a happy story. In the second half of Structural Transformation, 
he analyzes how the bourgeois public disintegrated as capitalism transitioned from the 
competitive to the organized phase, the interventionist state grew in its power and 
came to control social interactions, and the public was increasingly captured and even 
manufactured by consumerism and the mass media. It is probably due to his 
realization of this historical demise of the bourgeois public that Habermas later 
focuses on refining the normative ideal of rational deliberation without much historical 
footing. But as we have seen, a completely idealized rationalist model is not 
sustainable because a production of norms must rely on some performative affect, the 
formation of which is historically situated. The attempt to remove affectivity and 
historicity from rational deliberation undermines the emancipatory potential of reason 
at its roots.39 
                                                 
39 In this respect, I think Habermas simplifies the stakes of his predecessors’ project. In my view, 
Horkheimer and Adorno are concerned less about reason’s immanent illness than about the 
deterioration of its working environment—the affective, experiential, and sensory dimension of human 
life. Habermas’s misplaced criticism seems to stem from his hostility toward the attempts to 
conceptualize imagination as part of human faculty (e.g., aesthetics). However, Habermas’s dichotomy 
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Habermas’s account in Structural Transformation helps us uncover the 
historicity of rational deliberation, because there the participants—the bourgeois 
public of the seventeenth and eighteenth century—consisted of a specific group of 
people embedded in particular institutions, norms, and practices. In this context, the 
formation of the rationalist paradigm’s performative affect (i.e., affective attachment 
to rational deliberation) was intertwined with the construction of a new political 
subjectivity. We might characterize this subjectivity as “liberal” for its double 
skepticism toward the absolutist state as well as the masses. Liberal subjectivity was 
born in a time of great uncertainty. The emerging ideal of popular sovereignty was 
transforming a hierarchic society into a horizontal field of numerous and 
heterogeneous individuals, namely, “the people.” But at the same time, the people was 
often identified with “the masses” due to its unlimited, unspecified, amorphous nature, 
and was feared and despised for its unpredictability, vulgarity, and violence. It is at 
this juncture that liberal subjects emerged to assume, and assign a new meaning to, the 
elusive category of the people. 
Habermas is aware that the eighteenth century manifestation of rational 
deliberation was tied to the interest of a specific class. But according to him, the ideal 
of rational deliberation is “more than mere ideology” because of its intrinsic openness 
and its basic tendency to dissolve domination by reason (STPS 88).40 In other words, 
for Habermas the problem lies in the content, not the form, of rational deliberation. 
                                                                                                                                            
of the rational and the aesthetic is not just a mischaracterization of Adorno but a break from the German 
Enlightenment tradition in general. As Robert Hullot-Kentor points out, “The division between reason 
and the aesthetic, which Habermas seeks to establish in Adorno’s work, is a division drawn and insisted 
upon by Habermas, not by Adorno. Paradoxically, by insisting on this division Habermas separates 
himself from the Enlightenment tradition. For throughout the German Enlightenment, and especially 
since Kant, the defense of reason has been conceived not just as inseparable from but ultimately as 
dependent on the aesthetic.” Robert Hullot-Kentor, Things Beyond Resemblance: Collected Essays on 
Theodor W. Adorno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 32. 
40 Habermas repeated the same line of argument in his retrospective reflection on this issue, while 
admitting that in Structural Transformation he underestimated the exclusionary nature of the public 
sphere. Jürgen Habermas, “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,” in Habermas and the Public 
Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 425-430. 
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True, Habermas would readily agree, we need to take into account the interests of 
women and the plebian class, but only by extending the scope of rational deliberation. 
This view, however, fails to address the problem in its entirety, as it ignores how 
rational deliberation mobilized the bourgeois public by articulating its performative 
affect, and by the same token, demobilized other forms of publicness by marginalizing 
their performative affects. 
To illustrate this matter, let us put more pressure on some of the points that 
Habermas notes only in passing. For example, Habermas mentions that the “autonomy 
of private people” was “founded on the right to property … [and] realized in the 
participation in a market economy” (STPS 46). That the bourgeoisie had vested 
interest in the market gives clue to their eagerness to establish “rational deliberation” 
as the defining feature of publicness. Considering that at that time the biggest threat to 
the profiting in the market was perceived to be the “capricious ambition of kings and 
ministers,” to borrow Adam Smith’s phrase,41 we might view rational deliberation as 
a means to ensure constancy and predictability of political rule. Seen in this light, it is 
too quick to conclude, as Habermas does, that rational deliberation has the potential to 
dissolve all forms of domination (STPS 88). For if the bourgeois public wanted to 
subject domination to the standards of “reason” and “law” (STPS 28), they had a very 
specific kind of domination in mind: the arbitrary intervention in the market 
mechanism. 
But the very same desire for stability and order spawned a fear of the working 
class. The bourgeoisie was threatened by the sensual and desperate quality of workers’ 
political action stemming from their lived experience of violence and exploitation. 
This feeling seems to be captured in the following remark made in the aftermath of 
June 1848: “Isolated from the nation, placed outside the social and political 
                                                 
41 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Modern Library, 2000), 460. 
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community, alone with their concerns and their misery, [the workers] are acting in 
order to leave that terrible solitude, and, just like the barbarians with whom they are 
often compared, they perhaps contemplate an invasion.”42 In this context, elevating 
rational deliberation as the only form of publicness had the effect of banishing strikes, 
factory occupation, or mass protest from the realm of legitimate political action.43 
Moreover, Habermas intimates that the critical and reciprocal dimension of the 
bourgeois public depended on the “private” source. “The public’s understanding of the 
public use of reason was guided specifically by such private experiences as grew out 
of the audience-oriented (publikumsbezogen) subjectivity of the conjugal family’s 
intimate domain (Intimsphäre)” (STPS 28). Here the public-private relation Habermas 
glances over points to the event constitutive of the bourgeois public: the construction 
of the private-feminine sphere. In fact, the idea that rational deliberation occurring in 
public is to be guided by sentiments cultivated in the family seems to come almost 
directly from the text of Rousseau who, of course, most notoriously melds women and 
the private sphere together.44 With his full rhetorical force, Rousseau was indeed 
engaged in a construction, because as Joan Landes observes, women under the Ancien 
Régime did have a limited yet significant public presence. According to Landes, it was 
only during the course of the French Revolution that the private-feminine sphere got 
                                                 
42 The remark comes from Eugène Sue’s Les Mystères de Paris (1851). Quoted in Stefan Jonsson, “The 
Invention of the Masses: The Crowd in French Culture from the Revolution to the Commune,” in 
Crowds, eds. Jeffrey T. Schnapp and Matthew Tiews (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 
65. 
43 For classic accounts of these alternative forms of political action, see E. P. Thompson, The Making of 
the English Working Class (New York: Pantheon, 1964 [1963]); Christopher Hill, The World Turned 
Upside Down (London: Temple Smith, 1972). See also Charles Tilly, Popular Contestation in Great 
Britain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
44 For a discussion of this aspect of Rousseau’s philosophy, see Nicole Ferman, Domesticating 
Passions: Rousseau, Woman, and Nation (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1997); Penny 
A. Weiss, Gendered Community: Rousseau, Sex, and Politics (New York: New York University Press, 
1993); and Linda M. G. Zerilli, Signifying Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke, and Mill 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
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stabilized and institutionalized.45 And the practice of rational deliberation played a 
crucial role in this process. Just as the elevation of calm and rational deliberation 
marginalized more physical and direct modes of political action, the emphasis on 
clarity and universality served to delegitimize elite women’s allegorical, stylistic, and 
particularistic modes of articulation as public discourse. Again, it was the form, not 
just the content, of rational deliberation that displaced other modes of publicness. 
“[T]he secret power of bourgeois formalist and universalist rhetoric may be seen to 
derive from the way it promised to empty out the feminine connotations (and 
ultimately, the women as well) of absolutist public life.”46 
What all this suggests is that rational deliberation as manifested in the 
eighteenth century bourgeois public was essentially an affectively engaged articulation 
of the particularities associated with the white male bourgeoisie.47 Of course, this 
does not exhaust the normative potential of the ideal of rational deliberation. But it 
does call our attention to affectivity and particularity inexorably involved in any 
realization of an ideal. Without affective engagement, valid norms can neither be 
established nor realized. For rational deliberation to be possible, people must care 
about common issues, want to form an opinion directed toward a specific audience, 
and be disposed to perform some degree of empathic imagination. And if, as 
Habermas’s account of the bourgeois public exemplifies, affects are fostered or 
hindered by particular institutions, norms, and practices, we cannot simply presume, as 
the rationalist paradigm does, the existence of those affective prerequisites. Such a 
presumption would amount to the uncritical acceptance of power relations working to 
                                                 
45 Joan B. Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1988). See also Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men 
and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780-1850 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
46 Landes, Women and the Public Sphere, 40. 
47 For an excellent discussion of this point, see essays by Nancy Fraser, Mary Ryan, Geoff Eley, and 
Michael Warner in Habermas and the Public Sphere. 
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promote or suppress affects. As long as we remain strictly within the framework of the 
rationalist paradigm, we are left with an acquiescent version of democracy that is at 
the whim of power relations sometimes supplying, other times dismantling, its 
affective basis. 
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Dissolving the Demos: A Genealogy of Postwar 
Democracy 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Cold War Origins of Instrumental Democracy 
 
 
“If we suppose government to have bestowed a degree of tranquility … 
as the best of its fruits, and public affairs to proceed … with the least 
possible interruption to commerce and lucrative arts; such a state … is 
more akin to despotism than we are apt to imagine.” 
--Adam Ferguson (1767)1 
 
“[T]his war machine is terrifying not as a function of a possible war 
that it promises us … [but] as a function of the real, very special kind 
of peace it promotes and has already installed … [T]his war machine 
does no longer needs a qualified enemy but … operates against the 
“unspecified enemy,” domestic or foreign.” 
--Gilles Deleuze and Félix Gattari (1987)”2 
 
In the previous chapter I examined how democracy requires affective prerequisites, 
which are not free-floating but always attached to, and configured by, historically 
specific institutions, norms, and practices. By presuming the existence of the affective 
basis of its universal principles, the rationalist paradigm fails to acknowledge that it 
presupposes a particular subjectivity inhabiting a particular world, effectively keeping 
us from asking whether that world still, if ever, exists. Democratic disaffection that 
plagues both old and new democracies today gives us reason to be skeptical about the 
rationalist paradigm’s presumptuous gesture toward affect, and compels us to 
interrogate our world—subjectivities and affects that reside in it. The following three 
chapters conduct that interrogation. 
                                                 
1 Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, ed. Fania Oz-Salzberger (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 254-255. 
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Gattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 467. 
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In this chapter, I examine how instrumental democracy emerged during and 
after World War II as an assemblage of technologies, images, discourses, values, and 
prejudices. As noted in the Introduction, the desire to instrumentalize democracy is as 
old as democracy itself. However, it is during the Cold War that constitutive elements 
of instrumental democracy gelled and cohered enough to form a unitary frame. 
Specifically, I focus on three such constitutive elements. First, I trace how the concept 
and imagery of totalitarianism emerged as a powerful political symbol in the postwar 
era. As an all-embracing term that includes Fascism, Nazism, and Soviet Communism, 
totalitarianism came to epitomize the radical antithesis of democracy. In the postwar 
years, there was a pervasive notion that collectivities were the breeding ground of 
totalitarianism, and it powerfully drove an individualist reconstruction of democracy 
under the name of anti-totalitarianism. Second, I analyze the argument that emerged as 
part of anti-totalitarianism and served as the organizing principle of the individualist 
reconstruction of democracy. Articulated and popularized most notably by Friedrich A. 
Hayek, this argument correlates democracy with the capitalist economy and posits 
individuals conforming to the rules of the capitalist market as the foundation of 
democracy. Championing capitalism as the only guarantee of individual freedom, the 
Hayekian doctrine proposes to circumscribe democratic politics and discipline citizens 
so as to preserve capitalism in its purest form. Last, I examine how the contours of 
democracy shaped by anti-totalitarianism and Hayekian economic liberalism were 
reinforced by highly bureaucratic and technocratic practices. What undergirded the 
postwar variant of bureaucracy were a heightened sense of national security threats 
and the idea of “scientific management.” These two key elements of postwar 
technocracy not only justified a politically insulated decision-making process but also 
the application of logics and techniques developed for war purposes to civilian politics, 
perilously compromising the basic premise of democracy that regards people as the 
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foundation of legitimacy. While the relationship between these individual components 
of instrumental democracy was not entirely tension-free, they nonetheless worked 
together to the effect of dissolving crucial dimensions of democracy—collective 
subjectivities, public action, and the idea of the common good. 
To put my argument in perspective, a word on the general atmosphere of 
postwar American may be in order. Postwar America was a place infused with fear 
and optimism. On the one hand, there was an extreme anxiety generated by a fear of 
Communism. To be sure, Americans had already been alarmed by the rise of 
authoritarian governments in the 1920s and the 1930s. But the perceived threat to the 
“American way of life” was intensified and given urgency after the Second World 
War by the apocalyptic vision of nuclear warfare. Equally frightening were clandestine, 
psychological, and ideological operations said to be invisible yet rampant at home. 
Especially after the highly publicized trials of a top State Department official Alger 
Hiss (1948-1950) and the Rosenbergs (1950-1953), politicians such as Richard Nixon 
and Joseph McCarthy, journalists including Whittaker Chambers (a senior editor of 
Time who accused Hiss of being a Soviet spy) and William F. Buckley (the founder of 
National Review), and the popular media (e.g., movies3) joined forces in creating a 
terrifying image that communists and their sympathizers are everywhere engaging in a 
                                                 
3 While movie attendance began to drop after 1946, movies were still the major conveyer of images in 
postwar America. One of the most prevalent themes was the annihilation of the human race or the 
brainwashing by other-worldly creatures like aliens. Susan Sontag provides a shrewd analysis of the 
1950s science fiction films, which is, in my view, also an apt description of the American psyche at the 
time. “[T]hese films supply … extreme moral simplification—that is to say, a morally acceptable 
fantasy where one can give outlet to cruel or at least amoral feelings … The sense of superiority over 
the freak conjoined … with the titillation of fear and aversion makes it possible for moral scruples to be 
lifted, for cruelty to be enjoyed … [Meanwhile] [t]here is absolutely no … criticism … of the conditions 
of our society which create the impersonality and dehumanization which science fiction fantasies 
displace onto the influence of an alien.” Susan Sontag, “The Imagination of Disaster (1965),” in Against 
Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Picador, 1961), 215, 223. 
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conspiracy leading to a Soviet takeover.4 The whole country, as the historian Richard 
Hofstadter wrote, was caught in hysteria and paranoia.5  
This boundless fear was combined, almost perversely, with optimism about 
America’s national character and prosperity. After all, America has won the war, and 
spectacularly so. The atomic bomb was not only a reason for great anxiety but also a 
vivid demonstration of the nation’s virtually incontestable power. President Harry S. 
Truman attested to this sense of pride a few days after the bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in declaring that “we have emerged from this war the most powerful nation 
in the world—the most powerful nation, perhaps, in all history.”6 And the confidence 
in the nation’s military might was only bolstered by its economic prosperity. The GNP 
increased from $181.8 billion (1929) to $282.3 billion (1947) to $439.9 billion (1960), 
while personal consumption increased from $128.1 billion (1929) to $195.6 billion 
(1947) to $298.1 billion (1960).7 Americans were surrounded and captivated by 
commodities—newly built homes, shiny cars, eye-catching appliances, and the 
supermarket—that transmitted signs of affluence and solicited mass consumption. 
While fear and optimism may well coexist in any time of historical changes, 
what was unique about the postwar period was that those affective states were 
perceived to come from territories completely separate and diametrically opposed: fear 
from outside, optimism inside. This dichotomous worldview reinforced, and was 
reinforced by, the struggle to simplify, purify, and rigidify “the outside” and “the 
inside.” My contention is that external boundaries as well as the internal structure of 
                                                 
4 For the “Red Menace,” see David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman 
and Eisenhower (Simon & Schuster, 1978); Ellen W. Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1998); Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red: the McCarthy Era in 
Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
5 Richard Hofstadter, Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays (New York: Knopf, 1965). 
6 Harry S. Truman, “Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference (August 9, 
1945),” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1945, 213. 
7 Figures cited in Robert M. Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 41. 
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instrumental democracy came into shape in the midst of this struggle. The concept and 
imagery of totalitarianism was particularly crucial to demarcating external boundaries, 
as it condemned all political visions centered on collective subjectivities and actions as 
variants of Nazism and Soviet Communism. And Hayekian economic liberalism 
shaped the internal structure of instrumental democracy by restructuring democratic 
politics in accordance with the basic tenets of capitalism. Finally, the sciences 
recruited, guided, and transformed by war—which I call “war sciences”—reinforced 
instrumental democracy with a distinct conception of citizens as manageable units. 
The concomitant emergence of anti-totalitarianism, Hayekian economic liberalism, 
and postwar technocracy is to be seen as a decisive event in the history of democracy, 
because it furnished intuitive images of human nature and society, as well as 
technologies to reinforce those images, that would dominate the postwar concept and 
practice of democracy—the ontology, as it were, of instrumental democracy. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first section traces the rise of 
totalitarianism and its political impact. The second section analyzes Hayek’s theory 
that subjects democracy to capitalism and considers its implications. The last section 
examines the conjoining of the national security state and war sciences in creating a 
technocracy that embodies a centralized decision-making structure and a disposition to 
control and manage citizens. I end the chapter by exploring implications of 
instrumental democracy by analyzing Joseph Schumpeter’s procedural theory of 
democracy. 
 
Totalitarianism as Democracy’s “Other” 
When World War II was drawing to an end, Truman celebrated his country’s 
impending victory. “It was a victory of one way of life over another. It was a victory 
of an ideal founded on the rights of the common man, on the dignity of the human 
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being, on the conception of the State as the servant—and not the master—of its 
people.”8 Only two years later, however, Truman spoke of the uncertainty of the 
victory, pointing to the threat posed by the “aggressive movements to impose on [free 
peoples] totalitarian regimes.” He continued: 
 
“At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must 
choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a 
free one. 
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is 
distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free 
elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and 
religion, and freedom from political oppression. 
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority 
forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, 
a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of 
personal freedoms.”9 
 
A starkly dualistic worldview summarized here illustrates the contours of political 
imagination powerfully shaped by the idea of totalitarianism. We may begin by noting 
that he made no direct reference to the Soviet Union even though it was clearly what 
he had in mind (he pointed out Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria as the countries under 
the threat of totalitarianism). From this conspicuous silence as well as the grand 
language he used, one gets a sense that Truman intended to portray the Soviet Union 
as part of something more profound. The Soviet Union, he seems to imply, is not 
simply an individual country that happens to come into conflict with the United States. 
It is, instead, a symbol of a contending civilization (if one could call it a civilization) 
which fundamentally threatens everything America stands for, just as Fascism and 
Nazism did a few years ago. By extending the use of the term totalitarianism, 
originally referring to Fascism and Nazism, to include Soviet Communism, Truman 
                                                 
8 Truman, “Radio Report,” 213. 
9 Harry S. Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine 
(March 12, 1947),” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1947, 178. 
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invoked continuities between the Second World War and what was about to become 
the Cold War. By invoking totalitarianism as a description of the ultimate enemy, 
moreover, Truman completely externalizes totalitarianism as the Other that 
necessitates a preservation, not a critique, of liberal democracy. 
Truman’s implicit claims about totalitarianism were foreign to the term when it 
first gained currency in the English-speaking world in the mid-1930s.10 Under the 
influence of émigré scholars, many of them fugitives from Hitler’s Germany, the term 
was used only to analyze German Nazism and Italian Fascism. Concerned primarily 
with the economy in the aftermath of the Great Depression and influenced by the 
Marxist framework, many scholars in this period tended to see totalitarianism as a 
reaction to the crisis of capitalism. Max Lerner, a student of Charles Beard and 
Thorstein Veblen, exemplified this intellectual climate when he suggested that support 
for Fascism and Nazism was based on middle-class fears stemming from the 
Depression, which is the “logical consequence … of our capitalist-individualist 
economic organization and our system of nation-states.”11 Naturally, those with this 
point of view highlighted differences, not similarities, between totalitarianism and 
communism: the former is a deterioration of the problem to which the latter is an 
attempted solution. By the same token, liberalism, not communism, was thought to 
contain the seeds of totalitarianism. Most notably, Herbert Marcuse expressed this 
point of view when he argued that the contradiction of liberalism lies in the fact that it 
elevates reason as the foundation of society while at the same time completely 
instrumentalizing and privatizing reason. As a pure instrument, privatized reason is 
                                                 
10 The term “totalitarianism” was used as early as 1923 in Italy, and later in Germany, by those who 
criticized liberal democracy and called for a stronger state. At the time, however, the term was neither 
clearly defined nor widely accepted. For the debate surrounding this term in Italy and Germany, see 
Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), chap. 1. 
11 Max Lerner, “The Pattern of Dictatorship,” in Dictatorship in the Modern World, ed. Guy Stanton 
Ford (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935), 6. See also Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth: 
The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942). 
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unable to deal with generality that determines its goal. This void realm of generality is 
thus left vulnerable to irrational forces relying on “blood and soil,” “Volk,” or 
“totality.”12 Thus viewed, as Marcuse articulates in his later works, totalitarianism is 
not just a “terroristic political coordination of society” but also a “non-terroristic 
economic-technical coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs.”13 
It is, in other words, a culture in which alternate possibilities are essentially foreclosed, 
and liberalism is just as complicit with it as the dictatorships it excoriates. 
This radical critique of totalitarianism would become more influential in the 
1960s, but it was far from fashionable in the 1930s and 1940s. Instead, totalitarianism 
was constructed as an umbrella term that lumps together Italian Fascism, German 
Nazism, and Soviet Communism as the ultimate threat to the United States and its 
fundamental values. Beginning in the mid-1930s, numerous newspapers and 
journalists began to note significant, if impressionistic, similarities between Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union in their violent suppression of the opposition.14 In 
particular, Hitler’s purge of SA in June 1934 and Stalin’s purge following the 
assassination of Sergei Kirov in December 1934 drew considerable attention. The 
Kansas City Star commented that the purges revealed “the real basis of power in every 
dictatorship, whether Communist or Fascist.” Even liberal journals such as the New 
Republic, then more sympathetic to the Soviet Union, admitted that the Kirov purge 
“forcibly recalls the thirtieth of June in Germany.”15 After the 1937 purge trials in 
Moscow, even intellectuals on the Left came to draw explicit parallels between Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union. John Dewey—the leading Left intellectual who 
                                                 
12 Herbert Marcuse, “The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State (1934),” in 
Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 3-42, esp. 
15-19. 
13 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), 3. 
14 For a detailed account, see Thomas R. Maddux, “Red Fascism, Brown Bolshevism: The American 
Image of Totalitarianism in the 1930s,” The Historian 40 (1977), 89-94. 
15 Quoted in ibid., 89. 
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headed the committee that investigated the charges made against Leon Trotsky—
conveyed a widely shared sentiment when he made the following remark while 
announcing his committee’s vindication of Trotsky on CBS radio: “Next time anybody 
says to you that we have to choose between Fascism and Communism, ask him what 
is the difference between the Hitlerite Gestapo and the Stalinite G.P.U. so that a 
democracy should have to choose between one or the other.”16 And the Nazi-Soviet 
nonaggression pact in August 1939 virtually put the seal on this trend. A strong 
consensus on the Nazi-Soviet identification emerged during 1939 and 1941,17 and 
briefly subsided after Germany’s 1941 attack on the Soviet Union and the following 
U.S-Russia alliance, only to completely dictate the terms of political discourse in 
postwar America. 
As implied in Dewey’s remark, the identification of the Soviet Union and 
totalitarianism went hand in hand with the attempt to posit liberal democracy as the 
antithesis of totalitarianism. This dualism was reinforced further by the heated political 
battle over the New Deal. Totalitarianism became a unifying symbol of the anti-New 
Deal movement that helped conservatives recover from their crushing defeat in 1932 
and regain their voice in the mid-1930s. Many prominent figures on the Right accused 
the Roosevelt administration of taking the country in the direction of totalitarianism. 
Raoul Desvernine complained that the New Deal creates a government so powerful 
and centralized “as to give it the appearance, if not the substance, of a totalitarian State” 
and that “the integrity of the individual is trampled upon by the organized mob of 
government agents.”18 Similarly, Herbert Hoover claimed that a “vast centralization 
of power in the Executive” is “the first step of economic Regimentation” that 
                                                 
16 Quoted in Gleason, Totalitarianism, 44. 
17 Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet 
Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s,” American Historical Review 75(4) 
(1970), 1049-1050. 
18 Raoul E. Desvernite, Democratic Despotism (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1936), 205, 226. 
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“emulat[es] parts of [Fascism, Socialism, or Communism].”19 Facing the rising tide of 
totalitarianism abroad, even liberals began to waver. Most notably, Walter Lippmann, 
a fervent supporter of economic planning in the early 1930, switched his position 
within a matter of a few years and came out denouncing New Deal progressivism 
along with totalitarianism, socialism, and communism under the single heading of 
“collectivism,” contrasting it to democracy: “a democratic people cannot have a 
planned economy … [I]n so far as they desire a planned economy they must suspend 
responsible government.”20 Other liberals did not go quite as far as Lippmann did, but 
many of them were beginning to harbor uncertainty about the relationship between the 
economic system and democracy. As we will examine in the next section, under 
mounting pressure, and especially after his hugely unpopular attempts at the “court 
packing” and executive reorganization in the midst of the unexpected economic 
downturn in 1937,21 Roosevelt was forced to scale down the New Deal and defend his 
policies as a bulwark against a totalitarian revolution on U.S. soil. Gone was the 
defense of the New Deal as a remedy for the pathologies of liberalism, which had been 
dominant right up until the mid-1930s. 
It is unlikely that the politicians engaged in this political battle had any 
coherent intellectual framework in mind. In effect, however, they wound up creating a 
frame that sets liberalism against totalitarianism—a frame that was extremely 
inhospitable to more nuanced perspectives. A brief look at the diverging fate of 
Truman and Henry A. Wallace, perhaps two of the most influential Democrats at the 
time, illustrates how powerful this dichotomous frame was in the late-1940s. After the 
Republican sweep in the 1946 congressional election, Truman’s aggressive anti-
                                                 
19 Herbert C. Hoover, The Challenge to Liberty (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1934), 76, 192. 
20 Walter Lippmann, The Good Society (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937), 106. 
21 Both plans ended up raising a doubt about the extent of Roosevelt’s powers and a fear of dictatorship, 
and irrevocably damaged his popularity. See Thomas E. Lifka, The Concept “Totalitarianism” and 
American Foreign Policy, 1933-1949 (New York and London: Garland, 1988), 45-54. 
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totalitarian rhetoric boosted his popularity.22 Wallace, who was Roosevelt’s vice 
president from 1941 to 1945, advocated a reconciliatory relation with the Soviet Union 
in his 1948 presidential campaign, only to earn a minuscule million votes.23 
Thus, both as a label for all the “evil” countries and as a metaphor against 
which liberal democracy was pitted, totalitarianism was a normatively as well as 
politically charged symbol rather than a neutral representation of reality.24 The term 
was constructed by the historical events as much as it was by bleak images furnished 
by such novels as Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon (1940), Aldous Huxley’s Brave 
New World (1939), and especially George Orwell’s 1984 (1949), often against the 
intention of the authors.25 George Kennan, who is widely considered the architect of 
the containment policy against the Soviet Union but later turned into a critic of the 
“militarization” of Cold War policies,26 captured this aspect of totalitarianism in the 
following remark: “[W]hen I try to picture totalitarianism to myself as a general 
phenomenon, what comes into my mind most prominently is neither the Nazi picture 
                                                 
22 “According to the Gallup Poll, in January 1947, only 35 percent of Americans thought that Truman 
was handling his job well; by February, his approval rating stood at 48 percent; and by the latter part of 
the year, it had reached 60 percent.” Gleason, Totalitarianism, 77. 
23 Wallace’s career is also a story of the division and transformation of the American Left. For the 
“Wallace-Niebuhr division” and the origins of Cold War liberalism, see Mark L. Kleinman, A World of 
Hope, a World of Fear: Henry A. Wallace, Reinhold Niebuhr, and American Liberalism (Columbus: 
Ohio State University Press, 2000). 
24 Although it received a good deal of attention in the 1950s, the concept of totalitarianism was soon 
rejected in the scholarly community as ahistorical and imprecise. But it would regain currency among 
policymakers in the 1970s and especially after the election of Ronald Reagan. 
25 Irritated by the conservatives’ appropriation of his novel in their attack on socialism, Orwell wrote in 
his letter to Francis A. Henson of the United Auto Workers that “my recent novel is NOT intended as an 
attack on socialism or on the British Labor Party (of which I am a supporter) but as a show-up of the 
perversions to which a centralised economy is liable and which have already been partly realised in 
Communism and Fascism … The scene of the book is laid in Britain in order to emphasise that the 
English-speaking races are not innately better than anyone else and that totalitarianism, if not fought 
against, could triumph elsewhere.” Quoted in Gleason, Totalitarianism, 84. 
26 What is commonly known as Kennan’s “long telegram” identified a common tendency of 
totalitarianism and communism toward expansionism and played a crucial role in initiating containment 
policies. George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct (1946),” Foreign Relations of the United 
States, vol. 6, 1946: Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
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Kennan’s critique of the “militarization” of his ideas, see “Overdue Changes in Our Foreign Policy,” 
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nor the Soviet picture as I have known them in the flesh, but rather the fictional and 
symbolic images created by such people as Orwell or Kafka or Koestler or the early 
Soviet satirists … [Totalitarianism] is both a reality and a bad dream … [I]ts deepest 
reality lies strangely enough in its manifestation as a dream.”27 And like other 
dreamlike symbols, totalitarianism shaped and distorted people’s perception of reality 
and thereby took history in a certain direction. 
For our purposes, it is important to recognize how Cold War anti-
totalitarianism served to dismiss the ideal of the collective pursuit of the common good 
as something incompatible with and inimical to democratic politics. Hannah Arendt’s 
famed The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) was particularly instrumental in 
popularizing the idea that the masses are the basis of totalitarianism. Arendt argued 
that “[t]otalitarian movements are possible wherever there are masses who for one 
reason or another have acquired the appetite for political organization.” The masses, 
Arendt went on, are “people who either because of sheer numbers, or indifference, or a 
combination of both, cannot be integrated into any organization based on common 
interest, into political parties or municipal governments or professional organizations 
or trade unions. Potentially, the phenomenon of the masses exists in every country and 
form the majority of those large numbers of neutral, politically indifferent people who 
never join a party and hardly ever go to the polls.”28 This was a frightening idea 
especially in the context of postwar America because, as we will see in the next 
chapter, almost all empirical evidence available at the time suggested that most 
Americans were precisely such “neutral, politically indifferent people.” As I will argue 
in Chapter 5, Arendt herself was interested not so much in condemning the masses as 
                                                 
27 George F. Kennan, “Totalitarianism in the Modern World,” in Totalitarianism: Proceedings of a 
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an ontological entity as in understanding the historical process through which the 
masses were produced as a dominant mode of political existence. But it was her 
description of affinities between totalitarianism and the masses that stuck in Cold War 
America. And it was appropriated as a major rationale for a crusade against all 
collective subjectivities and actions.29 
While the individualist reconstruction of democratic politics was driven by 
anti-totalitarianism, its success can also be attributed to the fact that it resonated with 
other powerful intellectual currents at the time. First and foremost, the postwar years 
saw the formation of a new consensus on human nature. Given the experience of two 
atrocious wars, it is no surprise that this consensus struck a pessimistic, tragic note. 
While it was typically conservatives who warned against putting too much faith in 
human capacity, the liberals of the postwar period were no less emphatic in voicing 
the same concern. Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian of progressive persuasion, declared 
that “[t]he utopian illusions and sentimental aberrations of modern liberal culture are 
really all derived from the basic error of negating the fact of original sin.”30 In his 
hugely influential book The Vital Center (1949)—one of the manifestoes of Cold War 
Liberalism—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., stated, approvingly citing Niebuhr, that “[t]he 
Soviet experience, on top of the rise of fascism, reminded my generation rather 
forcibly that man was, indeed, imperfect, and that the corruptions of power could 
unleash great evil in the world. We discovered a new dimension of experience—the 
dimension of anxiety, guilt and corruption.”31 Claiming that the most frightening 
feature of totalitarianism was its attempt to “liquidate the tragic insights which gave 
man a sense of his limitations,” Schlesinger insisted that the problems of society can 
                                                 
29 For the reception of Origins, see Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Why Arendt Matters (New Haven, CT: 
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30 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1 (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1941), 273. 
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be found not simply in unjust political and economic institutions but more 
fundamentally in the fact that human beings were often corrupted by the “dark, 
slumbering forces” in their own psyches.32 
To some extent, this pessimistic view of human nature was a carryover from 
the interwar years. The experience of the conflict-ridden early twentieth century and 
the First World War had already dealt a serious blow to liberals’ belief in the ideal of 
the citizen and the common good as the unifying foundation of democracy. There is, 
however, a crucial difference between what might be called “interwar pessimism” and 
its postwar variant. Although it raised doubts about the existence of a common good, 
interwar pessimism championed radical action for social justice, embracing conflicts 
as the inevitable consequence. Niebuhr made this point clear in his Moral Man and 
Immoral Society, published in 1932. There he argued that the attempt to find or nurture 
a moral consensus on the common good in the political arena is futile and naïve, 
because such a consensus is not waiting to be achieved as soon as ignorance or lack of 
morality is overcome but blocked by the privileged class that tries to maintain its 
interest. This means that “[w]hen collective power, whether in the form of imperialism 
or class domination, exploits weakness, it can never be dislodged unless power is 
raised against it.”33 Thus, according to Niebuhr, what we must do is not to deny the 
fact that “[c]onflict is inevitable, and in this conflict power must be challenged by 
power” but to find out how to attain social justice through that conflict.34 Crucially, 
Niebuhr emphasized that the recognition of the inevitability of differing interests and 
social conflicts must not make us accept the idea of “accommodation” as a solution. 
As he forcefully wrote: “A favorite counsel of the social scientists is that of 
accommodation. If two parties are in a conflict, let them, by conferring together, 
                                                 
32 Ibid., xxiii, 56-57, 165. 
33 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1932), xii. 
34 Ibid., xv. 
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moderate their demands and arrive at a modus vivendi … Undoubtedly there are 
innumerable conflicts which must be resolved in this fashion. But will a disinherited 
group, such as the Negroes for instance, ever win full justice in society in this fashion? 
Will not even its most minimum demands seem exorbitant to the dominant whites, 
among whom only a very small minority will regard the inter-racial problem from the 
perspective of objective justice? Or how are the industrial workers to [negotiate] with 
industrial owners, when the owners possess so much power that they can win the 
debate with the workers, no matter how unconvincing their arguments? Only a very 
few sociologists seem to have learned an adjustment of a social conflict, caused by the 
disproportion of power in society, will hardly result in justice as long as the 
disproportion of power remains.”35 As evidenced by many interwar liberals’ 
enthusiastic support for a sit-down strike of the United Automobile Workers at the 
General Motors plant in Flint, Michigan, in December 1936,36 interwar pessimism 
was combined with deep commitment to the collective, if not consensual, pursuit of 
social justice. 
Almost reversing the position of interwar pessimism, postwar pessimism took 
the same recognition about the practical impossibility of attaining a common good 
through moral education and persuasion alone, and used it as a basis of an argument 
for moderating demands so as not to threaten political stability. One can detect this 
subtle yet significant shift in the thought of Niebuhr himself. While he was still issuing 
the same warning against utopian ideals, Niebuhr’s emphasis had already shifted from 
radical activism to orderly pluralism near the end of the Second World War. Stating 
that the “sadistic cruelties” produced by Nazism’s attempt to establish a “coerced unity” 
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36 For an account of the UAW members’ sit-down strike and the reactions to it, see Marc Stears, 
Demanding Democracy: American Radicals in Search of a New Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 107-110. 
 85 
in the community were a “tremendously valuable lesson for our civilization,” he 
suggested that democracy must find a way of allowing various interests and 
perspectives to “express themselves without destroying the unity and life of the 
community.”37 Niebuhr went so far as to assert that democratic politics is “a method 
of finding proximate solutions for insoluble problems,” practically recommending 
accommodation he specifically rejected in the 1930s.38 With this, Niebuhr was 
representing the predominant view of postwar liberalism. While calling for a “revival 
of American radicalism,” Schlesinger argued that such a new radicalism would be 
grounded in commitment to “piecemeal” changes through parliamentary institutions 
and would not “disrupt the fabric of custom, law and mutual confidence.”39 More 
bluntly, Seymour Martin Lipset remarked that a “stable democracy” would require a 
“manifestation” of conflict so as to give the “have-nots” a greater sense of “loyalty … 
to the system.”40 Lipset praised the two-party system for its ability to select “a man of 
the center” as their presidential nominee, reduce the intensity of political debate, and 
cement social cohesion.41 Daniel Bell, too, valorized the American electoral system 
that forces its participants to make compromises (the “deal”) forgoing their ideals as 
the “pragmatic counterpart of the philosophic principle of toleration” and, indeed, as 
“the saving grace” of American politics.42 
Despite its homage to pluralism, one cannot but sense that postwar 
pessimism’s focus was on preserving the existing consensus. It was a pluralism, as it 
were, with too many conditionals: political action is legitimate if it remains “within 
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bounds,” if it abides by the “rules of the game,” and if does not disrupt “the fabric of 
custom, law, and mutual confidence.” Conflicts are to be tolerated, postwar pessimism 
suggests, as long as they do not fundamentally challenge the institutions of Cold War 
America and people’s supposedly shared attachment to those institutions. We will 
examine the irony of this consensus-oriented pluralism more closely in the next 
chapter, but following the Niebuhr of the 1930s, one is led to wonder: when the 
deepest root of social conflicts lies in the disproportion of power, how can one resolve 
those conflicts in any genuine sense without addressing the problem of 
disproportionate power relations? How can one change power relations without 
challenging the rules of the game that work in favor of the privileged? 
In addition to postwar pessimism’s wary and even disciplining disposition 
toward collective action outside formal institutions, the conviction in democracy as a 
collective project was shaken further by a whole swath of theories on “mass 
society”—which Daniel Bell observed to be “Marxism apart … probably the most 
influential social theory in the world today.”43 As noted above, Arendt’s theory that 
links the masses and totalitarianism was particularly influential, but other worrying 
accounts of the masses flooded postwar America. “The mass man,” Dwight 
MacDonald wrote, “is a solitary atom, uniform with and undifferentiated from 
thousands of millions of other atoms who go to make up the “lonely crowd” [in David 
Riesman’s term].”44 And mass culture was thought to exacerbate the conformist 
tendency inherent in the masses deprived of both individuality and solidarity, 
threatening, in Bernard Rosenberg’s words, “not merely to cretinize our taste, but to 
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brutalize our sense while paving the way to totalitarianism.”45 The last remark betrays 
the strong connection between the critique of mass society and anti-totalitarianism. 
Many studies, both popular and academic, asserted that communism—which was 
presented as the only surviving incarnation of totalitarianism—appealed to those who 
were emotionally needy and maladjusted.46 The message was clear enough: it is a 
mistake to take the term democracy too literally; the attempt to realize the ideal of the 
“rule of the people” in a society where people are in fact only masses is almost an 
open invitation to totalitarianism. Despite their otherwise diverse political and 
ideological standpoints, many intellectuals shared this fear, and were concerned about 
the problem that José Ortega y Gasset famously brought to attention: the degeneration 
of the “old democracy … tempered by a generous dose of liberalism and of 
enthusiasm for law” into a “hyperdemocracy in which the mass acts directly, outside 
the law, imposing its aspirations and its desires by means of material pressure.”47 
 
The Birth of Capitalist Democracy 
As anti-totalitarianism partly due to its resonances with such powerful 
intellectual currents as postwar pessimism and the theories of mass society, the ideal 
of democracy as the collective pursuit of the common good quickly began to erode. 
But if anti-totalitarianism successfully undermined collectivities as the agents—and 
the pursuit of the common good as the purpose—of democracy, it still needed to 
explain what could serve as the alternative basis of democracy. What rose to this 
challenge, I suggest, was the idea that democracy can best be conceptualized and 
practiced as a correlate of capitalism. As for the articulation and propagation of this 
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 88 
idea, it is hard to overemphasize the influence of Friedrich A. Hayek, not only because 
he produced a paradigmatic account of this view in his immensely popular The Road 
to Serfdom (1944),48 but also because he built institutions and mobilized networks of 
people around that view, epitomized in the Mont Pèlerin Society which arguably 
became the theoretical hub of neoliberalism well before neoliberalism acquires 
political influence in the 1970s, as we will examine in Chapter 4.49 Hayek first 
convened the Society in 1947 and served as its first president between 1948 and 1960. 
In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek reverses the Marxist view that diagnoses 
Nazism as a twisted attempt to perpetuate capitalism, and claims that “the rise of 
fascism and Nazism was … a necessary outcome of [socialist] tendencies [in interwar 
Germany].”50 He refuses to reduce Nazism to a matter of psychology (“the peculiar 
wickedness of the Germans”), arguing that institutions, especially economic ones, 
determine its political system. Exemplifying the logic of the Cold War, Hayek 
advances a starkly dichotomous worldview. He divides the world into two kinds of 
economic system: capitalism (posited to be the system of competition) and socialism 
(posited to be the system of central planning). He, then, correlates those economic 
systems with liberal democracy and totalitarianism, respectively. As he puts it, “[t]he 
various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, etc., differ among themselves in 
the nature of the goal toward which they want to direct the efforts of society. But they 
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all differ from liberalism and individualism in wanting to organize the whole of 
society and its resources for its unitary end and in refusing to recognize autonomous 
spheres in which the ends of the individuals are supreme. In short, they are totalitarian 
in the true sense of this new word which we have adopted to describe the unexpected 
but nevertheless inseparable manifestations of what in theory we call collectivism” 
(63). To be sure, Hayek accepts the need for a “carefully thought-out legal framework,” 
“government action,” and grudgingly, even some regulation, but only when they serve 
to promote competition (41-42, 48). But if it interferes with unfettered capitalist 
competition, even limited regulations are counterproductive, because “both 
competition and central direction become poor and inefficient tools if they are 
incomplete; they are principles used to solve the same problem, and a mixture of the 
two means that neither will really work and that the result will be worse than if either 
system had been consistently relied upon (48).” 
Here it is crucial to get the full picture of Hayek’s defense of what he 
sometimes calls “economic liberalism,” as it is not simply an argument for the superior 
efficiency of capitalism in economic matters. Rather, his claim is that any attempt to 
restrict competition and interfere with the working of the market will inevitably land 
us in totalitarianism. As he states, “[i]f “capitalism” means … a competitive system 
based on free disposal over private property, … only within this system is democracy 
possible. When it becomes dominated by a collectivist creed, democracy will 
inevitably destroy itself” (77-78). 
Hayek’s reasoning behind this conclusion begins with the Cold War platitude 
that notions such as the “common good,” the “general welfare,” or the “general 
interest” have “no definite meaning to determine a particular course of action” and 
“cannot be expressed as a single end.” So-called “social ends,” he writes, are “merely 
identical ends of many individuals—or ends to the achievement of which individuals 
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are willing to contribute in return for the assistance they receive in the satisfaction of 
their own desires” (67). This contingent nature of the common good, then, creates a 
serious problem for democracy. Since the decision-making in democracy is based 
upon people’s agreement, central planning that “direct[s] all our activities according to 
a single plan” cannot move forward without the “existence of a complete ethical code 
in which all the different human values are allotted their due place” (64). In other 
words, planning, per Hayek’s definition, requires that we “agree on a much larger 
number of topics than we have been used to” (69). The formation of such a broad 
agreement on social ends is impossible, and if it happens to occur, it is “not likely to 
be formed by the best but rather by the worst elements of any society” (152). When 
one tries to form a consensus on the common good, “the worst get on top” because “in 
general, the higher the education and intelligence of individuals become, the more 
their views and tastes are differentiated and the less likely they are to agree on a 
particular hierarchy of values.” For a “high degree of uniformity,” Hayek asserts, “we 
have to descend to the regions of lower moral and intellectual standards where the 
more primitive and “common” instincts and tastes prevail … [We need to turn to] 
those who form the “mass” in the derogatory sense of the term, the least original and 
independent” (152). Moreover, even if it is possible to form a unanimous agreement 
on the common good, untainted by “common instincts and tastes,” democratic 
governments will never be able to realize it in their doomed attempt to find agreement 
on every particular aspects of the planning. This incompetence will “inevitably cause 
dissatisfaction with democratic institutions,” and “evoke stronger and stronger 
demands that the government or some single individual should be given powers to act 
on their own responsibility.” In the end, “[t]he belief is becoming more and more 
widespread that, if things are to get done, the responsible authorities must be freed 
from the fetters of democratic procedure” (69, 75). This is why, as Hayek memorably 
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declares, “the cry for an economic dictator is a characteristic stage in the movement 
toward planning” (75). Planning is, for Hayek, like a train with a broken break; once it 
is set in motion, no one can stop it from overloading, paralyzing, and ultimately 
destroying democracy with an ever-increasing demand for agreement on individual 
values and social ends. 
This is a skillfully simple, and for that reason powerful, logic. But a closer look 
reveals that it rests on obscure reasoning and normatively charged assumptions. Hayek, 
for example, confounds the normative necessity of fomenting democratic contestation 
around the common good with the empirical difficulty of attaining, once and for all, a 
unanimous consensus on one. But the difficulty, even impossibility, of forming a 
perfect consensus at a particular moment cannot be the reason to abandon the pursuit 
of the common good as such. Democracy is an indispensable political ideal, not 
because it is the most sure or efficient way of realizing individual preferences but 
because it is built on the normative expectation that it would value universal 
demands—demands for the sake of the demos or the common good—over particular 
ones. Of course, this universality is not a fixed entity but a temporary outcome of 
democratic contestation. This is why it is crucial for a democracy to make sure that 
that contestation takes place, and again, on equal terms. Put another way, the most 
important task of democracy is to preserve and promote substantial political freedom, 
and other forms of freedom are to be understood in terms of that central task. 
Hayek argues the exact opposite: economic freedom must precede political 
freedom. His central concern, as he puts it, is the dire fact that “[w]e have 
progressively abandoned that freedom in economic affairs without which personal and 
political freedom has never existed in the past” (16). To be sure, attaining substantial 
political freedom requires a certain form of economic freedom (I discuss this point 
more extensively in Chapter 5). But Hayek does not suggest that economic freedom 
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promote political freedom. Rather, he contends that economic freedom must be 
preserved at the expense of political freedom, or more precisely, that political freedom 
must be restricted so as to guarantee the capitalist form of economic freedom to the 
fullest extent. 
To understand how Hayek’s prioritization of economic freedom undermines 
political freedom, we need to examine his defense of capitalism more carefully. 
Hayek’s overarching argument rests on his emphasis on the limitation of human 
knowledge, which is well summarized in the following statement: “The peculiar 
character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the 
fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists 
in concentrated or integrated form, but solely as dispersed bits of incomplete and 
frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The 
economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate “given” 
resources … [I]t is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to 
anyone in its totality.”51 Based on this recognition, Hayek portrays capitalism—and 
competition as its essence—as a coordination mechanism that brings together and 
processes dispersed knowledge. As he puts it, “[c]ompetition is …, like 
experimentation in science, first and foremost a discovery procedure … Competition 
must be seen as a process in which people acquire and communicate knowledge.”52 
Hayek’s epistemological vision of capitalism is intriguingly mystical, as he 
takes the valuable insight (the limitation of human knowledge) and embeds it in an 
obscure mix of metaphysics and evolutionary theory, constantly moving back and 
forth between economics and general human culture. Consider, for example, the 
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following statement: “Competition as a discovery procedure must rely on self-interest 
of the producers … [I]t must allow them to use their knowledge for their purposes, 
because nobody else possesses the information on which they must base their decision.” 
Here Hayek gives the impression that he uses the term “self-interest” broadly to 
denote people’s motivations in general (“their purposes”). But in the very same 
paragraph he reveals that he means by “self-interest” only economic motivations. 
“[W]e rely on self-interest because only through it can we induce producers to use 
knowledge which we do not possess … The inducement to improve the manner of 
production will often consist in the fact that whoever does so first will thereby gain a 
temporary profit. Many of the improvements of production are due to each striving for 
such profits” (70). (For this reason, Hayek goes on to argue that it is “desirable not 
only to tolerate monopolies but even to allow them to exploit their monopolistic 
positions—so long as they maintain them solely by serving their customers better than 
anyone else, and not by preventing those who think they could do still better from 
trying to do so.” 73) This is not the place to dispute Hayek’s claim that producers will 
seek profit only by increasing productivity. The more curious point for us is his 
assertion that unfettered capitalist competition is the only way to operate a “discovery 
procedure” and thus the only path to cultural evolution, if not progress. 
There is much to ponder about Hayek’s plea to the concept of cultural 
evolution. Rejecting the bifurcated view of human values between “natural” and 
“artificial,” between desire and reason, he argues it is “culture”—“a tradition of learnt 
rules of conduct which have never been ‘invented’ and whose functions the acting 
individuals usually do not understand”—that shapes our concerns and behaviors (155). 
However, Hayek’s specific arguments about cultural evolution are strikingly dubious. 
He remarked: “The transition from the small band to the settled community and finally 
to the open society and with it to civilization was due to men learning to obey the same 
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abstract rules instead of being guided by innate instincts to pursue common perceived 
goals” (160, emphasis added). In his characteristic move, Hayek equates the market 
economy (which he uses synonymously with the “open society,” 162) with civilization 
itself, and strongly implies that it is the final destination of cultural evolution. It is here 
that Hayek’s concept of evolution as a purportedly neutral process of “cultural 
selection” betrays its own teleological and normative baggage. As he admits, “I have 
so far carefully avoided saying that evolution is identical with progress, but when it 
becomes clear that it was the evolution of a tradition which made civilization possible, 
we may at least say that spontaneous evolution is a necessary if not a sufficient 
condition of progress” (168). Seen in this light, Hayek’s argument is not prospective 
as he claims but in fact retrospective. He champions capitalism not because it opens 
up room for cultural progress but because its perceived achievement—productivity 
and material abundance—is what he endorses. Within this framework, Hayek’s 
emphasis on the limitation of human knowledge no longer works as a humbling 
reminder of human finitude but as a defense mechanism of market capitalism. Since 
the evolutionary process culminating in capitalism came about by individuals 
following rules they do not fully understand, they cannot change its course even if 
they find the consequences of capitalism pernicious. “Man has been civilized very 
much against his wishes” (168). 
The last point—that cultural evolution qua capitalist development occurs 
against keenly felt human needs—illuminates profoundly authoritarian tendencies of 
Hayek’s theory: he does not simply champion the objective aspect of capitalism such 
as productivity. Rather, he promotes a specific kind of subjectivity that abides by rules 
of market capitalism. This subjectivity is attuned with what Hayek calls “rational 
behavior” which he contrasts to “emotions” or “innate instincts.” According to him, 
“emotions” belong to the “kind of society in which [man] had lived in the dim past” 
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where, as hunters and gatherers, human beings pursued “common perceived goals” 
(160). Singling out the claim that sharing was a way of life in primitive human society, 
Hayek insists “these habits [of sharing] had to be shed to make the transition to the 
market economy and the open society possible” (162). What troubles him, then, is the 
recalcitrant fact that people still do not realize their disposition to share and pursue the 
common good is not consistent with the current stage of their evolution. Such a 
disposition is too deeply ingrained in our existence; to catch up with civilization, 
therefore, we need to reprogram ourselves.53 “The conduct required for the 
preservation of a small band of hunters and gatherers, and that presupposed by an open 
society based on exchange, are very different. But while mankind had hundreds of 
thousands of years to acquire and genetically to embody the responses need for the 
former, it was necessary for the rise of the latter that he not only learned to acquire 
new rules, but that some of the new rules served precisely to repress the instinctive 
reactions no longer appropriate to the Great Society [i.e., the capitalist society]” (164, 
emphasis added). 
Hayek felt that “innate instincts” were becoming threateningly pervasive in his 
time. “At present, … an ever increasing part of the population of the Western World 
grow up as members of large organizations and thus as strangers to those rules of the 
market which have made the great open society possible. To them the market economy 
is largely incomprehensible; they have never practised the rules on which it rests, and 
its results seem to them irrational and immoral. They often see in it merely an arbitrary 
structure maintained by some sinister power. In consequence, the long-submerged 
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innate instincts have again surged to the top. Their demand for a just distribution ... [is] 
based on primordial emotions” (165; see also 160). 
With a deep suspicion toward the opposition to what he firmly believes is the 
foundation of civilization, Hayek enters a precarious territory. If people will not 
behave rationally on their own, we may have to induce them to do so. Contradicting 
his own claim that rationality is what emerges out of spontaneous social coordination, 
Hayek sets out to devise a “method” that would inculcate rationality within individuals. 
This is possible because rationality is not a given quality, but the outcome of 
institutional arrangements. As he puts it, “rational behavior is not a premise of 
economic theory … The basic contention of theory is rather that competition will 
make it necessary for people to act rationally in order to maintain themselves” (75). Or, 
more bluntly: “Competition is as much a method for breeding certain types of mind as 
anything else” (76). Also, Hayek does not forget to give us a more specific description 
of how “competition” works. Economic theory is “based not on the assumption that 
most or all the participants in the market process are rational, but, on the contrary, on 
the assumption that it will in general be through competition that a few relatively more 
rational individuals will make it necessary for the rest to emulate them in order to 
prevail” (75, emphasis added). 
Thus Hayek’s method that would stem the rising tide of “emotional” demands 
for justice is centered on the protection of “a few relatively more rational individuals” 
from the majority of the population who have yet to adjust their behavior to the rules 
of the capitalist market. But who, exactly, are those rational individuals? 
 
“This should be remembered particularly by those who are inclined to 
argue that competition will not work among people who lack the spirit 
of enterprise: let merely a few rise and be esteemed and powerful 
because they have successfully tried new ways … and let those tempted 
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to imitate them be free to do so … and that spirit of enterprise will 
emerge by the only method which can produce it” (76). 
 
Hayek’s advocacy of a small cadre of entrepreneurs as proselytizers of capitalism 
finally reveals the reason why he wants to restrict political freedom in favor of 
economic freedom. Unfettered capitalism inflicts too much damage on the majority—
or in Hayek’s terminology, conflicts too much with our “primordial emotions”—to 
gain popular support. As he states, “[i]f in a society in which the spirit of enterprise 
has not yet spread, the majority has power to prohibit whatever it dislikes, it is most 
unlikely that it will allow competition to arise. I doubt whether a functioning market 
has ever newly arisen under an unlimited democracy, and it seems at least likely that 
unlimited democracy will destroy it where it has grown up” (77). From the perspective 
of cultural evolution Hayek advances, this is of course an unacceptable 
underdevelopment. If evolution means a devastation of the life of the majority, so be it: 
that is a small cost to pay to make progress toward, and remain in, “civilization.” “The 
intellectual growth of a community,” Hayek asserts, again conveniently switching 
from economic to epistemological registers, “rests on the views of a few gradually 
spreading, even to the disadvantage of those who are reluctant to accept them” (76). 
To rescue democracy from spiraling into barbarism, Hayek proposes to 
circumscribe democracy so as to ensure that the majority’s demands cannot infringe 
upon the economic freedom of a few entrepreneurs. Already in The Road to Serfdom, 
he argued that democracy is “essentially a means, a utilitarian device for safeguarding 
internal peace and individual freedom” (78). Now writing in the late 1970s, Hayek 
calls for the “dethronement of politics” (128). The currently “prevailing form of 
democracy” that interferes with the working of capitalism, he decries, “is ultimately 
self-destructive.” “It is therefore necessary to restrain these powers in order to protect 
democracy against itself,” and more specifically, “it will be necessary to make 
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provision against the ever-recurring infection with such illusions that is bound again 
and again to cause an inadvertent slide into socialism (149).” As such a cure for the 
“ever-recurring infection,” Hayek proposes a “model constitution” centered on a 
legislative upper house armed with a number of “safeguards” that would keep it 
insulated from political pressures. (Its members, for example, would be guaranteed a 
position of lay judges after serving as legislators a single term of fifteen years) (105-
127, esp. 111-117). Hayek speculates that his model constitution would be particularly 
useful for “those new countries which, without a tradition ever remotely similar to the 
ideal of the Rule of Law which the nations of Europe have long held, have adopted 
from the latter the institutions of democracy without the foundations of beliefs and 
convictions presupposed by those institutions” (108). His prediction would be realized 
with a cruel irony. As we will see in Chapter 4, Hayek’s institutional design would be 
adopted by Augusto Pinochet’s authoritarian regime in Chile as a means to repress and 
dissipate democratic beliefs and convictions. 
Although it was never a dominant view, Hayek’s correlation of democracy and 
capitalism exerted substantial ideological and political influence in the postwar period. 
(As we will examine in Chapter 4, the full-fledged economic restructuring of politics 
implicit in the Hayekian doctrine will begin to materialize starting in the 1970s with 
the rise of neoliberalism.) Most importantly, it played a crucial role in transforming 
the New Deal, the reigning ideology of the day. Since its inception and up until the 
mid-1930s, the New Deal was concerned primarily with the regulation by the 
government of the structure and performance of capitalism. As noted in the previous 
section, however, the New Deal was put under enormous pressure in the late-1930s, as 
opponents mobilized around anti-totalitarianism and supporters, alarmed by the spread 
of totalitarian regimes aboard, grew increasingly uneasy with the centralization of 
power at home. As the historian Alan Brinkley has put it, “few liberals could remain 
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unaffected by an environment in which the specter of totalitarianism was a staple of 
public discourse and private thought.”54 Battered by anti-totalitarianism, the 
regulatory strand of the New Deal gradually yet definitively gave way to the hitherto 
marginal Keynesian position that viewed the government essentially as a 
compensatory, not a regulatory, agency.55 Like the regulatory position, the Keynesian 
approach emphasized government spending, but not to directly promote and guide the 
production (e.g., roads, bridges, dams, etc.) but to boost mass consumption in the 
expectation that it would drive production and investment. As Alvin Hansen, an 
important economist of the New Deal, presciently remarked as early as in 1940, 
departing from his earlier advocacy of regulatory policies, “[c]onsumption … is the 
frontier of the future.”56 The decline of the regulatory vision has far-reaching 
implications, as it was accompanied by the demise of a whole range of left economic 
visions, effectively placing the Keynesian variant of the New Deal at the far left of the 
ideological spectrum. That this profound change occurred in less than a decade is hard 
to understand without taking into account the powerful influence of anti-
totalitarianism. The horrors of totalitarianism, most powerfully and influentially 
invoked in Hayek’s work, put liberalism on the defensive. And the correlation of 
democracy and capitalism, packaged as part of anti-totalitarianism, penetrated, and 
redirected, liberalism. 
Of course, anti-totalitarianism was not the only factor that influenced the 
transformation of the New Deal. The war achieved something to which various 
regulatory policies had only aspired for decades: it ended the Great Depression. 
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“Between 1939 and 1945, the GNP grew by more than 50 percent. Although the bulk 
of the growth was a result of military production, the consumer economy expanded by 
12 percent during the same years. Unemployment, the most persistent and troubling 
economic problem of the 1930s, all but vanished.”57 The incredible wartime economic 
growth few had foreseen served as nothing short of an inspiration for shifting the focus 
of the economic system away from production, regulation, and redistribution to 
demand, consumption, and growth. 
In understanding the rise, and the future unfolding, of the Keynesian variant of 
the New Deal, it is important to note that the war, and the consequent economic boom, 
exerted a decisive influence on what amounted to a metamorphosis of organized labor 
as a political force. Throughout the 1930s and the early 1940s, the labor movement put 
as much effort in forming itself into an independent political force that has a say in the 
determination of the economic structure as in making specific demands such as higher 
wages and improved working conditions. Undergoing the war and in the midst of 
economic prosperity in the postwar years, however, the focus of the labor movement 
decidedly shifted from solidarity, political organization, and structural reform to 
raising individual workers’ standard of living.58 Like the “compensatory turn” of the 
New Deal, the deradicalization of organized labor would have lasting consequences, 
few of which were readily visible at the time. One such consequence is the 
fragmentation of labor. Having largely abandoned its earlier efforts to form an 
independent political force based on broad social solidarity, organized labor was 
unable to challenge the postwar economy’s trend toward the segmentation of labor. As 
Nelson Lichtenstein notes, the postwar economy divided the American working class 
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into relatively favorably placed union members and “a still larger stratum, 
predominantly young, minority, and female, that was left out in the cold.”59 This 
division not only weakened organized labor but ultimately undermined political 
support for the (modest) welfare state established by the New Deal (e.g., blue-collar 
workers came to resent state-funded welfare, especially as the tax code became 
increasingly regressive, whereas unrepresented workers as well as the general 
population were led to suspect trade unions are merely “interest groups”). Moreover, 
organized labor’s retreat from structural issues deprived it of capabilities for 
participating in the reorganization of the political economy, which would prove almost 
fatal to its existence when the structural basis of the economy shifts as in the 1970s. 
In the simultaneously anxious and complacent atmosphere created by anti-
totalitarianism and the postwar economic boom, intellectuals, too, failed to 
fundamentally challenge the Hayekian doctrine, even as they criticized its particular 
aspects. Most Cold War liberals were impressed by the postwar economy’s 
extraordinary success in sustaining growth and raising the standard of living for the 
majority of Americans and, even as they recognized deep-seated problems, glanced 
over them with a lighthearted expectation that continuing growth would solve them in 
the long run. For example, Lipset, while admitting that inequality was a problem to be 
tackled, expressed his admiration at how the expansion of capitalism narrowed the 
“gap between the living styles” of the various classes by increasing the purchasing 
power of previously impoverished segments of the population.60 As liberals decided 
to find peace with capitalism, Hayek’s claim that the capitalist form of economic 
freedom is the prerequisite for democracy was considered perhaps hysterical but never 
threatening to democracy. Indeed, many liberals let Hayek’s framing, if not his 
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specific arguments, affect their own view of democratic politics. As Theodor Rosenof 
notes, surveying the reception of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, “one of the most 
interesting things about Hayek’s critics—most of whom were New Deal liberals and 
democratic socialists—was the extent to which they shared Hayek’s fear of the 
totalitarian specter and warned against “too much” government economic intervention 
… While in the early and mid-1930s, when the horrors of depression and poverty were 
foremost in social democrats’ minds, many stressed the need for central planning to 
meet the economic crisis, now, in the 1940s, with the impact of totalitarianism 
foremost, they rejected central planning as a harbinger of political authority—even 
though the logic of their own case against Hayek led elsewhere.”61 This trend, 
moreover, would not be overturned in the subsequent decades. Even a new generation 
of liberals, who emerged protesting the perceived conservatism of Cold War liberalism, 
focused mostly on expanding civil liberties and rights to the previously excluded. 
Rights-based liberalism, of course, also advocated social insurance and public 
spending. But the fundamental reshaping of capitalism, which had preoccupied 
American liberalism for a long time, would never reoccupy the center of the debate 
over democracy. 
If anti-totalitarianism and the Hayekian doctrine were more potent than 
warranted by their intellectual validity, a good deal of it can be attributed to the fact 
that the United States was waging a war against totalitarianism. In the context of the 
Cold War, the protection of liberal democracy from totalitarian enemies, outside as 
well as inside, became a national security issue, the handling of which can bypass, if 
not override, popular sovereignty. To put it another way, the war helped place the very 
meaning of democracy beyond the reach of democratic contestation. This ironic 
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practice was defended not only as an emergency, thus temporary, measure but as a 
perpetual state under the name of “scientific management.” In the next section, let us 
examine how intellectual justifications for, and technologies of, this management grew 
out of the Cold War. 
 
The National Security State, “War Sciences,” and the Management of 
Democracy 
The postwar years witnessed the rise of powerful intellectual justifications as 
well as the institutional infrastructure for a high level of bureaucratic or technocratic 
practices. To be sure, technocracy was hardly new. Not to mention Weber’s theory of 
bureaucracy, the ideas of technocracy and social engineering enjoyed something of a 
fad among Progressive intellectuals in the interwar years and were put to practice 
especially after the New Deal got underway.62 But the technocracy of the postwar 
period was distinct in that it was framed specifically around national security concerns. 
In the postwar context, moreover, the idea of “national security” itself took on a 
radically different meaning. The Pearl Harbor attack and the perceived possibility of a 
nuclear war created a sense that security threats are ubiquitous and constant. As 
Michael Latham observes, “[f]rom 1941 through the entire Cold War period, 
American policymakers would think less in terms of the static, quantifiable, material 
needs of “defense” and more in terms of the open-ended, ever-changing challenges of 
“security” … Rather than attempting to preserve an order based on a balance of power, 
they began an ideological struggle over the direction of global civilization itself. How, 
they asked, could the United States create an international environment in which its 
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values and institutions were most likely to spread and grow?”63 Many policymakers 
were convinced that this unprecedented security threat could be dealt with only 
through “scientific management,”64 and institutionalized a highly centralized and 
politically insulated bureaucratic structure most notably with the National Security Act 
of 1947.65 
While various aspects of the national security state has received extensive 
attention, what is only beginning to come to light is the extent to which the structure 
and function of the national security state was intertwined with the concept and 
practice of science. The intertwinement of the national security state and science is to 
be seen as a mutually transformative event. On the one hand, the Cold War 
transformed science from a socially engaged undertaking into a politically neutralized 
technocratic endeavor. A look at the debate in the philosophy of science concerning 
the nature of science—in particular, positivism (or logical empiricism) which 
ascended to the orthodox position in postwar America—illustrates this point. When it 
was first conceived, logical empiricism was not simply a philosophical doctrine; it was 
a progressive reform project. First generation logical empiricists such as Otto Neurath, 
Philipp Frank, and Charles Morris shared the belief that the philosophy of science 
should be politically as well as historically aware, and that a formal study of logic and 
semantics should be accompanied by the sustained inquiry into values, the sociology 
of science, and ideologies. While there were disputes over its specific arguments, this 
logical empiricism was generally welcomed in the 1930s by America’s progressive 
intellectuals (including Dewey) as an attempt to make social progress through a 
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symbiosis between science and democracy.66 But undergoing the Second World War, 
logical empiricism gradually yet decisively lost its politically engaged vision, and 
became a formal, abstract, and apolitical field, that is, what we associate today with 
the name positivism.67 In the 1950s, new leaders of logical empiricism such as Hans 
Reichenbach, Herbert Feigl, and Richard Rudner envisioned a lofty and insulated view 
of the scientific community indifferent to and immune from public debate—a view 
that is unmistakably in favor of the military-science collaboration during the Cold 
War.68 Upon Reichenbach’s portrayal, scientists are governed by an algorithmic logic 
(“cognition”) alone, while the general populace by “volitions.” For scientific activities, 
Reichenbach maintains, “it is therefore irrelevant where volitions come from … [or] 
whether we are conditioned to our volitions by the milieu in which we grew up.”69 
Positivism’s extraordinary success in postwar America is difficult to understand 
without considering the fact that political neutrality became its central tenet. As David 
Hollinger has insightfully remarked, “[i]nvocations of the term “science” tell us “less 
about how science works than about the cultural conflicts in society at large.”70 
On the other hand, science profoundly transformed the national security state. 
The RAND Corporation and its influence on the structure and function of the national 
security state is a case in point.71 Worrying that the end of war would turn the 
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attention of scientific and technical experts away from military and strategic concerns, 
the U.S. Army Air Force and the Douglas Aircraft Company created a technically 
independent think tank which was RAND. While initially it dealt primarily with 
technical problems (e.g., calculating the trajectories of the intercontinental ballistic 
missiles), RAND soon ventured into a comprehensive array of problems and began to 
supply “scientific” and “objective” public policies professedly free from politics and 
partisanship. (By the end of the 1950s, economists had become the dominant group at 
RAND.) The stock in trade, so to speak, of RAND was “systems analysis,” which 
involves quantitative assessments and the cost-benefit analysis of logistical, 
organizational, or strategic problems. The first successful systems analysis study was 
to determine the best configuration of bomber bases. Albert Wohlstetter, a 
mathematician at RAND, constructed a model on the assumption that all overseas 
American bomber bases were attacked simultaneously by the Soviet Union, leaving 
the United States completely incapacitated. Naturally, Wohlstetter’s mathematical 
model spewed out an enormous arms build-up as a solution. At first Wohlstetter’s 
study got cold-shouldered by the military, because his almost paranoid assumption 
was contrary to all intelligence available then (and since). But eventually his scenario 
made its way into the policy-making community, importantly through its claim to 
scientific objectivity, effecting “a mind-boggling peace-time arms build up that 
outstripped the Soviet’s armament manufacture pace by a factor of at least 15 to 1.”72 
Also, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense under Kennedy who just won the 
election partly by successfully exploiting the fictitious notion of a “missile gap” 
suggested by a RAND report, radically restructured the Department of Defense using 
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management technologies developed in RAND. Undertaken in accordance with the 
methodology known as the “Planning-Programming-Budgeting System” (PPBS), the 
crux of this restructuring was to link strategic matters with budget concerns—a bundle 
which would then be handled singly by McNamara who had no military experience. 
The DOD restructuring, in other words, produced a highly centralized decision-
making structure that alienated internal discussion over policies, let alone public 
debate. 
For our purposes, it is important to recognize that “scientific” management 
technologies did not simply justify and facilitate elite-driven technocracy. Those 
technologies also embodied and promoted a particular disposition toward ordinary 
people. In order to interrogate this matter, we need to approach science, as Andrew 
Pickering suggests, as a “zone of encounter between human and nonhuman agency—a 
place of struggle where human agency in its many guises (the scale and social 
relations of human actors, their interest and disciplined practices, and so on) is 
reciprocally reconfigured in relation to the contours and powers of nonhuman agencies 
like machines, instruments, and experimental set-ups.” In other words, we need to shift 
our attention from a “history of ideas” that “understand[s] scientific ideas as evolving 
under its own logic” to a “history of agency: a history of social agents in relation to the 
becoming of material agents.”73 This shift in perspective enables us to see an aspect of 
Cold War science that has not received sufficient attention: World War II and the Cold 
War brought into prominence a mechanical mode of subjectivity conducive to 
management and control. And the sciences recruited and mobilized for military 
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purposes systematically and on a massive scale like never before—“war sciences”—
played a crucial role in the construction of that subjectivity.74 
At the outset, war sciences were primarily concerned with optimization of the 
hardware such as radar in antisubmarine or antiaircraft warfare. The distinct challenge 
that war sciences faced was the need to translate heterogeneous agglomerations of 
actors, machines, and messages to a homogeneous language that can facilitate more 
effective surveillance and control.75 This explains why war sciences relied heavily on 
statistics (which converts various factors into numerically comparable categories). But 
more fundamentally, war sciences needed something like a new ontology of the enemy 
to even begin to perform their task. After all, what is the use of sophisticated statistics 
if one cannot settle the unit of measurement? Thus created, not on battlefield but in the 
laboratories, this enemy was something unique. As Peter Galison writes, it was neither 
the racialized enemy (e.g., opponents dehumanized as a beast or vermin) nor the 
anonymous enemy (e.g., individuals on enemy soil as the remote and invisible target 
of air raid). It was, instead, a “mechanized Enemy Other” that “was neither invisible 
nor irrational … [but] at home in the world of strategy, tactics, and maneuver, all the 
while thoroughly inaccessible to us, separated by a gulf of distance, speed, and 
metal.”76 
Norbert Wiener, a physicist who was involved in the improvement of 
antiaircraft technologies during World War II, provides an illuminating vision of this 
new ontology. Wiener’s idea was to use electronic networks to predict in advance the 
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position of an attacking plane, and use that knowledge to direct an antiaircraft gun. 
Given that the most advanced technology of tracing an airplane then available was the 
gunner’s vision and concentration, it is no surprise that the military took interest in 
Wiener’s proposal. Of course, the great difficulty of mechanically tracing an aircraft 
came from the fact that the “target” was not entirely mechanical. Undoubtedly the 
enemy pilot maneuvered the bombers to evade artillery fire and, in doing so, generated 
irregularities that could not be easily calculated. So as he tried to make the actual 
device that would implement his ideas in the summer of 1941, Wiener was in dire 
need of finding a way to formalize the behavior of the enemy pilot. As Wiener later 
remarked, because it was impossible to “eliminate the human element as far as it 
shows itself in enemy behavior … in order to obtain as complete a mathematical 
treatment as possible of the over-all control problem, it [was] necessary to assimilate 
the different parts of the system to a single basis, either human or mechanical. Since 
our understanding of the mechanical elements of gun pointing appeared to us to be far 
ahead of our psychological understanding, we chose to try to find a mechanical 
analogue of the gun pointer and the airplane pilot.”77 And this was the result of that 
assimilation: 
 
We realized that the “randomness” or irregularity of an airplane’s path 
is introduced by the pilot; that in attempting to force his dynamic craft 
to execute a useful manoeuver, such as straight-line flight or 180 degree 
turn, the pilot behaves like a servo-mechanism, attempting to overcome 
the intrinsic lag due to the dynamics of his plane as a physical system, 
in response to a stimulus which increases in intensity with the degree to 
which he has failed to accomplish his task. A further factor of 
importance was that the pilot’s kinaesthetic reaction to the motion of 
the plane is quite different from that which his other senses would 
normally lead him to expect, so that for precision flying, he must 
disassociate his kinaesthetic from his visual sense.78 
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This description tells us a great deal about the ontology of the mechanized Enemy 
Other. First of all, this ontology is behaviorist in the basic sense that the behavior of 
the Other is all that counts; what he may think or intend is unknowable and utterly 
irrelevant.79 Just like we would do with other servomechanisms such as guided 
missiles, we deduce the purpose of the enemy pilot from his past behavior (he has 
been trying to shoot down our airplanes, so that is his purpose), and predict his future 
behavior the same way. Second, the pilot is perceived as a homeostatic mechanism 
that adjusts itself in response to changes in the environment through its feedback 
function. In other words, a person is deterministically ensconced within the 
environment. He can change only himself, not the environment. Lastly, Wiener’s 
experiment is premised on a highly disciplined subject. What he observed was a 
situation in which the pilot had to dissociate his maneuvering from his normal senses. 
Moreover, the pilot is constantly disciplined by the plane (a stimulus to the pilot’s 
body increases in intensity with the degree to which he failed to meet the plane’s 
mechanical demands—this is called “inverse feedback”). It is under such an 
extraordinary condition that a person’s behavior becomes machine-like and thus 
mechanically predictable. 
It is not impossible to see this conception of a person could serve some 
military purposes. (Wiener’s project ultimately failed. Although he was able to predict 
the position of the attacking plane with remarkable precision, he could do so only two 
seconds in advance—too short a time to adjust the antiaircraft gun.) But Wiener 
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insisted that his servomechanical theory, which he later calls “cybernetics,”80 be 
applied to human nature in general, arguing that “men … are like machines from the 
scientific standpoint.”81 Indeed, the idea that both humans and nonhumans are alike 
goal-oriented feedback mechanisms capable of learning and adjusting profoundly 
influenced the postwar development of the natural as well as social sciences. One of 
the major venues for the diffusion of cybernetics was a series of conferences 
sponsored by the Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation between 1942 and 1952. Participants in 
this conference series included not just natural scientists but such eminent social 
scientists as Kurt Lewin, Gregory Bateson, Margaret Mead, and Karl Deutsch, many 
of whom were inspired to apply the feedback concept to societal and managerial 
problems.82 As Warren McCulloch stated in a memorandum distributed in advance of 
the tenth conference and included as an appendix in the proceedings, “Norbert Wiener 
and his friends … had shown the applicability of the notions of inverse feedback to all 
problems of regulation, homeostasis, and goal-directed activity from steam engines to 
human societies.”83 It is also to be noted that John von Neumann and Oscar 
Morgenstern participated in the early Macy cybernetics meetings shortly before they 
coauthored Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, which became a foundational 
text of game theory at RAND and beyond. With this wide-ranging impact of 
cybernetics in mind, Pickering went so far as to suggest that feedback thought in 
                                                 
80 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1961). 
81 Arturo Rosenblueth and Norbert Wiener, “Purposeful and Non-purposeful Behavior,” Philosophy of 
Science 17(4) (1950), 326, emphasis added. 
82 George P. Richardson, Feedback Thought in Social Science and Systems Theory (Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 95-96. 
83 Warren S. McCulloch, “Summary of the Points of Agreement Reached in the Previous Nine 
Conferences on Cybernetics,” in Cybernetics: Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological 
and Social Systems: Transactions of the Tenth Conference, ed. Heinz von Foerster (New York: Josiah 
Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1953), 70. Examples of feedback phenomena mentioned include, among others, 
cardiac flutter and fibrillation, the control functions of the cerebellum, various pathologies of the 
nervous system, the polling of public opinion, fluctuations of markets, and arms races. McCulloch also 
mentioned cultural anthropologists who study rules with respect to kinship, forms of address, praise, 
blame, etc. as negative feedback mechanisms serving to stabilize society. Ibid., 71-75. 
 112 
general and cybernetics in particular “took computer-controlled gun control and 
layered it in an ontologically indiscriminate fashion across the academic disciplinary 
board … [C]ybernetics … turn[ed] itself into a universal metaphysics, a Theory of 
Everything.”84 
In the next chapter, I will examine theoretical implications of applying the 
Wienerian ontology to democratic politics in more detail by analyzing how it figures 
in influential theories of democracy such as behavioralism and rational choice theory. 
Here it suffices to note that, within the framework of war sciences, the idea of 
insulated technocracy went hand in hand with the mechanistic, objectified view of a 
person whose intentions are disregarded and whose activities can and should be 
disciplined to fulfill predetermined purposes. In that respect, the central mechanism 
that shaped the practice of democratic politics during the Cold War was not based 
solely on the logic of exclusion as embodied in technocracy. Rather, it was double-
sided in that it entailed both exclusion and discipline. 
Two examples serve to illustrate this point. One is the trajectory of the Johnson 
administration’s war on poverty initiative.85 Initially, the architects of the war on 
poverty placed great emphasis on transforming local institutions and getting the poor 
involved in those institutions, believing that political alienation is one of the central 
factors that perpetuates the vicious cycle of poverty. This emphasis is reflected in the 
centrality of the Community Action Programs (CAPs) to the initial plan, which were 
intended to address the problem of poverty through coordination between locally 
organized nonprofit community corporations and the federal government. Influential 
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figures such as David Hackett, Richard Boone, and Frederick Hayes advocated 
“maximum feasible participation” of the poor in community programs as a way of 
mobilizing and empowering them as autonomous political agents, instead of treating 
them as passive recipients. While the phrase “maximum feasible participation” 
managed to find its way to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, its implementation 
quickly proved to be “too chaotic” for the taste of the systems analysts at the Pentagon, 
the economists at the Bureau of Budget, and the White House. This growing 
disillusionment in Washington resulted in the transformation of the entire war on 
poverty program in accordance with the PPBS. For example, Sargent Shriver who 
headed the Office of the Economic Opportunity presiding over the war on poverty—
and who had never been sympathetic to the CAPs—set out to eliminate participatory 
elements from his agency. In doing so, Shriver turned to his close friend for advice: 
Robert McNamara. McNamara, as noted, was not particularly fond of a decentralized 
decision-making structure and advised Shriver to establish a centralized system like 
the one he was running at the Pentagon. Taking McNamara’s advice, Shriver 
established a program analysis office reporting directly to him and hired RAND 
analyst Joseph Kershaw as assistant director. And over the summer of 1965, Henry 
Rowen, one of McNamara’s “Whiz Kids” and later president of RAND, drew a more 
comprehensive plan for implementing the PPBS in the civilian agencies of the federal 
government. In August 1965, President Johnson endorsed the plan. 
The other case is the changing reaction to urban riots in the 1960s. Even as the 
Johnson administration was waging one war against Communism abroad and another 
on poverty at home, America did not seem anywhere near peace. In the late 1960s, a 
series of riots by African Americans broke out in different parts of the country—in 
Watts (1965), Newark (1967), and Detroit (1967). After a particularly violent incident 
in Detroit, Johnson established the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 
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headed by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, assigning it to determine the cause of 
rebellion and to find possible remedies. Rejecting the conservatives’ charge that 
militant agitators were behind the riots, the Kerner commission’s report highlighted, in 
the words of Commission co-chair John Lindsay, a “reservoir of grievances” of the 
“Negro community” in the ghettos.86 Reflecting the viewpoint of consensus-oriented 
Cold War liberalism, the report suggested a piecemeal approach to the problem. Its 
suggestions—more low-income housing program, more urban renewal projects, jobs 
for the unemployed, improved police-community relations—sounded reasonable but 
did not really depart from the policies that the administration was already pursuing. At 
a time when conservatives were mounting a highly effective attack on the war on 
poverty, especially the CAPs, blaming it for worsening urban violence by politicizing 
the poor, the Johnson administration needed something punchier. Also, the Kerner 
report failed to address perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the riots: the riots erupted 
not just in ghettos but more frequently in economically favorable places, being Watts 
the most conspicuous example. In need of more sophisticated, and probably more 
immediately practical, theories about civil unrest, law enforcement authorities turned 
to those with established credentials: military think tanks involved in the development 
of counterinsurgency strategies in Vietnam, such as the Institute for Defense Analysis 
and, again, RAND. 
Around the mid-1960s, RAND was undergoing a small paradigm shift in their 
approach to counterinsurgency. While much of counterinsurgency studies in the early 
1960s had focused on winning the “hearts and minds” of the people, RAND analysts 
began to seriously doubt the effectiveness of such a strategy and turned their attention 
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to “coercive counterinsurgency.”87 A RAND analyst named Guy Pauker, for example, 
conveyed this sentiment in his 1967 paper. Reflecting on “the history of nationalist 
movements in the Third World,” Pauker argued that “there is a crucial point at which 
reforms are no longer enough and a revolutionary situation has arisen,” and suggested 
that racial tensions in the United States had reached just such a point.88 Such a 
pessimistic assessment did not seem entirely unwarranted at the time. But the question 
was: if reform is not going to work, what is the alternative? Two counterinsurgency 
specialists at RAND, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., worked on this question in 
a series of papers between 1966 and 1970. They criticized the “hearts-and-minds view” 
for focusing too much on the “demand side” (e.g., people’s sympathies for insurgents), 
and proposed to pay attention to the “supply side” which involves “factors within the 
insurgent organization which influence its capabilities and growth” (e.g., resources 
that insurgents can extract from the local population). Positing as their “fundamental 
assumption” that the population behaves “rationally” (i.e., behaves according to the 
cost-benefit analysis) and using mathematical models and graphs, Leits and Wolf drew 
the conclusion that insurgencies can be controlled most effectively by increasing the 
cost of instigating or supporting them.89 
Setting aside the validity of their model in the war context (which is at least 
debatable given the consequences of the escalation of violence in Vietnam), what 
concerns us here is Leites’s and Wolf’s claim that their theory can be applied directly 
to civilian politics or, as they put it, to “contemporary urban disorders and campus 
rebellions in the more developed countries.”90 Specifically challenging the analysis of 
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the Kerner report, Leites and Wolf argued that the socioeconomic environment was 
not a determining factor of the riots. “From an economic standpoint, Watts in 1965 
was probably among the most favorably situated of the black communities in the U.S. 
When one looks at the Detroit riots of 1967, it turns out that incomes of rioters were 
significantly higher than those of non-rioters … Similarly, campus rebellions have 
often been most severe in those academic centers (for example, Berkeley, Columbia, 
Wisconsin, Cornell, Harvard, and Swarthmore) where living and learning conditions 
were among the best.”91 Thus, instead of continuing the reform as the Kerner report 
had suggested, Leites’s and Wolf’s study asserted that the government would do a lot 
better (in terms of efficiency) by simply raising the cost of rebellion: collecting 
intelligence on potential threats, isolating rioters from the general population, and 
selectively “inflicting damage” on troublemakers.92 Coercive counterinsurgency 
advocated by Leites and Wolf would heavily influence America’s third world policy 
and set the tone for its domestic policies toward civil unrest.93 
In the late 1960s, civil violence was indeed reaching an unprecedented level 
and posed a genuine challenge to policymakers. But the decline of the structural 
approach exemplified by the Kerner report and the rise of RAND-style coercive tactics 
imported from war zones are indicative of the rapidly shrinking room for the 
deepening of democratic politics, opened up for a brief period of time. Rebellious 
actions were no longer viewed as the expression of a “reservoir of grievances” but as 
“crimes” and, worse, “insurgencies” to be controlled and suppressed. More 
fundamentally, this tale makes clear that there is a serious tension between the Cold 
War variant of “scientific management” and democratic politics, not simply because 
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scientific management favors a centralized decision-making process but also because 
it is predicated on the ontology that looks upon its object—citizens in this case—as an 
enemy to combat, not as a fellow to work with. 
 
Conclusion: The Emergence of Instrumental Democracy 
Today, we barely pause before equating democracy with a set of attributes 
such as voters, elections, or competing parties. What goes unnoticed is the extent to 
which the substance of democracy beneath those formal attributes was structured by 
historical conditions associated with the Cold War. In this chapter, I have sought to 
unearth those conditions in order to subject some of those substantive issues to critical 
scrutiny. Is individual preference the only viable foundation of democracy? Do 
democracy and capitalism constitute a seamless symbiosis? Is democratic politics to 
be subordinated to the knowledge and techniques of “experts”? 
To address these questions, we need to shift our mode of investigation and 
examine how individual pieces identified thus far form a coherent whole. I take up this 
task in the next chapter by analyzing behavioralism and rational choice theory as 
symptomatic articulations of Cold War imperatives. In anticipation of that discussion, 
let us consider an early inspiration for those theories: Joseph Schumpeter’s 
“procedural” theory of democracy. In Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 
published in 1942, Schumpeter challenged what he calls the “classical doctrine of 
democracy” and provided an alternative concept of democracy. He starts out 
denouncing the concept of the common good and the “will of the people” as the 
foundation of democracy. The classical doctrine, Schumpeter claims, mistakenly 
presupposes that “there exists a Common Good” that is “always simple to define and 
which every normal person can be made to see by means of rational argument.” This 
presupposition implies “definite answers to all questions so that every social fact and 
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every measure taken or to be taken can unequivocally be classed as “good” or “bad.”” 
Add to this the belief that “there is also a Common Will of the people (= will of all 
reasonable individuals) … that is exactly coterminous with the common good or 
interest or welfare or happiness,” and we have a full-fledged picture of totalitarianism 
where “[t]he only thing, barring stupidity and sinister interests, that can possibly bring 
in disagreement and account for the presence of an opposition is a difference of 
opinion as to the speed with which the goal, itself common to nearly all, is to be 
approached.”94 
Schumpeter’s hugely influential rendering of the classical theory of democracy 
provides a glimpse into the dimension of democracy lost in the Cold War.95 By 
equating the will of the people with the aggregation of private individuals’ 
predetermined preferences, Schumpeter completely ignores the dynamic and political 
nature of the formation of the popular will, which is central to the classical theory of 
democracy. Rousseau, a major spokesperson of the classical doctrine, makes this clear 
in his distinction between “the will of all” that is “no more than a sum of particular 
wills” and “the general will” that “considers only the common good.” Rousseau’s 
claim that the general will considers “only” the common good might have easily 
invoked an image of totalitarianism in the minds steeped in Cold War culture, such as 
Schumpeter’s. What went unnoticed, however, is the fact that Rousseau explicitly 
rejects any permanent homogenization of individual differences. As he states in book 
II, chapter 3 of the Social Contract, “[i]f there were no different interests, the common 
                                                 
94 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942), 250. 
95 Schumpeter’s critique provoked impassioned responses. John Plamenatz scathingly remarked that 
Schumpeter’s attack on “what [Schumpeter] called “the classical theory of democracy … is ignorant 
and inept.” Schumpeter’s theory is “worth discussing,” Plamenatz fumed, “only because it has been 
taken seriously … I suspect that not a few American political scientists, immersed in their studies of 
political behaviour in the largest of the Western democracies, gladly took [Schumpeter’s] word for it 
that the theories of the past, which they were too busy to read, were so unrealistic as not to be worth 
reading.” John P. Plamenatz, Democracy and Illusion (London: Longman, 1973), 96, 99. See also 
Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 
chaps. 1-2. 
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interest would be barely felt, as it would encounter no obstacle; all would go on of its 
own accord, and politics would cease to be an art.”96 The “art of politics” is nothing 
but the heart of Rousseau’s democratic theory; and it is most distinctively a dynamic 
process. Rousseau argues that the “act of association” creates “a corporate and 
collective body” in place of private interests and that this collective body “receive[s] 
from this act its unity, its common identity, its life, and its will.”97 Based on this 
observation, Rousseau offers another suggestive distinction: “This public person … is 
called … State when passive, [and] Sovereign when active.”98 
According to Rousseau’s last distinction, one may understand Schumpeter’s 
theory as an attempt to replace the active state of democracy with the passive one. 
Reflecting the pessimistic view of human nature and the suspicion toward the masses 
that pervaded Cold War political imagination, Schumpeter contends that “groups” 
including professional politicians, exponents of an economic interest, or political 
activists “are able to fashion, and within very wide limits, even to create the will of the 
people.” The popular will that the classical doctrine elevates as the foundation of 
democracy is in actuality “manufactured” in a manner “analogous to the ways of 
commercial advertising.”99 Given this reality, Schumpeter proposes that we diminish 
the classical doctrine’s emphasis on “the people” and, instead, “make the deciding of 
issues by the electorate secondary to the election of the men who are to do the 
deciding.” Upon this shift in perspective, democracy is redefined as a “method” or an 
“institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals 
                                                 
96 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole (London: 
Everyman Library, 1993), 203. 
97 Ibid., 192, emphasis added. 
98 Ibid., 192-193. 
99 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 263. 
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acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote.”100 
As an early articulation of instrumental democracy, Schumpeter’s theory does 
not simply tilt the balance between Rousseau’s Sovereign and State towards the latter. 
Rather, it fundamentally redefines the relationship between Sovereign and State from 
an intricate balance to be worked out through the “art of politics” to an inherent 
conflict that commands the repression of one for the sake of the other. And predictably, 
that repression always works in favor of State. As I discuss in the next chapter, both 
behavioralism and rational choice theory illustrate mechanisms of this repression in 
detail. But one finds the most general and glaring statement of the tension between 
democracy as a modus operandi and democracy as a form of life in Samuel 
Huntington’s discussion of the “democratic excess.” In a 1975 study sponsored by the 
Trilateral Commission, entitled The Crisis of Democracy, Huntington somberly wrote 
about the dim future of democracy. He considers “contextual challenges” such as the 
aggressive behavior of the Soviet Union and the oil price increases and “social trends” 
including the increasing power of populist movements and critical intellectuals as a 
possible threat.101 But Huntington is worried about a more fundamental problem that 
stems from the very nature of democracy. “[P]erhaps most seriously, there are the 
intrinsic challenges to the viability of democratic government which grow directly out 
of the functioning of democracy. Democratic government … function[s] so as to give 
rise to forces and tendencies which, if unchecked by some outside agency, will 
eventually lead to the undermining of democracy … The more democratic a system is, 
indeed, the more likely it is to be endangered by intrinsic threats” (7-8). By this 
intrinsic challenge, Huntington means, primarily, increasing popular demands that 
                                                 
100 Ibid., 269. 
101 Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (New York: 
New York University Press, 1975), 4-7. Subsequent references cited parenthetically. 
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presumably exceed the capacity of the government. So like Schumpeter, Huntington, 
too, thinks that the “vitality of democracy” fundamentally conflicts with the 
“governability of democracy,” or more precisely, that the former threatens the latter. 
“[S]ome of the problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess 
of democracy.” To restore balance between “vitality and governability in the 
democratic government,” Huntington calls for a “greater degree of moderation in 
democracy” (113). 
 
“[T]he effective operation of a democratic political system usually 
requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of 
some individuals and groups. In the past, every democratic society has 
had a marginal population, of greater or lesser size, which has not 
actively participated in politics. In itself, this marginality on the part of 
some groups is inherently undemocratic, but it has also been one of the 
factors which has enabled democracy to function effectively. Marginal 
social groups, as in the case of the blacks, are now becoming full 
participants in the political system. Yet the danger of overloading the 
political system with demands which extend its functions and 
undermine its authority still remains. Less marginality on the part of 
some groups thus needs to be replaced by more self-restraint on the part 
of all groups” (114). 
 
Huntington, like everyone else writing in the early 1970s, did not know that the global 
diffusion of democracy—which Huntington himself later famously labels the “Third 
Wave”—was about to begin in just a few years. But his prescriptions in this passage 
would dictate, almost uncannily, the development of democracy in the following 
decades. As we saw in the Introduction, both new and old democracies suffer from 
political apathy, withdrawal, and disillusionment—signs of democratic disaffection—
despite the seeming triumph of democracy in the late twentieth century. One is 
tempted to say that lack of democratic vitality is what threatens the governability of 
democracy today. Indeed, next report to the Trilateral Commission, written twenty five 
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years later, is titled Disaffected Democracies and begins with the following question: 
“why, in some of the world’s oldest democracies, in an era in which democracy as a 
form of government has triumphed worldwide, is public confidence in leaders and the 
institutions of democratic governance at or near an all-time low?”102 My argument, 
which I began to make in this chapter and will unfold in the following chapters, is that 
democratic disaffection is closely related to the instrumentalization democracy 
underwent in the postwar era, the nature of which is implied in Huntington’s remarks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
102 Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam, Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the Trilateral 
Countries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), xv. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Logics of Instrumental Democracy: Scientific Theories of 
Democracy 
 
 
“Consistent as well as humane thought will be aware of the hateful 
irony of a philosophy which is indifferent to the conditions that 
determine the occurrence of reason while it asserts the ultimacy and 
universality of reason.” 
--John Dewey (1927)1 
 
“Any theory which denies a place to uncongenial modes of thinking 
and feeling, despite the fact that such modes have always existed and 
are even now threatening to reach epidemic proportions, ignores them 
at its peril.” 
--Norman Jacobson (1964)2 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined the historical emergence of instrumental 
democracy as an assemblage of Cold War imperatives and began to explore its 
theoretical implications by comparing Schumpeter’s theory of democracy to 
Rousseau’s. In this chapter, I want to investigate logics of instrumental democracy 
more closely by analyzing the vision of democracy formulated by behavioralism and 
rational choice theory in political science. Scholarly discourse is always symptomatic 
of the historical context in which it is produced, and the postwar era is no exception. 
Without taking into account the Cold War context, one may be left to wonder, for 
instance, why the state concept was almost banished from the discussion of American 
democracy at a very time when the American state was becoming more powerful than 
                                                 
1 John Dewey, The Later Works, 1925-1953, vol. 1 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1981-1990), 99. 
2 Norman Jacobson, “Political Science and Political Education,” American Political Science Review 
57(3) (1963), 561. 
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ever,3 or why the existence of the common good was denied when anti-Communism 
prevailed as the ultimate American cause. In particular, behavioralism and rational 
choice theory provide two distinct and yet equally clear articulations of instrumental 
democracy. Behavioralism elevates pluralism from a dilemma to an ideal of 
democracy, codifying the democracy constructed, and constricted, by anti-
totalitarianism. Rational choice theory shows that if citizens are completely reduced to 
rational individuals whose sole motivation is to maximize benefit and minimize cost 
and democracy to a mere instrument of aggregating the preferences of those 
individuals, there is no reason for them to participate in politics at all. 
Of course, I am not suggesting that behavioralism and rational choice theory 
are useless as a research tool. Like many other technologies, their historical origins do 
not necessarily determine the utility of behavioralism and rational choice theory as 
methods. Assessing their explanatory power and heuristic value is an important matter, 
but not pursued here.4 Instead, I approach behavioralism and rational choice theory as 
normative visions or narratives of democracy premised upon Cold War imperatives. 
Because behavioralism and rational choice theory construct a vision of democracy 
somewhat distanced from empirical reality, they provide a more coherent and clearer 
                                                 
3 Terence Ball, “American Political Science in Its Postwar Political Context,” in Discipline and History: 
Political Science in the United States, eds. James Farr and Raymond Seidelman (Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993), 218.  
4 There has been a heated debate surrounding behavioralism and rational choice theory as a method of 
political inquiry. For a critique of the scientific study of politics in general, see Charles Taylor, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Clarke E. 
Cochran, “The Politics of Interest: Philosophy and the Limitations of the Science of Politics,” American 
Journal of Political Science 17(4) (1973): 745-766; and essays in Essays on the Scientific Study of 
Politics, ed. Herbert J. Storing (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962). For a critique of 
behavioralism, see Christian Bay, “Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Critical Evaluation of Some 
Behavioral Literature,” American Political Science Review 59(1) (1959): 39-51; Charles Allan McCoy 
and John Playford, eds., Apolitical Politics: A Critique of Behavioralism (New York: Crowell, 1967); 
Marvin Surkin and Alan Wolfe eds., An End to Political Science: The Caucus Papers (New York: Basic 
Books, 1970). For a critique of rational choice theory, see Kirsten Renwick Monroe ed., The Economic 
Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1991); Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A 
Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). 
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articulation of instrumental democracy than what could be extracted from its historical 
origins in the previous chapter. This shift in focus reveals commonalities between 
behavioralism and rational choice theory that are otherwise quite different and often 
contending research programs.5 Together, behavioralism and rational choice theory 
redefine democracy in accordance with instrumental democracy. They posit 
individuals (or groups as a collection of individuals) as the fundamental basis of 
democracy. Inspired by Schumpeter’s ideas, behavioralism and rational choice theory 
reduce the common good to a sum of completed and unchallengeable individual 
preferences, dismissing as totalitarian Rousseau’s insight that the common good must 
be formed and reformed through people’s experience of coming and acting together as 
a (temporary) collective body. In stark contrast to theories in prior decades, 
behavioralism and rational choice theory discount the significance of political 
participation and refuse to interrogate people’s unwillingness to go beyond the narrow 
confines of their private domain. In fact, they legitimize political apathy, either as a 
means to naturally restrain the irrational force of the masses or as the natural outcome 
of individuals’ rational calculation. As behavioralism and rational choice theory 
envision it, democracy is a self-regulating mechanism that works out a compromise 
between expressed individual interests on its own largely separated from people’s 
actual contributions. 
This is an extremely dubious way of theorizing democracy, insofar as it 
interrogates neither the process through which specific interests are formed and come 
to be expressed nor the ways in which those interests are “processed” in the 
                                                 
5 Practitioners of rational choice theory often describe their movement as a reaction against 
insufficiently scientific behavioralism. See William Riker, “The Ferment of the 1950s and the 
Development of Rational Choice Theory,” in Contemporary Empirical Political Theory, ed. Kristen 
Renwick Monroe (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 191-201. For a 
critique of rational choice theory from the behavioralist point of view, see Green and Shapiro, 
Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. 
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mechanism called democracy. As I will demonstrate, what behavioralism and rational 
choice theory effectively do is to translate normative and historically contingent 
assumptions deeply embedded in Cold War America into a “scientific”—value-neutral 
and transhistorical—model of democracy. This may be a manifestation of American 
social sciences’ enduring desire to make their study more scientific, which was felt 
more acutely in the postwar period.6 But by failing to recognize historical conditions 
and forces that gave rise to their premises, behavioralism and rational choice theory 
participate in a form of collective amnesia that serves to reinforce instrumental 
democracy. While characteristically championing reason as the end of nature and the 
basis of science, John Dewey once remarked that reason is not a quality given 
spontaneously or naturally but a product of deliberate arts of politics and education. 
This is why, in the passage I cited as one of this chapter’s epigraphs, Dewey warns 
against the “hateful irony of a philosophy which is indifferent to the conditions that 
determine the occurrence of reason while it asserts the ultimacy and universality of 
reason.” Sadly, his warning went unheard; the scientific theories of democracy in the 
postwar years would be exposed to precisely that irony. 
This chapter is divided into four parts. First, I briefly sketch the history of 
American political science up until World War II. American political science emerged 
with a germ of paradox due to its double-sided aspiration to be value-free science and 
to serve the democratic ideal at once. Second, I examine how behavioralism 
conceptualizes democracy as a self-regulating mechanism that alienates people by 
                                                 
6 After World War II, there was real pressure on social scientists to demonstrate their scientific 
standing, especially regarding the entry of the social sciences into what would ultimately become the 
National Science Foundation (NSF). See Samuel Z. Klausner, “The Bid to Nationalize American Social 
Science,” in The Nationalization of the Social Sciences, eds., Samuel Z. Klausner and Victor M. Lidz 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 3-39. At the request of the Social Science 
Research Council (SSRC), sociologist Talcott Parsons drafted (though never actually used for the 
intended purpose) a paper stressing the scientific nature of the social sciences that would become 
crucial to the social scientists’ self-image. Talcott Parsons, “Science Legislation and the Social 
Sciences,” Political Science Quarterly 62(2) (1947): 241-249. 
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circumscribing the role of their contributions. Third, I interrogate how rational choice 
theory redefines democracy in terms of the narrow concept of rationality, and in doing 
so, produces an impoverished vision of democracy unable to elicit people’s support. 
Lastly, I broaden the scope of my discussion and examine how instrumental 
democracy influenced not only the concept of democracy but also its practice by 
becoming part of modernization theory. 
 
Between Science and Democracy: A Dilemma of American Political 
Science 
American political science was born, as it were, with a double allegiance to 
scientific neutrality and the democratic ideal.7 On the one hand, a group of reform-
minded individuals protested against religious doctrines and moral philosophy they 
deemed dogmatic and metaphysical, and turned to science, looking for the most 
advanced knowledge as well as the foundation of their intellectual and cultural 
authority.8 Especially after the publication of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species 
(1859), scientific research gained enormous prestige over theology, and became the 
                                                 
7 There is a vast literature on the development of American political science. Some of the notable 
works include: Bernard Crick, The American Science of Politics: Its Origins and Conditions (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959); Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, The 
Development of American Political Science: From Burgess to Behavioralism (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 
1967); Dorothy Ross, The Origins of American Social Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991); John G. Gunnell, Imagining the American Polity (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2004); David Ricci, The Tragedy of American Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, 
and Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Raymond Seidelman, with the assistance of 
Edward J. Harpham, Disenchanted Realists: Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884-1984 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985); James Farr, “The History of Political 
Science,” American Journal of Political Science 32 (1988): 1175-1195; Rogers M. Smith, “Still 
Blowing in the Wind: The American Quest for a Democratic, Scientific Political Science,” Dædalus; 
American Academic Culture in Transformation: Fifty Years, Four Disciplines 126(1) (1997): 253-287; 
Farr and Seidelman, Discipline and History. 
8 For the conflict between science and religion in this period, see David D. Hall, “The Victorian 
Connection,” in Victorian America, ed. Daniel Walker Howe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1976), 81-94; Frank M. Turner, Between Science and Religion (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1974); idem., “The Victorian Conflict between Science and Religion: A Professional Dimension,” 
Isis 69 (3) (1978): 356-376. 
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basis of university reform after the Civil War. Both academically and institutionally 
prominent post-Civil War intellectuals—Charles W. Eliot at Harvard, Andrew D. 
White at Cornell, Daniel C. Gilman at Johns Hopkins, William Graham Sumner at 
Yale, and John W. Burgess at Columbia—were captivated by the ideal of science that 
promised to reveal fundamental laws of nature and society.9 On the other hand, these 
self-avowed scientists did not want to abandon the traditional mission of universities 
that had been performed by moral philosophy in the pre-Civil War era, namely, 
promoting good citizenship.10 When he accepted the Presidency of Cornell and 
introduced “History, Political and Social Sciences” as one of the six departments in 
1868, White proclaimed political science as an essential component of the education 
of those who would “rise to positions of trust in public service.”11 Likewise, Burgess 
said that the Columbia School of Political Science (the first graduate program of 
political science in the United States) he founded at 1880 was “designed to prepare 
young men for all the branches of public service.”12 While the emphasis was clearly 
on the training of civil servants, the expectation was that expanding university 
education would help enlighten the American public in general.13 
While political scientists were, and are, never quite attentive to the difficulties 
involved in reconciling these two vocational purposes, there is clearly a tension, if not 
                                                 
9 The meaning of the term “science” was still vague in the late nineteenth century. Some meant by the 
word science desirable scholarly dispositions such as calmness and impartiality, others increased 
attention to history, still others natural science devoted to discovering universal laws of politics. Somit 
and Tanenhaus, Development of American Political Science, 76-79. As I discuss in the next section, the 
very term “science” becomes a site of struggle in the postwar period. 
10 Crick, American Science of Politics, 19-36, 73-74. 
11 Quoted in Mary O. Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of 
American Social Science, 1865-1905 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1975), 280. 
12 Quoted in Anna Haddow, Political Science in American Colleges and Universities, 1636-1900 (New 
York: Appleton-Century, 1939), 180n30. 
13 As late as 1913, the American Political Science Association (APSA) ranked “train[ing] for 
citizenship” as the first of the services to be performed by departments of political science, and 
“prepar[ing] for professions such as law, journalism, teaching, and public service” and “train[ing] 
experts and to prepare specialists for government positions” as the second and the third, respectively. 
Charles G. Haines, “Report on Instruction in Political Science in Colleges and Universities,” American 
Political Science Review 8(1) (1914), 264. 
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a contradiction, within their aspiration. There is simply no logically consistent way to 
promote values while at the same time staying value-neutral. The tension between 
science and democracy haunts the subsequent development of political science, and in 
particular, critically affects many political scientists’ conceptualization of democracy 
in the postwar period. 
The pre-World War II development of political science can be told roughly as 
the rise and fall of state theory. Influenced by the German theory of the state 
(Staatslehre)14 and by the works of Francis Lieber,15 and perhaps responding to the 
deeply felt need for national unity, the first generation of post-Civil War political 
scientists such as Theodore D. Woolsey (Yale), White (Cornell), Burgess (Columbia), 
and Herbert Baxter Adams (Johns Hopkins) promoted or at least implicitly embraced 
the “state” as the central concept of American democracy. The state, upon Lieber’s 
formulation, “has nothing whatsoever to do with the individual” and is distinguished 
from government that is merely the “institution or contrivance” through which the 
state acts; rather, the state is viewed as the natural outgrowth of humanity as a social 
being, in and through which “[man] obtain[s] … his highest object, namely, that of 
being fully man.” In theorizing the state, Lieber placed great emphasis on its “organic 
operation.” As he put it, the ideal working of the state would have an “organism … in 
which thousand distinct parts have their independent action, yet are by the general 
organism united into one whole, into one living system.”16 
                                                 
14 For the German influence on the American university, see Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, 
The Development of Academic Freedom (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), chap. 8. See 
also Jurgen Herbst, The German Historical School in American Scholarship: A Study in the Transfer of 
Culture (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965). 
15 Francis Lieber (1798-1872) was a German émigré scholar who held the first professorship of 
political science. His contemporaries as well as later historians have recognized Lieber’s principal role 
in producing the first systematic theory of the state, and laying the foundation for the discipline of 
political science. See Ross, Origins, 37-42, 66-69; Gunnell, Imagining the American Polity, 57-67. See 
also James Farr, “Francis Lieber and the Interpretation of American Political Science,” Journal of 
Politics 52(4) (1990): 1027-1049. 
16 Francis Lieber, Manual of Political Ethics, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1876), 219, 238, 210, 
353. 
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To later generations, however, the notion that there is an organic community 
underlying government institutions seemed too metaphysical and insufficiently 
scientific. Thus the following decades witnessed a decline of state theory—the trend 
precipitated by World War I that had made Americans reject the German philosophy 
of the state as the intellectual source of authoritarianism. Increasingly, the organic 
vision of the state predicated on a sovereign people seemed untenable in the face of 
mounting evidence that suggests a pluralistic, or just fragmented, society. Intellectuals 
at the time such as Graham Wallas, A. Lawrence Lowell, Walter Lippmann, and Frank 
Kent all painted a splintered society driven by self-interested and prejudiced 
individuals rather than by an informed and responsible public.17 Perhaps most 
famously, Lippmann proclaimed that the ideal of the “omnicompetent, sovereign 
citizen” is a “false” and “unattainable” ideal, because in reality most people do not and 
could not know “what is happening, why it is happening, what ought to happen” in 
politics.18 Lippmann suggested seeing society not as one organic whole but as “all the 
adjustments between individuals and their things,” and democracy as a set of elections 
in which individuals merely “support or oppose the individuals who actually 
govern.”19 
So by the end of the 1920s, pluralism was the dominant description of 
American democracy. And yet, it was hardly a normative ideal. Charles Merriam—a 
University of Chicago political scientist who was probably the most powerful patron 
of the scientific study of politics at the time—saw social fragmentation as an ill to be 
remedied through civic education.20 But with the eclipse of the concept of the state, it 
                                                 
17 Graham Wallace, Human Nature in Politics (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1962 [1908]); A. 
Lawrence Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government (New York: Longmans, Green, 1913); 
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was just not all that certain what normative ideal could inspire and motivate 
individuals into a public. 
Nowhere was this uncertainty expressed more vividly than in John Dewey’s 
famed The Public and Its Problems (1927). Like many of his contemporaries, Dewey 
rejected traditional state theory that theorizes the state as the totality with its own will. 
He replaced the concept of the state with the concept of “the public” that he defined as 
a distinctive form of association that “may have extensive and enduring consequences 
which involve others beyond those directly engaged in them.” Government, Dewey 
asserted, is a representation (“external mark”) that attends to the interest of the 
public.21 What is interesting about Dewey’s reformulation of state theory is that he 
assigned self-consciousness to the public, thereby making it dynamic. A public, 
Dewey argued, needs to “form itself” and “has to break existing political forms” to do 
so. Thus viewed, a state is “something to be scrutinized, investigated, searched for. 
Almost as soon as its form is stabilized, it needs to be re-made.”22 Although he agreed 
with Lippmann’s assessment that the democratic public currently seemed to be “lost” 
or “bewildered,”23 Dewey refused to view it as the reason to give up on the ideal of 
the organized public or the community vital to any meaningful democracy. As he put 
it, “democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea 
of community life itself.”24 However, despite his passionate call for the “Great 
Community,” Dewey remained vague as to how that ideal could be achieved, except to 
suggest the “perfecting of the means and ways of communication of meanings so that 
                                                                                                                                            
methods of thinking rather than instilling substantive ideas and values determined by political elites. 
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22 Ibid., 31-32. 
23 Ibid., 116. 
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genuinely shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform 
desire and effort and thereby direct action” as the “only possible solution.”25 
Going into World War II, pluralism was still a dilemma of American political 
science. Lippmann’s and his colleagues’ acceptance of pluralism as an empirical, if 
brutal, fact of political life was resisted by a number of radical democratic thinkers 
such as Dewey who held on to the hope that “one day American democracy would see 
citizens participate actively and openly in dialogue with each other and in pursuit of a 
common good.”26 This ambivalence, however, would disappear in a matter of a few 
years. In postwar America, pluralism came to be glorified as the consummation of the 
democratic ideal. In the works of prominent scholars such as David Truman and 
Robert Dahl, pluralism as a description of American politics was transformed into a 
normative prescription dictating the way in which the ideal of democracy ought to be 
realized. Gone was the search for the demos that, with all of its uncertainty, had long 
defined the vocation of political science. 
 
Constricting Democratic Politics: Behavioralism’s Pluralist Heaven 
A prominent practitioner defines behavioralism as “an orientation or a point of 
view which aims at stating all the phenomena of government in terms of the observed 
and observable behavior of men.”27 To its many proponents, this approach could help 
political scientists agonize less about first principles and pay more attention to the 
nitty-gritty of real-world politics.28 This, then, is an important insight. The 
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enlargement of democratic aspiration and imagination must be accompanied by a 
painstaking effort to find out conditions for realizing that aspiration and imagination. 
However, behavioralism takes this insight in a different direction. Instead of engaging 
in a critical dialectic between imagination and reality, behavioralism constructs the 
democratic ideal entirely out of the “observed and observable” world, closing the 
productive gap between what is and what could be. Behavioralists start by looking at 
the countries commonly called democratic, study how those countries work, and 
taking a crucial if unwitting step, equate the working of those countries with the 
manifestation of the democratic ideal itself. In characteristically paradoxical terms of 
American political science, behavioralists expect to establish the “validity of 
democratic principles” by “empirical investigation.”29 
Having thus fixed their eyes on the observed world and the individuals therein, 
behavioralists extracted a purportedly realistic concept of democracy by studying the 
country commonly called democratic, namely, the United States. Robert Dahl’s 
influential account of “polyarchy” is representative of this approach. Echoing 
Schumpeter, Dahl defined democracy as a method by which “ordinary citizens exert a 
relatively high degree of control over leaders.”30 He rejected the view identifying 
democracy with the will of the people as a myth, because “the people” (which Dahl 
the behavioralist equated with a majority) does not exist in contemporary societies. As 
far as Dahl saw, there are only “groups of various types and sizes, all seeking in 
various ways to advance their goals, usually at the expense, at least in part, of 
others.”31 Thus what distinguishes democracy from dictatorship is neither majority 
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rule nor minority rule, but “minorities rule.”32 Elections are crucial, Dahl insisted, not 
because they reveal the preference of a majority but because, when combined with 
continuous political competition, they “vastly increase the size, number, and variety of 
minorities whose preferences … will influence the outcome of governmental 
decisions.”33 American democracy is a good approximation of polyarchy in that it 
provides a “high probability that an active and legitimate group in the population can 
make itself heard effectively at some crucial stage in the process of decision.” This, 
Dahl concluded, is “no mean thing in a political system.”34 At any rate, that is pretty 
much all a realistic concept of democracy can ask for—a “markedly decentralized 
system” in which “decisions are made by endless bargaining.”35 
Behavioralists’ celebration of pluralism, however, is haunted by a 
disconcerting gap. The image of thriving and vibrant minorities is interrupted by 
overwhelming evidence that large segments of the population are apathetic about 
politics. Interestingly, many behavioralists were unmoved by widespread apathy that 
troubled the earlier generation of political scientists so much. For example, Bernard 
Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee found in their study of Elmira, New 
York that most people cast their ballot with little knowledge, motivation, or principle, 
contradicting the requirements of the citizen commonly assumed for the successful 
operation of democracy.36 But for them it was not cause for alarm, let alone reform. 
On the contrary, apathy is lauded for relaxing partisanship, providing maneuvering 
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room for political shifts, and facilitating compromise. “Low affect toward the 
election—not caring much—underlies the resolution of many political problems,” they 
concluded.37 Reporting similar findings, Herbert McClosky put the matter in even 
blunter terms. “Democratic viability is … saved by the fact that those who are most 
confused about democratic ideas are also likely to be politically apathetic and without 
significant influence … [A]pathy … keep[s] doubters [of the established values] from 
acting upon their differences.”38 As one observer of the discipline remarked, 
behavioralists “christened as the very definition of democracy the apathy and popular 
ignorance of politics Merriam derided.”39 
It is hard to understand this peculiar embrace of apathy by self-proclaimed 
democratic theorists without considering the influence of the Cold War. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the staple of Cold War psychology was the fear of the masses. 
As Schumpeter summarily quipped, “[t]he electoral mass is incapable of action other 
than a stampede.”40 And this fear of the masses was precisely what guided prominent 
behavioralists’ study of democracy. Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, took pains 
to show how people with low income, low socioeconomic status, and low education 
tend to have authoritarian tendencies, and how they are likely to be attracted to an 
extremist movement (i.e., fascism and Communism) rather than a moderate and 
democratic one.41 David Truman worried that people’s anxiety, “unguided by 
customary instruments of leadership,” might lead to “an irresponsible initiative that 
under certain conditions may be parlayed into a force of monstrous destructiveness.”42 
Drawing on studies like these, Dahl qualified his emphasis on the activity of people, 
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musing that if “an increase in political activity brings the authoritarian-minded [lower 
class] into the political arena,” it could undermine polyarchy.43 It was the fear of the 
“irrational masses” and the perceived need to restrain them that governed 
behavioralists’ welcoming disposition toward apathy. “For Truman and his colleagues,” 
Ira Katznelson testified, “it followed implicitly (certainly these authors explicitly 
preferred other values) that it is far better for the excluded to remain apolitical than 
challenge the dirty secrets of the regime.”44 
Taken in context, behavioralists’ focus on order and stability is understandable; 
the perceived threat was undoubtedly great, and they needed a clear answer as to 
whether democracy is capable of dealing with that threat. But their urgent concern 
crippled as much as it guided their vision of democracy. For one thing, as the flip side 
of its bias against the masses, the behavioralist account of democracy has strong elitist 
implications.45 And behavioralists are not particularly apologetic about it. Pointing to 
the fall of China and the Sputnik crisis, Truman cautioned that the American political 
system would be in grave danger if “the holders of power and privilege are unaware of 
their positions.”46 Likewise, V. O. Key, though in an attempt to challenge the reckless 
charges that the masses are indifferent or foolish, placed great emphasis the role of 
elites. “The critical element for the health of a democratic order consists in the beliefs, 
standards, and competence of those who compose the influentials, the opinion-leaders, 
the political activists … The responsibility rests here, not in the masses of the 
people.”47 
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More generally, it is difficult to deny that behavioralism paints too benign a 
picture of pluralism. As many critics have pointed out, behavioralist democracy is not 
as open and inclusive as it is advertised by its proponents and, to that extent, its 
interpretation of apathy as a sign of content or as the lack of virtue on the part of 
people is self-serving. For instance, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz argued that due 
to its exclusive focus on observable decisions behavioralists were blind to the problem 
of “non-decision”—the ways in which the powerful actors set agendas so that certain 
issues do not even reach the decision-making arena.48 Steven Lukes raised a more 
fundamental issue, suggesting that behavioralists failed to take into account the 
possibility that people’s preferences themselves are skewed by power relations.49 E. E. 
Schattschneider observed that behavioralist democracy tended to privatize and localize 
conflict rather than socializing, nationalizing, and democratizing it, thereby containing 
the scope of political conflict in favor of elites.50 What these otherwise diverse 
critiques have in common is a sense that behavioralist democracy is biased toward the 
preservation of the status quo, too much to claim democratic character. As 
Schattschneider put it, “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus 
sings with a strong upper-class accent.”51 
Still, the problem might go deeper. The fact that behavioralist democracy 
excludes a large number of people certainly is part of the problem. But the heart of the 
matter, I suspect, might lie in the way in which behavioralist democracy includes 
people. 
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Let us begin by clarifying exactly what it is that behavioralists want to preserve. 
True, behavioralists highlighted stability and order, but they would most likely resent 
the charge that they did so to serve the upper-class interest or to block social changes 
altogether. What, then, is it that behavioralists try so hard to protect from disturbances? 
Truman gives us the most explicit answer. “The great political task now is to 
perpetuate a viable system.”52 Concerning the nature of this “viable system,” David 
Easton’s systems theory provides a good illustration. Influenced by Wiener’s 
cybernetics, Easton imagined a political system as a “continuous feedback loop” that 
receives various inputs from “the environments” and produces political outputs which, 
then, modifies the environments and the next round of inputs.53 This image of a 
system abstracted from actual people and their actions pervaded the behavioralist view 
of democracy. Even in Dahl’s account of polyarchy placing so much emphasis on the 
activity of people, one senses the presence of a political system that works out a 
compromise on its own while countless minorities are engaged in endless bargaining. 
This belief in the mysterious working of a self-regulating system, I submit, is another 
significant reason why behavioralists failed to recognize the threat posed by pervasive 
apathy. Berelson and his colleagues summarily described this mentality. “Individual 
voters today seem unable to satisfy the requirements for a democratic system of 
government outlined by political theorists. But the system of democracy does meet 
certain requirements for a going political organization. The individual members may 
not meet all the standards, but the whole nevertheless survives and grows.”54 
If behavioralists’ account of a self-regulating system sounds overly wishful 
and intellectually unwarranted, it should. It rests on a set of assumptions, the origins of 
which we have identified in the Cold War context in the previous chapter. First, it 
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assumes that all the input elements can be translated into the terms recognized by the 
system and thus are given equal shot at influencing outputs. But as exemplified in the 
free market that only recognizes preferences expressed in terms of monetary value, 
systems often have a selective process marginalizing inputs that fail to conform to 
their terms. Second, and related, behavioralists’ systems thinking imagines a self-
contained and benign mechanism that allows inputs and outputs to freely exchange 
influences. In other words, it does not consider disciplinary effects of the system itself 
or, more fundamentally, external forces that shape the terms of the system. To 
understand this point, we may simply recall Wiener’s enemy pilot. When the pilot 
enters the aircraft, his “inputs” are predetermined by his assignment. And he is 
constantly forced to produce those inputs by the physical pressure that increases with 
the degree to which he fails to conform to the mechanical requirements of the aircraft.  
So what, exactly, are the terms of the political system in behavioralists’ mind? 
While calling for the perpetuation of a viable system, Truman argues that we could 
achieve that goal only by maintaining the conditions that promote a widespread 
understanding and appreciation of the “rules of the game,” which he defines as 
“interests or expectations that are so widely held in society and are so reflected in the 
behavior of almost all citizens that they are, so to speak, taken for granted.”55 Dahl 
makes the same point in his perplexing remark that polyarchy as minorities rule is 
simultaneously majority rule. The seeming contradiction of this remark is resolved, 
Dahl asserts, insofar as specific policies selected by the bargaining among minorities 
“lie most of the time within the bounds of consensus set by the important values of the 
politically active members of the society, of whom the voters are a key group.”56 This 
consensus—or the “democratic creed,” as Dahl calls it—would involve a belief in 
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democracy as the best form of government, in the desirability of basic rights and 
procedures, and in the essential legitimacy of the governmental institutions. This may 
sound innocuous at first glance, but consider how, as Dahl recognizes, it is in reality 
often attached to the perilously complacent view that “our system is not only 
democratic but is perhaps the most perfect expression of democracy that exists 
anywhere; if deficiencies exist, either they can, and ultimately will, be remedied, or 
else they reflect the usual gap between ideal and reality that men of common sense 
take for granted.”57 
But it is not complacency latent in the “terms of the system” that worries Dahl. 
On the contrary, he proposes ways to reinforce and reproduce the value consensus, 
because it “tends to be incomplete” and typically “decays.”58 He entertains the idea 
that powerful social processes like formal schooling would make “rejection of [the 
democratic creed] almost impossible.” This sounds quite chilling, but Dahl is adamant. 
“To reject the creed is infinitely more than a simple matter of disagreement. To reject 
the creed is to reject one’s society and one’s chances of full acceptance in it—in short, 
to be an outcast … To reject the democratic creed is in effect to refuse to be an 
American. As a nation we have taken great pains to insure that few citizens will ever 
want to do anything so rash, so preposterous—in fact, so wholly un-American.”59 
In a society where people are disciplined so thoroughly by the democratic 
creed and those who fail to conform to that creed are pushed outside “the system,” 
democratic politics takes on a radically different meaning. Dahl gives an expression to 
this situation. “[W]hat we ordinarily describe as democratic “politics” is merely the 
chaff. It is the surface manifestation, representing superficial conflicts. Prior to politics, 
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beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is the underlying consensus on 
policy that usually exists in the society among a predominant portion of the politically 
active members.”60 But if all the important stuff of politics can be taken care of by 
disciplinary mechanisms such as the education system, and if politics is merely the 
“chaff,” why would ordinary people bother to care about politics at all? The problem 
only worsens with those who happen to be outside the existing value consensus. Take 
another look at Dahl’s praise of American democracy, now with a particular attention 
to the qualifiers he uses. “[In American democracy] an active and legitimate group in 
the population can make itself heard.” By “active” Dahl refers primarily to people who 
vote, but what about “legitimate?” Here is his definition: “those whose activity is 
accepted as right and proper by a preponderant portion of the active.”61 In effect, then, 
Dahl poses an almost insurmountable obstacle to the “outsiders.” They need to 
transform the value consensus to get recognized as legitimate equals; and yet, the only 
way to do it is to conform to that consensus, because “no appeal is likely to succeed 
unless it is framed in terms consistent with the creed.”62 Locked in this vicious circle, 
the outsiders, too, have good reason to withdraw from politics and become apathetic. 
Behavioralist democracy does not simply neglect or condone, but produces democratic 
disaffection.  
 
The Capitalist Restructuring of Democracy: Rational Choice Theory 
If behavioralism severely constrains the scope of democracy by making the 
goals and terms of politics incontestable, rational choice theory redefines the very 
nature of democracy in accordance with the precepts of the capitalist economy. In 
particular, the concept of rationality and the image of the individual as the bearer of 
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rationality (“the rational actor”) are a basic tenet that unifies diverse branches of 
rational choice theory such as social choice theory, public choice theory, and positive 
political theory. While it has almost become a matter of convention to say that rational 
choice theory is an economic approach to politics, it is important to emphasize that 
rational choice theory shares certain assumptions with the postwar variant of 
neoclassical economics. The generic expression “economic approach” ascribes to the 
field of economics more continuity and homogeneity than actually exists. But the fact 
of the matter is that the rational actor model arose as the conceptual basis of war 
sciences and profoundly influenced the development of both postwar economics and 
rational choice theory.63 
Rational choice theory is a direct descendant of game theory. During World 
War II, game theoretic analysis was picked up by the Anti-Submarine Warfare 
Operations Research Group attached to the Navy and used to find the most efficient 
way to allocate limited resources among various military demands (for example, it was 
used to figure out how to deploy a limited number of aircraft in the Strait of Gibraltar 
to detect German U-boats. This is a perfect two-person zero-sum game situation, 
where the patrolling airplane tries to maximize the chance of detecting, and the U-boat 
tries to minimize that chance). After the war, game theory found its home at the 
RAND Corporation, which, as noted in the previous chapter, had close ties to the 
military.64 Its new task was even more serious than the efficient detection of U-boats: 
making projections and devising hypothetical strategies about intercontinental warfare, 
namely, a possible nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Given 
that the content and the character of game theory were guided by military concerns, it 
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is not surprising that the primary goal of game theory was the reduction of uncertainty 
under the conditions of uncertainty. To make predictions about the enemy whom they 
did not and could not actually know, game theorists had to imagine the enemy in 
familiar, quantifiable, and predictable terms. Thus at RAND, a new concept of 
rationality came into being. Rationality was reduced to abstract algorithms; the idea 
that realization of rationality might require actual people’s actual interactions 
disappeared, because such interactions tend to disrupt order and defy management or, 
in technical terms, increase uncertainty—game theory’s ultimate fear. 
The connection between RAND and rational choice theory is so close that one 
cannot but suspect its claim to scientific neutrality.65 There are seven works 
considered canonical in rational choice theory: John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), Duncan Black’s “On 
the Rationale of Group Decision Making (1948), Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and 
Individual Values (1951), Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy 
(1957), James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock’s The Calculus of Consent 
(1962),William Riker’s The Theory of Political Coalition (1965), and Mancur Olson’s 
The Logic of Collective Action (1965). Six of them have direct ties to RAND: John 
von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s pioneering work was enthusiastically received 
at RAND and applied to an analysis of atomic weapons strategy. Kenneth Arrow’s 
work grew out of his RAND assignment that mathematically determines the Soviet 
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Union’s collective utility function. Anthony Downs, James Buchanan, and Mancur 
Olson spent time at RAND in a crucial period leading up to the production of their 
works. Although William Riker had no direct affiliation with RAND, he developed 
during 1961-62 the main ideas of his book at the Center for Advanced Study in the 
Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University where Kenneth Arrow was also a fellow. 
Only Duncan Black worked outside the national security think tank complex, but his 
influence in the institutionalization of rational choice theory was marginal. 
Against this backdrop, the peculiarity of the rational actor assumption becomes 
clearer. While there are ongoing debates among practitioners, the rational actor is 
generally defined as an individual who pursues certain goals reflecting her perceived 
self-interest by consciously choosing the alternative with the highest expected utility 
under conditions of full information.66 This hypothetical person, rational choice 
theorists argue, should be the sole basis of all collective decision-making. 
As simple as it may seem at first glance, this conceptualization of the rational 
actor is charged with a number of assumptions. Albert Hirschmann’s famous account 
of the ascendance of the concept “interest” in seventeenth century European thinking 
provides a broad background of our discussion. According to Hirschmann, the pursuit 
of self-interest, long denounced as one of men’s principal sins, came to be accepted as 
an expression of a “calm passion” that could counter the destructive working of more 
fanatic types of passion such as desire for power or lust. This rather unexpected 
affirmation of self-interest occurred primarily because self-interested behavior 
promised to be more predictable. As Hirschmann puts it, “in pursuit of their interest 
men were expected or assumed to be steadfast, single-minded, and methodical, in total 
contrast to the stereotyped behavior of men who are buffeted and blinded by their 
                                                 
66 Some of these assumptions have been loosened or modified in the later literature. Some rational 
choice theorists now think that the rational actor is less knowledgeable about their alternatives and, 
instead of always trying to maximize utility, satisfies some minimum utility or minimizes regret. 
 145 
passions.”67 For those obsessed with the inconstancy of human affairs in the post-
Hobbesian age (Locke designated “the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will 
of another man” as the greatest evil), this was no small appeal. It is, then, no surprise 
that self-interest was vindicated again in the Cold War context in which totalitarianism 
was associated with affective excess. David Riesman observed how “people in pursuit 
of their private ends” engaged in the “quieter modes of resistance to totalitarianism.”68 
For Riesman pervasive apathy, endemic corruption, a thriving black market, and 
rampant crime in the Soviet Union suggested that the ineradicably self-centered nature 
of human beings might just be the most effective deterrent to the communist threat. 
Based on this observation, Riesman went so far as to propose to “re-evaluate the role 
of corruption [associated with the pursuit of self-interest] … with less emphasis on its 
obviously malign features and more on its power as an antidote to fanaticism.”69 
Seen in this light, the rational actor assumption can be viewed as a peculiar 
theorization of self-interest. As Hirschmann tells us, when it first gained currency the 
concept of self-interest denoted the act of reflecting on the manner in which one 
pursues her broadly defined aspirations. The concept of rationality used in rational 
choice theory, then, is faithful to this original meaning of self-interest. Focusing on the 
calculation of means, not the determination of goals, rational choice theory assumes 
that the rational actor’s preferences are already determined. As Arrow repeatedly 
emphasizes in his pioneering work, rational choice theory is concerned with “a 
procedure for passing from a set of known individual tastes to a pattern of social 
decision-making.”70 This position is based partly on Arrow’s view that interpersonal 
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comparison of utility is impossible, that is, individual preferences are entirely 
subjective—a view that Arrow takes from the debate in welfare economics (SCIV 9). 
But his laissez-fair disposition toward individual preferences is not merely a technical 
matter. Rather, it comes as much from a characteristically Cold War suspicion that any 
collective attempt to engage with individual preferences is totalitarian. Echoing 
Schumpeter, Arrow justifies his rational actor model by contrasting his theory to 
“idealist political philosophy” exemplified by Rousseau and Kant. According to 
Arrow, idealist political philosophy is predicated on a stark division between 
individual preferences “exist[ing] at any given instant under varying external 
influences” and “some sort of consensus on the ends of society” that is “assumed to 
exist” (SCIV 81-86). Arrow, like Schumpeter, does not allow any movement between 
these two registers; the relationship between individual preferences and the common 
good is one of winner-take-all competition rather than mutually beneficial critical 
dialogue. Based on this static frame of thinking, Arrow finds that “[e]thical absolutism” 
he sees in idealist political philosophy is “unsatisfying to a mind brought up in the 
liberal heritage” even while admitting that his laissez-fair position has the “danger of a 
glorification of the status quo” (SCIV 84-85). 
Since the process through which the actor forms her goals is not interrogated, 
rationality is reduced to a means to achieve predetermined ends. As Downs stated, 
“the term rational is never applied to an agent’s ends, but only to his means. This 
follows from the definition of rational as efficient, i.e., maximizing output for a given 
input, or minimizing input for a given output.”71 At first glance, this appears to be a 
typical description of the rational actor assumption widely used in neoclassical 
economics. It hides, however, the fact that rational choice theory relies on a simpler 
                                                 
71 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), 5. Hereafter cited 
in the text as ETD followed by page numbers.  
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and narrower concept of rationality. Influenced by game theory, rational choice theory 
significantly simplifies the function of rationality. Arrow illustrates this point in 
postulating that individuals are rational insofar as they satisfy two axioms (SCIV 19): 
 
Axiom I: For all x and y, either x R y or y R x. 
Axiom II: For all x, y, and z, x R y and y R z imply x R z. (SCIV 13) 
 
Here “R” means “preferred or indifferent to.” So in rational choice theory, to be 
rational the individual only needs to be able to decide her preference between two 
given alternatives (Axiom I) as long as she maintains logical consistency in her 
preference-ordering (Axiom II). The rational actor is no longer required, as in 
economics, to engage in a complex calculation with regard to her diminishing 
marginal utility for multiple commodities and her budget constraints; instead, she 
simply decides what she prefers between x and y. As Arrow states, rational choice 
theory assumes that “there is a basic set of alternatives which could conceivably be 
presented to the chooser” and that the chooser is “required to choose one out of this set” 
—an assumption, he admits, “not customarily employed in economics, though familiar 
in mathematics and particularly in symbolic logic” (SCIV 11-12). Importantly, while 
rational choice theory vows to not pry into how rational individuals determine their 
goals, it nevertheless predetermines the nature of those goals. Downs, saying that 
“Schumpeter’s profound analysis of democracy forms the inspiration and foundation” 
for his whole analysis, posits that the individual acts only to maximize specifiable 
benefits from government activity (ETD 36-37). 
Rational choice theory’s conception of individual rationality as an instrument 
concerned exclusively with the efficiency of attaining given goals shapes its view of 
social order. Rational choice theory holds that a social order must represent an 
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objective aggregation of individual preferences. Arrow remarks that he “will assume 
… that individual values are taken as data and are not capable of being altered by the 
nature of the decision process itself” (SCIV 9). In this portrayal, democratic politics 
does not involve deliberation and contestation that challenge the values and interests 
that people bring to the political arena. In other words, people play little role in 
actually making collective decisions; all the responsibility is transferred to the 
methods of voting that are also deemed a technical matter. This, then, is an apt 
illustration of instrumental democracy. As we have examined in the previous chapter 
with regard to Schumpeter’s theory of democracy, instrumental democracy no longer 
works through the productive tension between individual differences and the common 
good so that the former does not become destructive and the latter tyrannical. Likewise, 
in a democracy envisioned by rational choice theory individuals and political 
processes exist in a highly bifurcated fashion: on one side, there are completely 
spontaneous individual preferences that require neither articulation nor justification; 
on the other side, there is a mathematical formula that cannot be tampered with by 
individual initiatives. These two sides, moreover, necessitate and feed each other. 
Rational behavior is impossible, for instance, if individuals cannot expect the 
government to act rationally, and vice versa. The consequence is a self-perpetuating 
system in which the individual and the government constantly discipline each other to 
be rational while eradicating “non-rational” elements as a source of disturbance. 
This self-perpetuation is a problem because, as a close analysis of rational 
choice theory reveals, a democracy founded solely on rationality is ridden with 
contradictions. First of all, one of the major findings of rational choice theory is that 
voting, which is equated with democracy, is unable to aggregate individual 
preferences into a rational collective outcome—unable, that is, to do the job assigned 
to it by rational choice theory. Arrow shows this point in his famous “impossibility 
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theorem,” which is a formalization of what is known as the “voter’s paradox” first 
noted by the French political philosopher Condorcet. Condorcet noted that when three 
or more individuals try to choose among three or more alternatives by a majority vote, 
their attempt will inevitably fail. Suppose that there are three individuals (1, 2, 3) 
voting for competing parties to receive one of three alternatives (A, B, C) as benefits. 
 
Individuals Preference rankings 
 First Second Third 
1 x y z 
2 y z x 
3 z x y 
 
When individual preferences are in a cycle like this, voting cannot produce a rational 
outcome that optimizes all the participants’ preferences. Provided that individuals vote 
purely according to their preferences, any chosen outcome can be defeated by one of 
the other outcomes (if the government chooses x, both 2 and 3 prefer y and vote for an 
opposition that promises to choose y; if y is chosen, both 1 and 3 prefer x; if z is 
chosen, both 1 and 2 prefer y). Thus the outcome is determined not by individual 
preferences but by “irrational” factors such as the power of one player to dominate 
others or the manipulation of the voting process through, for instance, control of the 
agenda. 
Arrow finds that the democratic procedure of all varieties suffers from cycling 
majorities, if it meets the minimal criteria of fairness—if, for example, it allows 
individuals to prefer any alternatives and rank them in any way they want without 
limitations (condition of “universal domain”); if it tries to ensure that the collective 
outcome is determined exclusively by individual preferences and not influenced by 
 150 
external factors (“citizens’ sovereignty”); and if it keeps any one person’s preference 
from dominating others’ (“nondictatorship”) (SCIV 24-31).72 As he puts it, “If we 
exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, then the only methods 
of passing from individual tastes to social preferences which will be satisfactory and 
which will be defined for a wide range of sets of individual orderings are either 
imposed or dictatorial … [T]he doctrine of voters’ sovereignty is incompatible with 
that of collective rationality” (SCIV 59-60, emphasis eliminated). 
Some rational choice theorists, such as William Riker, welcomes this 
instability as a reason to reject what he calls “populism”—his equivalent of 
Schumpeter’s “classical doctrine of democracy” or Arrow’s “idealist political 
philosophy”—represented, unsurprisingly, by Rousseau. As he concludes in a 
characteristically forthright phrase, “[p]opulism as a moral imperative depends on the 
existence of a popular will discovered by voting. But if voting does not discover or 
reveal a will, then the moral imperative evaporates because there is nothing to be 
commanded. If the people speak in meaningless tongues, they cannot utter the law that 
makes them free. Populism fails, therefore, not because it is morally wrong, but 
merely because it is empty.”73 As an alternative, Riker offers what he calls “liberalism” 
that he associates with Madison. According to Riker’s interpretation, liberalism only 
expects from voting (i.e., democracy) the possibility of approving or rejecting officials. 
In other words, Riker’s liberalism does not require unwanted officials to be actually 
removed or wanted ones actually elected. As he acknowledges, “it may happen that an 
                                                 
72 Arrow lists two more conditions, but they are concerned more with the logical necessity of the model 
than the fairness of the decision procedure. One is that individuals are able to rank their options in a 
logically consistent way (“rationality”); the other is that individuals determine their preferences between 
two alternatives on their own merit without taking into account other alternatives (“independence of 
irrelevant alternatives”). 
73 William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy 
and the Theory of Social Choice (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1982), 239. On Riker’s 
mischaracterization of populism, see Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn, “Democracy and Social Choice,” 
Ethics 97 (1986): 6-25; Carole Pateman, “Social Choice or Democracy? A Comment on Coleman and 
Ferejohn,” Ethics 97 (1986): 39-46. 
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uninformed or unsophisticated or well-manipulated electorate fails to operate the 
voting system as its members would wish.” If people succeed in electing or rejecting 
officials as intended once in a while, that is good enough a vindication of liberalism.74 
But as we will see presently, if people are rational actors who are concerned only with 
efficiently gaining benefits and if democracy (reduced to voting) is an eminently 
inefficient device, it is not clear why people would ever try to overcome apathy and 
the effects of manipulation. The problem gets worse as political issues grow more 
complex and manipulation becomes more pervasive. The rational actor assumption 
keeps undermining Riker’s hope for the periodic success of voting. 
Unlike Riker, most rational choice theorists have found the indeterminacy of 
voting caused by cyclical majorities troubling and tried to solve Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem in various ways. As Nicholas Miller points out, the general consensus among 
rational choice theorists is that the probability of cyclical majorities increases as the 
number of individuals and alternatives increases. So they focused their efforts on 
reducing the heterogeneity of individuals and alternatives by, for example, requiring 
that people’s preferences be ordered along a single dimension (e.g., class, race, gender, 
etc.), restricting the range of values to be considered, or by postulating a high degree 
of consensus among voters.75 One of the problems of this strategy, as Miller notes, is 
that it freezes a current distribution of preferences, thereby perpetuating the same 
winning outcome over time. This, of course, threatens the viability of democracy at its 
core. If the same group of people always wins, those who are in the losing group, as 
rational individuals, have no incentive to abide by the democratic procedure. Only if 
“preferences are pluralistically distributed,” Miller argues, “political disaffection 
                                                 
74 Riker, Liberalism Against Populism, 243. 
75 Nicholas R. Miller, “Pluralism and Social Choice,” American Political Science Review 77(3) (1983), 
739-740. 
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plausibly is reduced.”76 At this point, we are brought back to the pluralist democracy 
championed by behavioralism we have examined in the previous section. Pace Miller 
(and Riker who speaks about the political flux generated by cyclical majorities as the 
source of political evolution, which he likens to natural selection77), our analysis tells 
us that embracing cyclical majorities as a way to promote pluralism is not a 
fundamental solution to the problem of disaffection, since behavioralism is plagued by 
its own tendencies to generate disaffection. 
Rational choice theory eliminates the rational actor’s incentive to participate by 
proving democracy to be an inefficient mechanism for amalgamating individual 
preferences into a collective decision. But more fundamentally, non-participation is 
inherent in the very definition of the rational actor. As Down famously reasons, in a 
situation where millions of people are eligible to vote, every rational voter realizes the 
probability that his vote will decide the election is extremely small. The result, Downs 
writes, is “an enormously diminished incentive for voters to acquire political 
information before voting” (ETD 245). Because the cost (time invested in acquiring 
information, registering, going to the polls, and so on) almost always exceeds the 
benefit (desired electoral outcome), the rational actor will never participate in voting 
(ETD 265). So the phenomenon of apathy that behavioralists observed is redescribed 
by Downs as “rational abstention.” But because the postulates of rational choice 
theory leads him to conclude that everyone—not just certain segments of the 
population as in the case of behavioralism—will abstain, Downs cannot be quite 
welcoming about his own findings. “When no one votes,” he grimly writes, 
“democracy collapses,” (ETD 267). 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 743. 
77 Riker, Liberalism Against Populism, chap. 8. 
 153 
In his attempt to save democracy, however, Downs deviates from the premises 
of rational choice theory. His initial intuition is to maintain the rational choice 
framework by formulating the preservation of democracy as a long-term benefit. The 
rational voter, Downs asserts, can view democracy as “a capital sum which pays 
interest at each election.” But this only shifts the locus of the problem without actually 
solving it. As he concedes, the possible contribution of one person to the preservation 
of democracy is so small (as it is in the case of voting) that it does not make sense for 
any rational person to act at all (ETD 270). Having thus reached an impasse, Downs is 
forced to resort to aspects of human affairs that rational choice theory tries so hard to 
banish from its model. He suggests the rational actor “is willing to bear certain short-
run cost he could avoid in order to do his share in providing long-run benefit 
[preservation of democracy],” because “[r]ational men in a democracy are motivated 
to some extent by a sense of social responsibility relatively independent of their own 
short-run gains and losses” (ETD 270, 267, emphasis added). He also speculates that 
“[o]ne thing that all citizens in our model have in common is the desire to see 
democracy work” and they are willing to “bear at least some cost” because the 
collapse of democracy is “so disastrous” (ETD 268, emphasis added).  
A person “doing his share” out of a “sense of social responsibility” and a 
“desire” to preserve democracy—this image severely compromises, if not contradicts, 
the purportedly universal rational actor model on which rational choice theory is 
predicated.78 The essence of rational choice theory is to explain human behavior 
based exclusively on the narrow concept of rationality, ruling out all the other 
motivational forces. As Downs unambiguously states concerning elections, “[t]he 
                                                 
78 In an article written almost thirty years after, Downs argues that democracy “depends upon 
widespread acceptance and practice of certain values among the citizenry itself.” He recognizes that 
those values are culturally and historically determined entities and exist separate from the narrow 
concept of rationality. Anthony Downs, “Social Values and Democracy,” in Economic Approaches, 
143-170, quote at 143. 
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political function of elections in a democracy, we assume, is to select a government. 
Therefore rational behavior in connection with elections is behavior oriented toward 
this end and no other” (ETD 7). But Downs is ultimately unable to explain how 
elections (i.e., democracy) can survive as a political institution without either 
loosening the rational actor assumptions or recognizing that democracy is not merely 
an instrument to select a government. This is more than a moment of theoretical 
incoherence, insofar as rational choice theory is an articulation of instrumental 
democracy which is a historical phenomenon. As I will discuss in the following 
chapter, the late twentieth century is pervaded with aggressive attempts to refashion 
the practice of democratic politics in terms of the rational actor. And in the real world, 
people’s sense of social responsibility does not sit on the bench waiting to be called to 
rescue democracy when rationality suddenly looks not so inspiring; the propagation of 
rationality as a social norm undermines people’s sense of social responsibility along 
with their affection for democratic institutions. The theoretical impasse of the rational 
choice account of democracy makes us wonder: what happens if democratic politics 
actually turns into a game played by rational individuals? 
 
Globalizing Instrumental Democracy? Modernization Theory 
The impact of instrumental democracy was hardly limited to the conceptual 
arena. It also exerted real political and historical influence by becoming part of a 
broader discourse that shaped American foreign policy during the Cold War—
modernization theory. Modernization theory was developed as a response to the 
concern acutely felt in postwar America. In its competition with the Soviet Union for 
the favor of, if not control over, many postcolonial states, the United States seemed 
outmaneuvered by its contender in laying out a clear map for development. The Soviet 
Union, many believed, was running ahead with its well-developed theory of historical 
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materialism. In Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917), Lenin set out a 
thesis that imperialism was a manifestation of capitalism’s inherent contradictions and 
a sign of its impending disintegration. The colonial world, Lenin implied, was bound 
to supersede the imperialist powers through revolution, just like the proletariat was in 
relation to the bourgeoisie. Lenin’s reformulated historical materialism attracted 
leaders of postcolonial societies, not only because it assured that the “scientific law” of 
historical progress was on the side of their struggle for national liberation but also 
because it showed them an alternative path of development untainted by capitalism—
which was perceived in most postcolonial societies as the colonizer’s exploitive 
economic system. The Soviet Union’s rapid industrialization at the time only served to 
make this theoretical promise look more plausible. In this situation, the American 
foreign policy elite were anxious to come up with its own metanarrative of historical 
progress to rival that of Communism.79 
If RAND was the incubator of rational choice theory, it was the Center for 
International Studies at MIT (CENIS) that served as an institutional home for 
modernization theory. The person who helped establish CENIS was also the most 
influential articulator and propagator of modernization theory: Walt Whitman Rostow. 
Rostow wrote The Stages of Economic Growth, with a not-so-subtle subtitle “A Non-
Communist Manifesto,” which became the founding text of modernization theory. 
Rostow’s thesis was that all societies developed along a universal linear path which he 
breaks down into five phases: “traditional society,” “preconditions for take-off,” “take-
                                                 
79 This anxiety was clearly expressed, for example, at the 1954 Princeton Economic Conference 
attended by foreign policy makers, businessmen, labor leaders, and academics. Jerome Wiesner of MIT 
well summarized the worry shared by participants. “Unfortunately, we have not found the flame for the 
torch. That is, we don’t have the overt ideological philosophy that we can tell to the natives [of 
postcolonial states] … We can say such thing as ‘freedom’ and ‘economic development,’ but we do not 
have a positive goal which you can talk about, which you can describe how to achieve, etc., in the same 
sense that the Russians do.” See Mark H. Haefele, “Walt Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth: Ideas 
and Action,” in Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War, eds., David C. 
Engerman et al. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 84-85, quote at 85. 
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off,” “drive for maturity,” and the “age of high mass-consumption.”80 In this vision, 
the highest stage of development was represented by the West and, especially, the 
United States (Rostow extrapolated his account of the age of high mass-consumption 
exclusively from the American experience). As one CENIS study made clear, 
“Implicit … in the use of such words as ‘transitional’ and ‘modernizing’ are some 
basic assumptions which we have asserted rather than proved—that is, that these 
[traditional] societies are indeed going through a process which will produce in them 
social and economic changes parallel to those which have occurred in modern Western 
states.”81 Rostow and his fellow modernization theorists argued that the most 
effective way to fight the appeal of Communism in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and 
the Middle East was to help the countries in those regions concentrate their 
revolutionary energy on a “take-off.” If they could accelerate the transition to the 
“next stage,” the argument went, affluence and a massive amount of consumer goods 
would resolve social discontent that was presumably a fertile soil of Communism. 
This idea had a profound impact on the foreign policy making of the 1960s in which 
Rostow himself was deeply involved, first as an advisor during Kennedy’s presidential 
campaign, then as head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council in the 
Kenney administration, and, finally, as Johnson’s National Security Adviser. 
It is worth emphasizing that modernization was presented as comprehensive 
progress that entails broad changes in the political, economic, cultural, and even 
psychological realms. Thus Rostow and others’ work on economic modernization was 
closely tied with works in other disciplines such as political science, sociology, 
psychology, and anthropology. More relevant to our discussion, some of the most 
                                                 
80 Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), chap. 2. 
81 Max Millikan and Donald Blackmer, eds., The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States 
Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), 143. 
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influential political scientists at the time gathered around the Social Science Research 
Council’s Committee on Comparative Politics established in 1953 and devoted their 
efforts to comprehending the relationship between social and political changes, giving 
rise to a whole body of literature which came to be known as “political development.” 
The central puzzle of political development arose from the idea widely 
accepted by its practitioners that modernization is characterized by both capitalism 
and liberal democracy. This is not a surprising assumption given that the end point of 
modernization was modeled on the 1950s United States. The trouble was that the 
capitalist development they espoused was found to generate political instability which 
was not consistent with the liberal democracy they also championed. As Samuel 
Huntington states, “economic development increases inequality at the same time that 
social mobilization decreases the legitimacy of that inequality. Both aspects of 
modernization combine to produce political instability.”82 How can we maintain the 
two pillars of modernization theory when one undermines the other? 
The way in which modernization theorists dealt with this conundrum is highly 
reflective of the instrumental vision of democracy. Gabriel Almond and Sidney 
Verba’s The Civic Culture (1963), perhaps the most influential work in political 
development, illustrates two strategies modernization theorists deployed to manage 
destabilizing effects of modernization. It is telling that both strategies try only to 
contain people’s demand for participation without interrogating what engenders that 
demand, namely, capitalism. The first strategy is to constrict the scope of participation. 
While promising the “emerging nations” that democracy “offers the ordinary man the 
opportunity to take part in the political decision-making process as an influential 
                                                 
82 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CN: Yale University 
Press, 1968), 58-59. 
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citizen,”83 Almond and Verba stated, following Schumpeter, that “[i]n all societies, of 
course, the making of specific decisions is concentrated in the hands of very few 
people … [T]he degree of democracy in a nation … [is synonymous with] the degree 
to which ordinary citizens control those who make the significant decisions for a 
society—in most cases, governmental elites” (136). Taking a logical leap from 
empirical description to normative prescription—a move characteristic of many 
scientific theories of democracy—Almond and Verba went further and celebrated the 
weakness of ordinary citizens. “The comparative infrequency of political participation, 
its relative lack of importance for the individual, and the objective weakness of the 
ordinary man allow governmental elites to act. The inactivity of the ordinary man and 
his inability to influence decisions help provide the power that governmental elites 
need if they are able to make decisions” (346). Of course Almond and Verba 
recognized the need to keep the power of the elites in check, but they considered it 
sufficient to have a possibility of such checks. In other words, they argued that it is 
important for citizens to think they are able to influence the political process, even 
when in reality that may be, by their admission, “a myth.” What matters is “the very 
fact that citizens hold to this myth” (346). 
The second strategy is to continually suspend the actual practice of 
participation. This strategy is pursued first by shifting the focus of discussion from 
structural conditions to “culture,” understood as individuals’ beliefs, attitudes, and 
orientations. As Almond and Verba put it, “the development of a stable and effective 
democratic government depends upon more than the structures of government and 
politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process—
upon the political culture” (366; see also 6, 339, 347, 358). And a culture that is 
                                                 
83 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), 3. Subsequent references cited parenthetically. 
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“appropriate for maintaining a stable and effective democratic political process” and 
“fits” the democratic political system is termed by Almond and Verba a “civic culture” 
(360). Composed of “a set of political orientations that are managed and balanced,” 
the civic culture is expected to produce a seemingly unattainable balance between 
“apparently contradictory demands” implied in the first strategy (360, 359): citizens 
ought to be at once deeply committed to the ideal of democratic participation and 
“relatively passive, uninvolved, and deferential to elites” (343). In other words, people 
are demanded to suspend their participation until the gap between the ideal of 
democracy and its elite-driven reality becomes unacceptably wide. People living in a 
civic culture (or more precisely, in the United States and Britain), Almond and Verba 
seem to believe, will be able to determine exactly when that threshold is crossed and 
moderate their participation accordingly. This argument is tautological insofar as the 
concept of civic culture already contains political moderation as its core element. And 
it is dangerously biased toward the status quo: whenever citizens resort to a more 
direct mode of participation in order to make their demands, it can now be repressed 
not just for the instability it causes but for something more profound—that is, for the 
violation of a “civic culture.” The problem gets even worse in the developing countries 
where a civic culture “must be newly created” (368). Because the intensity of people’s 
political action is attributed not to the urgency of structural changes but to cultural 
backwardness and psychological immaturity, their challenge to the existing system is 
always deemed premature. In the “underdeveloped” areas, participation is not quite 
foreclosed but almost infinitely postponed to an unspecified time in the future. 
The implications of these strategies became painfully clear when they were 
translated into policies and applied to postcolonial countries. As noted above, 
modernization theory was emphatic about the need to accelerate capitalist 
development as a way to counter the influence of Communism. Modernization theory 
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thus not only legitimized but gave urgency to intervention in postcolonial countries. 
But since modernization theory also posited that ordinary people in the intervened 
countries were not prepared, culturally and psychologically, to pursue modernization 
on their own, the actual undertaking of intervention always took the form of a top-
down imposition of predetermined programs. 
Nowhere was the gap between the democratic ideal and the authoritarian 
practice of modernization exemplified more dramatically than in the Strategic Hamlet 
Program in Vietnam.84 In the early 1960s, nervous about the expansion of the guerilla 
force in Vietnam but not quite ready to make a troop commitment, the Kennedy 
administration engaged in a massive resettlement project. Determining that “an 
apathetic rural population is a vulnerable target for communist political activity,” the 
United States helped the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem organize 
the scattered rural population into “strategic hamlets,” settlements protected by ditches, 
a fence of barbed wire, and bamboo stakes. While the immediate goal of strategic 
hamlets was to physically separate the rural population from the National Liberation 
Front (NLF; called as the “Vietcong” by Diem and the United States), thereby cutting 
off the local resources of the NLF, the ambition of American policy makers ran deeper. 
They hoped to create in the rural population a new sense of affinity with the South 
Vietnamese government and, moreover, to instill in dislocated people a new political 
culture. As Rufus Philips of the Agency for International Development remarked, “the 
central idea of the Strategic Hamlet Program … is that through the institutions of their 
own self-government, the people will be given a political stake in their own hamlets, 
                                                 
84 My discussion of the Strategic Hamlet Program in this paragraph draws on the following works: 
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and ultimately in the national government, worth defending.”85 But if the hamlet 
residents were allowed to elect their chiefs and councils through the “civic action 
team,” they were also managed with identification cards, forced to build homes and 
fortifications, and participated in military drills, all the while surrounded by 
watchtowers. Firmly convinced of the positive force of modernization, many policy-
makers failed or refused to reconsider the basic assumptions behind the Strategic 
Hamlet Program. Whenever problems were reported from the field, they blamed the 
Vietnamese government’s poor execution of an essentially sound program. What was 
ruled out, until the quick dissolution of the strategic hamlets following Diem’s 
assassination in 1963, was the possibility that the “democratic” organizations and 
procedures in the hamlets were but an instrument of the central government (or foreign 
power) for the imposition of predetermined programs—an instrument that was 
inherently unable to inspire affective attachment or cultivate a “civic culture.” 
The catastrophic failure in Vietnam shattered modernization theory, or at least 
it seemed that way for a while. Its pieces, however, would prove to be remarkably 
resilient and reappear in various permutations. As we will see in the following chapter, 
instrumental democracy, too, would persist and evolve in the late twentieth century, in 
theory as well as in practice. The story of the evolution of instrumental democracy 
begins with an unexpected turn of history: many “unprepared” countries suddenly 
started moving toward democracy. To this swirl of history we now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 Cited in Latham, Modernization as Ideology, 186. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The Evolution of Instrumental Democracy: Third Wave 
Democratization and Its Pathologies 
 
 
“What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the 
passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history 
as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and 
the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human government.” 
--Francis Fukuyama (1989)1 
 
“[In post-transition Chile] politics no longer exists as a struggle 
between true alternatives, as historicity (historicidad), but exists merely 
as a history (historia) of small variations, adjustments, changes in 
aspects of society that do not compromise the global dynamics [of 
capitalism].” 
--Tomás Moulián (1997)2 
 
In the previous two chapters I examined how instrumental democracy emerged from 
Cold War imperatives, was codified by behavioralism and rational choice theory, and 
became an integral part of the idea of modernization to be exported around the globe. 
As instrumental democracy evolves in the late twentieth century, the demos (and its 
dialectical relationship with the common good) dissolves into self-interested 
individuals supposedly free yet ultimately managed by the state apparatus and market 
principles—forces that become increasingly technocratic and undemocratic. This 
chapter traces this process. In keeping with my project’s underlying argument that 
history and theory are mutually constitutive, I juxtapose the historical unfolding of 
                                                 
1 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (Summer 1989), 4. 
2 Tomás Moulián, Chile actual: Anatomía de un mito (Santiago: ARCIS Universidad, 1997), 39. All 
translations in this chapter are mine, unless otherwise indicated. 
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instrumental democracy with conceptual articulations of that unfolding. This approach 
is especially fitting when it comes to the main subjects of my analysis in this 
chapter—the Third World and the Third Wave—which were discourses as much as 
they were historical events. As noted in the Introduction, the term “Third World” 
describes revolutionary movements for self-rule in post-colonial societies in the 1950s, 
whereas the term “Third Wave” refers to the global spread of democracy that occurred 
between 1974 and 1990. In many ways, the Third World and the Third Wave, as 
projects as well as concepts, were a response to modernization theory discussed in the 
previous chapter: the former was an attempt to envision an alternative to the path set 
by modernization theory (as well as by historical materialism), the latter an effort to 
address the failure of modernization theory as a conceptual as well as a foreign policy 
tool. 
I contend in this chapter that the Third Wave of democratization is haunted by 
the evolution of instrumental democracy. Focusing on the fact that the global spread of 
democracy occurred precisely when the Cold War was mutating into a new world 
order which was neoliberal globalization, I analyze the transition from the Third 
World to the Third Wave as the ascendance of one form of political life conforming to 
that new order and the decline of another form of political life. I develop my argument 
by interrogating the underlying assumptions of the “Third Wave discourse,” which 
refers to some of the major works of democratization scholarship in its earlier phase. 
In particular, I focus on two related assumptions of the Third Wave discourse. First, 
while agreeing with modernization theory that the procedural conception of 
democracy inspired by Schumpeter and Dahl is the definition of democracy,3 the 
                                                 
3 Huntington, for instance, declared that by 1970 “Schumpeter had won” the debate over the meaning 
of democracy, asserting that a country is democratic as long as there are contested elections based on 
universal franchise and the civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize “that 
are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns.” Samuel Huntington, The 
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Third Wave discourse adopts a “dynamic model” by placing particular emphasis on 
the activities of elites. As Dunkwart Rustow succinctly stated in his seminal 1970 
article, the creation of democracy is now understood as a “deliberate decision on the 
part of political leaders.”4 Second, since democratization is viewed as a strictly 
political event involving competition among the elite, socioeconomic issues drop out 
in the Third Wave discourse. In their influential early study of democratization, Larry 
Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset asserted that democracy “signif[ies] 
a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social system … Indeed, 
a distinctive aspect of our approach is to insist that issues of so-called economic and 
social democracy be separated from the question of governmental structure.”5 
Together, these assumptions constitute an outright rejection of modernization theory’s 
functionalist model in which grand socioeconomic and cultural undercurrents slowly 
give rise to democracy. 
As I will elaborate in the first section, these two assumptions are intertwined 
with the reconfiguration of the world order—and the interests of the United States as 
the hegemon in that order—in the late twentieth century. The Rustovian “negotiations 
approach” to democratization received huge attention partly because it came at a time 
when US foreign policy, guided by modernization theory, seemed not only morally 
unpalatable but pragmatically incapable of stabilizing the Third World. Anti-
                                                                                                                                            
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and London: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1991), 6-7.  
4 Dunkwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 
2(3) (1970): 337-363, 355. See also Guillermo A. O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University, 1986), 8; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic 
Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10-12. 
5 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries, 4 
vols. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner and the National Endowment for Democracy, 1989), vol. 4, xvi, 44-
47. See also Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1990), 97-102; Samuel Huntington, “The Modest Meaning of 
Democracy,” in Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum, ed. Robert A. Pastor (New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1989), 11-28. 
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Communist authoritarian regimes Washington supported in the postwar era became 
increasingly unsustainable as capitalism was undergoing a major transformation in the 
1970s, and both scholars and policymakers needed a new framework to address this 
change. What is distinctive about the Third Wave discourse is that it portrayed 
democratization essentially as an unthreatening event. According to this approach, the 
Third Wave, in stark contrast to the Third World, neither fundamentally challenged 
nor drastically altered the dominant socioeconomic system. This, in part, reflects 
scholars’ understandably welcoming disposition toward democratization and their 
eagerness to put the Third Wave in favorable light. But in doing so, they ended up 
paying more attention to acquiescent aspects of the Third Wave, while neglecting 
more radical voices that opened up political space under authoritarianism and drove 
the struggle for democracy long before political elites were able to “negotiate.” As a 
result, the Third Wave discourse blinds us to the possibility that Third Wave 
democratization might be not so much a realization as a frustration of popular 
aspirations—a troubling materialization of Huntington’s call for “a greater degree of 
moderation in democracy” discussed in Chapter 2. The Third Wave discourse’s elitist 
and purely political understanding of democracy unwittingly participates in the 
marked trend of the late twentieth century to domesticate democracy in compliance 
with the terms of neoliberal globalization. 
I unpack my argument by examining democratization in Chile and South 
Korea. As discussed in the Introduction, Chile and South Korea are two of the 
exemplary cases of the double development of formal democracy and capitalism and 
provide particularly useful venues for exploring the intertwinement of democracy and 
neoliberalism in the late twentieth century. The experiences of Chile and South Korea 
suggest that we can come to terms with democratic disaffection plaguing both 
countries’ post-transition politics only when we consider aspects of democratization 
 166 
ignored by the Third World discourse. Democratic disaffection occurs not despite the 
adoption of democratic institutions but because democratic institutionalization was 
overshadowed by elite-centric politics and the neoliberal restructuring of social 
relations. As I will demonstrate, formal democratization in Chile and South Korea 
produced a variant of instrumental democracy at odds with the popular vision of 
democracy formed, if incompletely, during the anti-authoritarian struggle. This 
disjuncture between the vision of democracy during the struggle for democracy and 
the reality of democracy after the transition, I contend, is the major factor that 
accounts for the curious transformation of democratic aspirations into democratic 
disaffection observed in Chile and South Korea. Major elements of instrumental 
democracy were already in preliminary formation in the authoritarian regimes, and 
found its way into the institutions, discourse, and practice of democracy in the post-
transition era. 
In addition to reiterating my point in the Introduction that my account in this 
Chapter does not establish causal relations between instrumental democracy and 
democratic disaffection but aims to illustrate and analyze systematic tendencies of 
instrumental democracy to produce democratic disaffection in post-transition Chile 
and South Korea, I want to note that my critical investigation into the two countries’ 
democratization does not take issue with a prima facie claim that minimal democracy 
is more desirable than authoritarianism. As Nancy Bermeo has starkly put it, “if you 
are given to dissent, the difference between democracy and dictatorship can literally 
be the difference between life and death.”6 My aim, here as well as throughout my 
project, is to make sense of the gap between democratic institutions and practice that 
many political elites and scholars predicted would narrow over time. If this gap 
persists and deepens as it does in Chile and South Korea, it threatens the very 
                                                 
6 Nancy Bermeo, “Rethinking Regime Change,” Comparative Politics 22(3) (1990), 374. 
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legitimacy and operation of minimal democracy. Those who are committed to minimal 
democracy should therefore take this gap seriously. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I examine the fall of the Third 
World and the rise of the Third Wave in light of geopolitical and socioeconomic 
change in the late twentieth century. Second, I contrast the concept of democracy put 
forward by the authoritarian regime with its counter-discourse, namely, the vision of 
democracy formed during the struggle against authoritarianism. I argue that this 
counter-discourse was centered on the recovery of politics that had been regimented 
and foreclosed by the authoritarian regimes. I develop this argument by focusing on 
the concepts el pueblo and minjung—both meaning “the (marginalized) people”—as 
an aspired democratic subjectivity. Third, I investigate how that subjectivity was 
systematically marginalized in post-transition Chile and South Korea. I conclude by 
briefly discussing how the experience of the Third Wave is being incorporated into 
democracy promotion as a major US foreign policy initiative in the post-Cold War era. 
 
From the Third World to the Third Wave: The Changing World Order in 
the Late Twentieth Century 
As soon as we expand the historical scope of our perspective, we are presented 
with a puzzle. Why did the United States welcome and celebrate the Third Wave of 
democratization? This question might sound odd. To be sure, Woodrow Wilson spoke 
about making the world “safe for democracy” as early as in 1917. In practice, however, 
democracy-promotion was hardly at the center of US foreign policy in the postwar 
years. The United States perceived popular demands for self-rule, which erupted in 
many post-colonial societies after World War II, generally as a threat and violently 
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repressed them.7 The United States used covert operations to support coups against 
democratically elected governments in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Chile 
(1973), and tried to do so in Indonesia (1958). Other operations to “preserve freedom 
and the world order,” as many policy-makers at the time liked to say, were executed in 
Greece (1947-49), Philippines (1948-1954), Taiwan (1950), Korea (1950-53), Panama 
(1958), Lebanon (1958), Congo (1960-65), Vietnam (1960-75), Cuba (1961), and 
Laos (1962).8 Why, then, did the United States not intervene in the Third Wave? Why 
did the United States suddenly decide to assume the role of democracy-promoter in the 
1980s? Had democracy somehow become “safe” for freedom and the world order? 
To address these questions, we need to approach both the Third World and the 
Third Wave within a broader historical context. After all, such terms as the Third 
World and the Third Wave—like the Cold War—did not even exist before World War 
II. 
The term Third World gained prominence after the 1955 Asian-African 
conference in Bandung, Indonesia—one of the biggest and most influential gatherings 
of Third World leaders held in the postwar era.9 In his opening speech, Indonesia’s 
president Sukarno declared that “we are living in a world of fear”: “The life of man 
today is corroded and made bitter by fear. Fear of the future, fear of the hydrogen 
                                                 
7 Of course, the Soviet Union’s intervention in the Third World in the postwar era was no less ruthless. 
See, for example, Robert H. Donaldson ed., The Soviet Union in the Third World: Successes and 
Failures (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981). I am focusing on the United States’ relation to the Third 
World in order to compare it to its promotion of Third Wave democratization in the subsequent period.  
8 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), esp. chap. 4. See also William Blum, Killing Hope: 
U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995). 
9 The African-American writer Richard Wright, who attended the conference, described his incredulous 
excitement of encountering the news of the Bandung conference: “The despised, the insulted, the hurt, 
the dispossessed—in short, the underdogs of the human race were meeting. Here were class and racial 
and religious consciousness on a global scale … What had these nations in common? Nothing, it 
seemed to me, but what their past relationship to the Western world had made them feel. This meeting 
of the rejected was in itself a kind of judgment upon that Western world!” Richard Wright, The Color 
Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company, 
1956), 12. 
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bomb, fear of ideologies. Perhaps this fear is a greater danger than the danger itself, 
because it is fear which drives men to act foolishly, to act thoughtlessly, to act 
dangerously.”10 With this insightful critique of the Cold War, Sukarno made it clear 
that the “first intercontinental conference of coloured people in the history of mankind” 
aimed to overcome such a fearful world (39). In the woeful state caused by the Cold 
War, Sukarno asserted, people were “grasp[ing] for safety and morality” and that was 
why “now more than at any other moment in the history of the world” politics should 
be based upon “the highest code of morality” centered on “the well-being of mankind” 
(42-43). Formerly colonized countries, now united under the name of the Third World, 
were in a privileged position to advance this mission because they had experienced 
colonialism “in all its ruthlessness” and seen “the immense human wastage 
[colonialism] causes, the poverty it causes, and the heritage it leaves behind.” In this 
respect, Sukarno concluded, what united twenty-nine countries was not religion, race, 
or culture, but “a common detestation of colonialism in whatever form it appears” (43). 
And according to Sukarno, colonialism was well and alive in a supposedly post-
colonial world, as it “has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, 
intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a 
nation” (44). 
As Sukarno’s last remark reveals, Third World leaders were keenly aware that 
their struggle to claim sovereignty and recover nationalist culture was inextricably 
intertwined with their economic underdevelopment and dependence inherited from the 
colonial era. Given this recognition, it is not surprising that the Third World was 
skeptical of the laisser-faire principles underlying the postwar international economic 
system. Reinforced by the so-called “Bretton Woods institutions” led by the United 
                                                 
10 George McTuran Kahin, ed., The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1956), 43. Subsequent references cited parenthetically.  
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States—the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT (though the GATT was neither an 
independent institution nor founded at Bretton Woods)—the principles of “free trade” 
and “free enterprise” mean, in practical terms, the removal of all barriers to 
international trade and of governmental interventions in the domestic economy. Such 
an open international economy worked in favor of the United States that urgently 
needed avenues for export that could absorb its wartime overproduction and access to 
foreign raw material in order to ensure further economic growth. From the viewpoint 
of the Third World, however, the Bretton Woods regime meant but a recreation of the 
prewar international division of labor that would put them at a systematic disadvantage. 
Aid programs such as the Marshall Plan that helped reestablish industries in Western 
Europe never came to Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Saying that there was no 
planned aid to Latin America, Marshall remarked that the benefits of American aid to 
Europe would “trickle down” to the poor of Latin America when European demand 
for Latin American agricultural goods increased, if, of course, Latin America accepted 
free trade principles.11 But even if we set aside the accuracy of the trickle-down 
theory, such a dependent model of economic development was precisely what Third 
World countries wanted to overcome. Because the Bretton Woods system was biased 
against raw materials in favor of industrial products, “free trade” between developed 
and underdeveloped countries had the effect of not only increasing their income gap 
but locking the latter in raw material production with no prospect for industrialization 
of their own. It is no coincidence that the second Asian-African conference (Cairo, 
1962) called for a United Nations trade conference outside the GATT, which, with the 
support of Latin American and Eastern European states, led to the creation of the 
United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The Third 
                                                 
11 Economist, May 8, 1948, 782; quoted in Craig Murphy, The Emergence of the NIEO Ideology 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 27. 
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World’s moral and political critique of the Cold War and their challenge to unfettered 
capitalism were parts of the same project. 
The Third World’s search for alternatives came as a threat to the United States. 
In the Cold War context, the Third World was viewed less as fellow nations than as 
the object of domination and control supposed to belong to one or the other side of the 
Cold War. As the NSC 68, a strategic document laying out the basic US foreign policy 
agenda during the Cold War, stated, “[t]he assault on free institutions is world-wide 
now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free 
institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.”12 This dichotomous view led the 
United States to reduce all deviations from full-fledged capitalism to a move toward 
Soviet-style communism, and almost forced her to repeatedly intervene in the Third 
World as it did throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
Cold War binaries and interventionism pervaded American Third World policy 
up until the late 1970s. Its influence is conspicuous, for example, in Jeane 
Kirkpatrick’s notorious article, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” published in 
1979 in Commentary. In this acrid denunciation of the Carter administration’s foreign 
policy, Kirkpatrick asserted that Washington “lost” Iran and Nicaragua to 
revolutionary forces, undermining US interests. According to her, it was a gravely 
misguided decision not to protect “an established autocracy with a record of friendship 
with the U.S.” from the attacks by “insurgents, some of whose leaders have long ties 
to the Communist movement.”13 From Kirkpatrick’s point of view, the Carter 
administration, and liberals more generally, misinterpreted insurgency in the Third 
World as “evidence of widespread popular discontent and a will to democracy” while 
                                                 
12 “NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950, in Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1950 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State), vol. 1, 
234-292, 240. 
13 Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary 68(5) (1979), 34-45, 35. 
Subsequent references cited parenthetically. 
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in fact such insurgency was dominated by radicals presumably sponsored by the 
Soviet Union and Cuba (38). Liberals were “duped” into supporting these insurgencies 
because insurgents invoked the symbols and values of democracy, but Marxist 
revolutionaries were actually “totalitarians” who would install a government no less 
repressive in its nature and openly hostile to the United States (42). She chided the 
Carter administration for failing to recognize “the nature of traditional versus 
revolutionary autocracies and the relation of each to the American national interest” 
(44).  
The focus of Kirkpatrick’s distinction between traditional and revolutionary 
autocracies was whether or not the regime was favorably disposed to the United States. 
But she also made a theoretically suggestive claim that sheds light on our discussion 
of the Third Wave. She argued that, as compared to their revolutionary counterparts, 
traditional autocracies have more potential for democratization and liberalization, as 
they “permit limited contestation and participation” (44). But how, exactly, limited is 
that contestation and participation? We get a hint when Kirkpatrick approvingly 
observed that traditional autocracies “leave in place existing allocations of wealth, 
power, status, and other resources.” Although she acknowledged that such a strong 
bias toward the status quo “favor[s] an affluent few and maintain masses in poverty,” 
she was not particularly worried. “Because the miseries of traditional life are familiar, 
they are bearable to ordinary people who, growing up in the society, learn to cope, as 
children born to untouchables in India acquire the skills and attitudes necessary for 
survival in the miserable roles they are destined to fill” (44). Thus “limited 
contestation and participation,” which is granted by traditional autocracies and 
supposed to evolve into democracy, neither challenges the “existing allocations of 
wealth, power, status, and other resources” nor addresses “the miseries of traditional 
life.” Any attempt to do so is labeled “revolutionary” and presumed to be antithetical 
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to democratization. The idea that democracy can and should be contained by a system 
that benefits a few while leaving the majority in the state of misery is oxymoronic. If 
that absurdity did not occur to Kirkpatrick, it testifies to a stranglehold that the 
circumscribed and instrumentalized concept of democracy—the origins and logics of 
which we examined in previous chapters—held on postwar minds. And it was a 
stranglehold with real consequences. When democracy was perceived to dismantle the 
existing socioeconomic structure, as in the case of the Allende government in Chile, 
the United States was not welcoming at all.14 
Given that the United States supported only “moderate democratization,” 
namely, democratization that was limited in its scope of participation and contestation, 
the Reagan administration’s democracy promotion policy seems less a departure from 
than a modified continuation of the Kirkpatrick doctrine.15  Insofar as the Kirkpatrick 
doctrine was an expression of hard-nosed realism that proclaimed to consider nothing 
but national interest, we have reason to suspect that the United States’ turn to 
democracy promotion originated not from a genuine shift in her value orientation but 
from a broader process through which she recalculated her interest in response to 
important changes in the late twentieth century. 
One of the more immediate changes was the declining legitimacy of military 
operations as a foreign policy option. Vietnam, of course, was crucial to this change. 
And the “loss” of Nicaragua resulted in a fundamental reconceptualization of 
American foreign policy, albeit in a different way than was suggested by Kirkpatrick. 
                                                 
14 On US intelligence activities in Chile, including its involvement in the coup against the Allende 
government, see US Senate, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 (Washington, D.C.: US Government 
Printing Office, 1975). See also James Petras and Morris Morley, The United States and Chile: 
Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government (New York: Monthly Review, 1975).  
15 The beginning of this policy shift is marked by Reagan’s speech before the British parliament in 
1982, in which he announced:  “If the rest of this century is to witness the gradual growth of freedom 
and democratic ideals, we must take actions to assist the campaign for democracy.” Ronald Reagan, 
“Address to Members of the British Parliament,” June 8, 1982, Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States, Ronald Reagan, 1982, 742-748, 745. 
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As Carl Gershman, the president of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a 
new US foreign policy agency created in 1983, said: “The Nicaraguan experience 
shattered both sides of the argument over U.S. attitudes towards friendly Third World 
autocrats. On one hand, conservative view that such regimes are a bulwark against 
communism seemed a good deal less compelling after the Sandinistas took over from 
Somoza. The Nicaraguan events seemed to bear out a different analysis, namely, that 
right-wing authoritarianism is fertile soil for the growth of Marxist-Leninist 
organizations … On the other hand, the liberal side of the argument—that policy 
sufficed in simply seeking the removal of authoritarian dictatorships, as communist 
movements could be defeated by denying them this easy target—fared no better. As 
long as the Communists were the most determined alternative to Somoza, the downfall 
of the dictatorship would enable them to take power.”16 As struggles for democracy 
were gaining momentum in many corners of the world in the early 1980s, helping the 
moderates lead and deradicalize those struggles began to appear, for both 
conservatives and liberals, not only a morally superior but a more effective strategy to 
contain the expansion of Communism.  
Moreover, the United States was in the process of reconfiguring her economic 
interest within a new global capitalism that began to materialize in the early 1970s. 
The most notable change was the rise of transnational finance capital as the dominant 
force in the international economic system. By the mid-1970s the volume of purely 
monetary transactions carried out in offshore money markets already exceeded the 
values of world trade many times over, and the trend toward the expansion of finance 
capital only accelerated in the subsequent period.17 And this change was not purely 
                                                 
16 Carl Gershman, “The United States and the World Democratic Revolution,” Washington Quarterly 
(Winter 1989), 127-139, 130.  
17 Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Time, new 
and updated ed. (London: Verso, 2010 [1994]), 308. 
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quantitative. Once the United States abandoned fixed exchange rates in 1971 and 
deregulated banking in the late 1970s, the public control of capital flows virtually 
ceased to exist. The rising power of finance capital, then, effected a set of profound 
changes. The focus of economic policy shifted from full employment to inflation 
control via higher interest rates (which, along with deregulation, lured transnational 
financial capital from London back to New York). Regulatory measures and public 
control of industries and services were abandoned in favor of liberalization and 
privatization in order to facilitate investment by finance capital at the cost of extreme 
economic volatility. To be sure, these changes occurred unevenly and over time, but 
they took shape and emerged throughout the 1980s and the 1990s as the predominant 
economic doctrine—which came to be called “neoliberalism.” 
As I will discuss in the following sections, the ascendance of neoliberalism 
was hardly a change in the economic realm alone. It marked a radical break from the 
New Deal as a social vision that, in its ideal realization, links the public control of 
capital, social welfare policies, and democratic politics. And this broader 
transformation quickly spread around the globe, in part because the neoliberal phase of 
global capitalism created an environment in which economic measures became a 
highly effective tool of disciplining Third World countries. Beginning in the 1970s, 
many Third World countries started amassing an unprecedented level of debt. A 
sudden surplus of credit produced by OPEC money and slack demand in the 
stagnating North flowed into Third World countries. At the same time, the global 
economic recession depressed commodity price while inflating interest rates in 
creditor countries. In effect, already sizable debts doubled and Third World countries 
were forced to keep borrowing more money to service their debts. So when high 
international liquidity was no longer available in the 1980s, heavily indebted Third 
World countries had to face periodic economic crises, if not collapses. Through this 
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process, Third World countries became at once vulnerable to transnational capital and 
dependent on multilateral lending institutions such as the IMF—a trend that would 
only accelerate in the following decades. 
In the neoliberal phase of capitalism, democracy appears more attractive to the 
United States for a number of reasons. For one thing, the cost of supporting the 
authoritarian regime is higher in the neoliberal era. The higher economic volatility 
caused by neoliberalism makes it difficult for authoritarianism to compensate for its 
lack of legitimacy with stable economic performance. In a society marked by periodic 
economic crises, a legitimizing mechanism, such as elections, that allows people to 
express their discontent and anger is preferable to an irreplaceable figure at the apex of 
the power structure for the purpose of absorbing social tension. At the same time, the 
increased dependence of the Third World on the global capitalist regime means there 
are now mechanisms other than domestic dictatorships (e.g., conditionality clauses of 
the IMF) that can reinforce the existing socioeconomic framework and the allocation 
of power within that framework. As we will see, Third Wave governments’ vulnerable 
and dependent position in the neoliberal world order severely constrains their ability to 
respond to popular demands. In this respect, it is indicative that the Reagan 
administration’s democracy promotion policy was accompanied by an aggressive 
rejection of the Third World’s attempts to reform the global economic system. At a 
summit with selected Third World leaders in 1981, Reagan unilaterally declared the 
death of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a set of reform agendas 
proposed by Third World countries and adopted, though without the consent of the 
United States and a few other advanced countries, at the UN General Assembly in 
1974. 
Seen in this light, the global spread of democracy in the late twentieth century 
was not simply individual countries’ departure from authoritarianism. Rather, the fall 
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of the Third World and the rise of the Third Wave were two sides of the same event 
symptomatic of a slow yet definitive shift in the global order from the Cold War to 
neoliberal globalization. It is, then, not surprising that the nature of Third Wave 
democratization was heavily influenced by structural constraints inherent in the new 
global system. And those constraints, as I will now demonstrate in the contexts of 
Chile and South Korea, tended to realize tendencies toward instrumental democracy. 
 
Contending Visions of Democracy: Authoritarianism and Democratization 
in Chile and South Korea 
In Chile and South Korea, what people demanded under the name of 
democracy was not the adoption of a set of institutions—not that alone. Institutional 
change, of course, was certainly significant, but not as an isolated goal but as a symbol 
of deeper social, economic, and cultural transformations. In the actual struggle for 
democracy, institutional change and a more fundamental social transformation were 
understood to constitute an integrated whole. Separating out these two aspects of 
democratization and focusing exclusively on one of them while bracketing the other, 
as the Third Wave discourse does, ignore this crucial fact and keep us from 
understanding the relationship between purely institutional and more substantial 
democratization. To appreciate this point, we first need to examine how the vision of 
democracy was formed as a counter-discourse to the authoritarian regime’s view of 
democracy. 
Authoritarian rule, despite its reliance on force, is nonetheless not exempt from 
the need to legitimize its existence. From this need arises a contradiction that creates 
instability within the authoritarian regime. Guillermo O’Donnell insightfully analyzes 
this dynamic in his influential account of “bureaucratic authoritarianism.” According 
to O’Donnell, bureaucratic authoritarianism is both a “system of political exclusion” 
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that imposes a particular type of order on society and a “system of economic exclusion” 
that “promotes a pattern of capital accumulation which is highly skewed toward 
benefiting the large oligopolistic units of private capital and some state institutions.”18 
The authoritarian regime justifies this exclusion in a double-sided move: it sets out 
general goals such as modernization that the nation as a whole ought to pursue and, at 
the same time, renders parts of the nation—e.g., the popular sector, the working class, 
dissidents intellectuals—as an obstacle to be removed in order to attain those goals. As 
O’Donnell puts it, bureaucratic authoritarianism “appears as if placed before a sick 
nation … contaminated by innumerable internal enemies.”19 Bureaucratic 
authoritarianism then claims to “cure” the nation through supposedly neutral, technical, 
and rational measures and, most important for our purposes, dismisses any attempt to 
politicize social issues as impatient, irrational, and dangerous. This move, however, 
contains a contradiction insofar as it oscillates between generality (of national goals) 
and particularity (of beneficiaries of nationalist projects). As it excludes and represses 
more people, the authoritarian regime widens the gap between the general and the 
particular components of its legitimation mechanism, making its inherent contradiction 
increasingly unsustainable.  
In Chile, the authoritarian vision was clearly stated in the Declaration of 
Principles of the Chilean Government (Declaración de principios del Gobierno de 
Chile, hereafter Declaration), published by the junta in 1974 after its violent overthrow 
of the Allende government in the previous year. In it, the junta proclaimed to embrace 
“an emphatically nationalistic point of view” and to hold “national unity as its most 
                                                 
18 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State,” in The New 
Authoritarianism in Latin America, ed. David Collier (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 
292-293. 
19 Ibid., 293. 
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cherished objective.”20 As noted above, however, the authoritarian regime’s appeal to 
generality (i.e., the nation) was predicated upon carving out and then excluding parts 
of the nation. The junta was not coy about who was excluded from the nation it was 
trying to rebuild. “Chile must be a land of property owners, not a country of 
proletarians … Chile is not neutral in her relationship to Marxism … The present 
Government neither fears nor hesitates to declare itself anti-Marxist.” While “[t]he 
right to dissent must be preserved,” the junta stated, “the experience of recent years 
shows the need to subject it to acceptable limits” (31, 35). The targeting of the workers 
and the Marxists is predictable given that they were the political base of the Allende 
government. More suggestive is the pathology that the junta associated with Marxism. 
In the Declaration, Marxism was sometimes presented as a totalitarian doctrine in a 
typical Cold War fashion, but more frequently as the force to disrupt national unity by 
stirring up antagonism between classes—in other words, less as an affirmation than as 
a negation of totality. Here, it is important to note that what was criticized was not just 
class conflict but the very notion of conflict as such. The junta called upon all Chileans 
“to surmount former divisions and factions” and “become part of th[e] great national 
unity movement” (37). What this amounted to was a wholesale rejection of the 
undertaking of politics which is nothing but a productive negotiation of conflicts and 
differences (labeled “divisions and factions” by the junta).  
The junta’s rejection of politics is most evident in its self-assigned “historical 
mission” of “giving Chile new governmental institutions to provide our democracy 
with solid stability, cleansing our democratic system from the vices that facilitated its 
destruction.” The key principle of this “new institutionality” was the “decentralization 
                                                 
20 Junta de Gobierno, Declaración de principios del Gobierno de Chile (Santiago, 1974), 32. This 
document was published in Spanish, English, French, and German. In most cases I used the English 
version. When I modified translation, I provided original Spanish. Subsequent references cited in the 
text parenthetically.  
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of power” that “would enabl[e] the country to advance toward a technocratic society 
with true social participation” (35). The emphasis of this institutional reform lay in the 
“independence” of interest groups and especially trade unions (“gremios”)—
traditionally formidable political forces in the Chilean political system—which the 
Declaration revealingly equated with “depoliticization (despoliticización).”21 This 
curious equation of independence and depoliticization was a key element of Chilean 
neoconservatism (“gremialismo”), which began as a student movement at the Catholic 
University in the mid-1960s and became a major force in the Pinochet regime.22 In the 
language of Jaime Guzmán, the leader of gremialismo, the Declaration pronounced 
that social unions “may become authentic means of social [i.e., nonpolitical] 
participation” only by blocking the influence of political parties (37, emphasis added). 
More specifically, by the concept depoliticization the Declaration meant that union 
activities must be exercised “responsibly and thoughtfully” with the understanding 
that “the state must harmonize the reasonable aspirations of each sector with the 
national interest” and that unions must become “vehicles contributing technically to … 
governmental decisions” (38). Ultimately, the junta strived to “transform[] Chile into a 
technocratic society where informed opinion shall prevail over slogans” (38). In 
setting out these goals, the junta seemed aware that this “end of politics” cannot 
emerge naturally or voluntarily, as it pledged to “energetically apply the principle of 
authority and drastically punish any outburst of disorder or anarchy” (33). 
It was around the rejection of politics that neoliberal economists (known as the 
“Chicago Boys”23), another major governing faction of the Pinochet regime, 
                                                 
21 Suggestively, the official document translates despoliticización as “freedom from politics,” 
indicating a purely economic view of freedom that would dominate Chile and elsewhere in the years to 
come. 
22 For an overview of the gremialista movement, see Marcelo Pollack, The New Right in Chile, 1973-
1997 (London: Macmillan, 1999), 30-38. 
23 The term “Chicago Boys” refers to the fact that many economists who served in the Pinochet regime 
received their postgraduate degrees from the University of Chicago. For a thorough discussion of the 
Chicago Boys, see Juan Gabriel Valdéz, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile 
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converged with the gremialistas.24 Although their individualist and modernist 
dispositions did not sit well with the gremialistas’ corporatist and traditionalist values, 
the Chicago Boys, like the military, perceived politics to be inefficient and corrupt. 
They too understood freedom in depoliticized terms, if only with a clearer 
alternative—economic freedom manifested and realized solely in a “free market.” 
Because they viewed the market as a neutral and technical mechanism to be managed 
by experts like themselves, the Chicago Boys eagerly agreed with, and played a major 
role in realizing, the vision of a technocratic society proclaimed in the Declaration.25 
In fact, it was the Chicago Boys that formulated a sophisticated theory of 
interdependence between authoritarianism and neoliberalism. Drawing on the work of 
Hayek, they criticized democratic politics for being swayed by such organized groups 
as political parties and labor unions at the expense of individual interests. According to 
the neoliberals, those collectivities distort and obstruct the proper working of the 
market and should be removed in order to guarantee individual freedom. This, in turn, 
                                                                                                                                            
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); see also Glen Biglaiser, “The Internationalization of 
Economics in Latin America,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 50(2) (2002): 269-286. 
24 On the close personal links between the neoliberals and the gremialistas, see Carlos Huneeus, 
“Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime: The ‘ODEPLAN Boys’ and the ‘Gremialists’ 
in Pinochet’s Chile,” Journal of Latin American Studies 32(2) (2000): 461-501. 
25 To be sure, technocratic elements have always been present in Chilean politics. Economic planning 
by technocrats was pursued, if unsuccessfully, by the Allende government, as exemplified in an 
exaggerated fashion by “Project Cybersyn” that intended to manage the economy through a 
computerized center in Santiago that would process “real time” economic data coming via telex from 
several industries over the country. However, political participation was not seen as antithetical to the 
technocratic management of the economy as it was in the Pinochet regime; rather, participation was 
integrated as an important part of that management. Gonzalo Martner, the director of the Office of 
National Planning (Oficina Nacional de Planificación, ODEPLAN) in the Allende government, is 
emphatic about this point. “An important aim is that planning should cease to be a superstructure and 
becomes the basis of the system, and to this end an agreement is being drawn up with the Central 
Trades Union Confederation (CUT [Central Única de Trabajadores]) to establish a joint ODEPLAN-
CUT Commission … This commission will propose operational models for planning mechanisms with 
full worker participation for each enterprise. The Popular Unity government believes that planning is a 
way of enhancing participation, enabling discussion on and participation in the substantive issues of 
development policies.” Gonzalo Martner, “The Popular Unity Government’s Efforts at Planning,” in 
The Chilean Road to Socialism: Proceedings of an ODEPLAN-IDS Round Table, March 1972, ed. J. 
Ann Zammit (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1973), 71-73. On Project Cybersyn, see Eden 
Medina, “Designing Freedom, Regulating a Nation: Socialist Cybernetics in Allende’s Chile,” Journal 
of Latin American Studies 38(3) (2006): 571-606. 
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calls for an extremely strong central power that is able to dismantle and continue to 
hold in check those organized social groups. As Castro de Sergio, a leading Chicago 
Boy and longtime finance minister in the Pinochet regime, bluntly put it, “A person’s 
actual freedom … can only be ensured through an authoritarian regime that exercises 
power by implementing equal rules for everyone.”26 Based on this idea, Pablo 
Baraona, another key neoliberal and economic minister in the military government, 
went so far as to envision a “new democracy” that the Pinochet regime would create. 
He argued that  
 
“the new democracy … will have to be authoritarian, in the sense that 
the rules needed for the system’s stability cannot be subject to political 
processes, and that compliance with these measures can be guaranteed 
by our armed forces … [It will also have to be] technified, in the sense 
that political bodies should not decide technical issues but restrict 
themselves to evaluating results, leaving to the technocracy the 
responsibility of using logical procedures for resolving problems or 
offering alternative solutions.”27 
 
Baraona’s remark reveals that Pinochet’s neoliberal authoritarianism constitutes not 
simply a rejection but a redefinition of democracy. And at the center of that 
redefinition is reduction of democracy to an instrument that can be appropriated by an 
external authority to serve purposes beyond the reach of democratic politics. While 
announcing his plans to extend neoliberalism into seven areas of policy (labor, social 
security, education, health, justice, agriculture, and regional administration) in his 
September 11, 1979 speech, Pinochet asserted that democracy was “not an end in itself” 
but only a means to build a truly “free society.”28 
                                                 
26 Quoted in Valdéz, Pinochet’s Economists, 30. 
27 Quoted in ibid., 31. 
28 Quoted in Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet 
(New York and London: Norton, 1991), 191. 
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The convergence of the gremialistas and the neoliberals under Pinochet 
illustrates depoliticization and the neoliberal restructuring of the economy as mutually 
reinforcing aspects of instrumental democracy. The diverging fate of two important 
political actors—business groups and organized labor—under the Pinochet regime 
clearly demonstrates this point. Big business groups (grupos económicos) benefited 
greatly from the privatization of public enterprises, which occurred in remarkably 
favorable terms (e.g., low sale price, subsidies), and acquired excessively concentrated 
economic power. At the end of 1978 six business groups controlled 54% of the assets 
of the 250 largest private enterprises in Chile, and five of those groups doubled their 
assets between 1978 and 1980.29 This trend was even more pronounced in the 
financial sector. By 1982 Cruzat and Vial groups, two biggest business groups in Chile, 
controlled 42 percent of all banking capital and 60 percent of all credit.30 In sharp 
contrast, organized labor was severely suppressed in a supposedly free economy. As 
noted above, the military regime tried to demobilize workers as soon as it came into 
power. Decree Laws no. 32 of October 4, 1973, for example, made dismissal of 
workers extremely easy, effecting a “wholesale authorization to fire union leaders and 
militants.”31 The notorious Labor Plan (Plan Laboral) of 1979 epitomized the military 
regime’s repressive labor policies throughout the 1970s which would persist even after 
the transition.32 The Labor Plan severely restricted workers’ collective bargaining 
ability by limiting the scope of bargaining to wage issues and by banning negotiations 
on any matters that might interfere with the employer’s right to organize the firm. At 
                                                 
29 Alejandro Foxley, “The Neoconservative Economic Experiment in Chile,” in Military Rule in Chile, 
eds., J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986), 32-33, 45. See also Pilar Vergara, “”Changes in the Economic Functions of the Chilean State,” 
in ibid., 85-116. 
30 Constable and Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies, 191-192. 
31 Manuel Barrera and J. Samuel Valenzuela, “The Development of Labor Movement Opposition to the 
Military Regime,” in Military Rule, 236, 236n4. 
32 For the military regime’s labor policies in the 1970s, see Karen L. Remmer, “Political 
Demobilization in Chile, 1973-1978,” Comparative Politics 12(3) (1980): 275-301. 
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the same time, it allowed employers to modify contracts without consulting employees, 
to hire replacement workers during strike (which was limited to sixty days), and to 
dismiss workers without providing any justification.33 It introduced, moreover, new 
bargaining entities inside firms designed to compete with, and ultimately weaken, 
unions. 
The military regime ensured through constitutional reform that the social 
relations established under its rule were to be preserved. As I will discuss in the next 
section, the constitution of 1980, while embracing the transition to democracy in an 
attempt to legitimize and extend authoritarian rule, erected institutional barriers that 
would make changing the basic frame of society exceedingly difficult. The 1980 
constitution, which was accepted by opposition leaders during the negotiation process 
and played a significant role in shaping the direction of democratization in Chile, was 
named the “Constitution of Liberty” in honor of Hayek’s 1960 book.34 
Pinochet’s authoritarian redefinition of democracy finds a striking parallel in 
South Korea. In October 27, 1972, a year before the coup in Chile, Park Chung Hee, a 
former general who staged a successful coup in 1961 against the democratic and short-
lived Chang Myon government (1960-61) and was elected President in 1964, declared 
the “yushin” (literally meaning “revitalizing reform”) regime.35 The yushin 
constitution was purported to “consolidate democracy that suits our circumstances” in 
order “to eliminate at once all factions and political schemes undermining stability and 
to accelerate the reunification of Korea through the maximization of efficiency and 
                                                 
33 Posner, State, Market, and Democracy in Chile, 51. 
34 For Hayek’s argument for an upper legislative body insulated from political pressure as a “safeguard” 
for democracy, see his Law, Legislation, and Liberty, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1979), chap. 17. 
35 On the context in which the yushin regime was established, see Young-soon Kim, “Yushin cheje-ui 
soorip wonin-ae kwanhan yonku” [A Study of the Establishmnet of the Yushin Regime],” in Onul-ui 
Hankuk Jabonjuui-wa Kuk-ka [Capitalism and the State in Contemporary Korea], ed. Sansa-yon (Seoul: 
Hangil-sa, 1988), 23-89.  
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national unity.”36 The thematic resemblance of the yushin constitution and the 
Declaration is hard to miss. Both documents, articulating the essence of Pinochet’s and 
Park’s authoritarianism, categorically reject the expression and negotiation of different 
social voices—politics as such—for the sake of stability and efficiency. Even a brief 
look at major features of the yushin constitution clearly demonstrates this point. The 
National Assembly was deprived of its congressional oversight and its yearly session 
was limited to 150 days. One third of its members were to be chosen by the National 
Congress for Unification (NCU), which was under the direct influence of the president. 
Most blatantly, the constitution authorized the president to dissolve the National 
Assembly when he deems necessary. The judicial branch, too, came under the 
president’s power. The constitution also abolished review of legality for confinement 
and eliminated clauses on the nullity of confessions extracted by torture. Together, 
these measures freed Park from all formal and informal pressure. At the same time, the 
constitution stipulated that the president be elected indirectly by the NCU and 
eliminated a two-term limit, effectively guaranteeing Park’s permanent rule (in 1972, 
Park, the only candidate, was elected president with 99.99% of NCU votes).37 As the 
public criticism of the yushin constitution grew, Park issued Emergency Degree no. 9 
in May 13, 1975 and banned all oppositional activities, including the reporting of 
those activities.  
The yushin constitution was but a consolidation of tendencies already present 
in Park’s nominally democratic rule (1963-1972), during which politics had been 
replaced by authoritarian decision-making and technocratic management. As in 
Pinochet’s case, Park’s authoritarianism was less a rejection than a redefinition of 
democratic politics. Park made this point clear as early as in 1962: 
                                                 
36 Donga Ilbo-sa [Donga Daily Co.], “Yushin Hunbup [The Yushin Constitution],” Donga Yonkam 
[Dong-a Yearbook] (1973), 574-575. 
37 Ibid., 527-532. 
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“Our attempt to import democracy over the past 17 years has failed 
because we have been trying to uncritically adopt a foreign ideal 
without a sufficient reflection on our nation’s history and culture … We 
can import only a form of democracy, not its roots. We have come to 
realize, if belatedly, that our task is the “Koreanization” of democracy. 
Since democracy relies not on irresponsible freedom but on self-
disciplining freedom, [Korean] democracy must include elements of 
leadership and guidance.”38 
 
Park called his alternative vision of democracy “administrative democracy.”39 Indeed, 
Park created a huge bureaucratic system and used it as a major venue for the making 
and execution of policies, bypassing democratic processes. Park gave great 
discretionary power to the state bureaucracy and, in order to ensure its effective 
function (and maintain his personal control over it), insulated major bureaucratic 
organizations such as the Economic Planning Board and the Ministry of Finance from 
political and social pressure.40 Even before political activities were constitutionally 
banned under the yushin regime, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency freely 
suppressed dissidents, bending and ignoring law. 
Although Park was deeply committed to nationalism and always emphasized 
national unity, his rule was predicated upon the political as well as economic exclusion. 
And as in Chile under Pinochet, the nature of this exclusion was deeply conditioned by 
the Cold War. Ever since its independence from Japanese colonial rule after World 
War II, the South Korean state has depended heavily on the United States that needed 
a bastion against the expansion of Communism in East Asia and, especially after the 
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Korean War, anti-communism became raison d’être for South Korean regimes. The 
military junta led by Park, too, declared immediately after the 1961 coup that it would 
“oppose communism as its primary objective.”41 Although North Korea was 
undeniably a security threat, anti-communism was used far more broadly as a tool to 
delegitimize and suppress domestic opposition throughout Park’s eighteen-year rule. 
The National Security Law (NSL) and the Anticommunist Law (AL)—major legal 
mechanisms by which anti-communism was reinforced—subjected to severe penalty 
(including capital punishment) “any person” who “has organized an association or 
group for the purpose of … disturbing the state or who prepared or conspired to do so” 
or who “has praised, encouraged, or sided with anti-state organizations or members 
thereof on foreign communist lines or benefited the same in any way through other 
means.”42 With this vague definition, virtually anyone who challenged Park’s 
authoritarian rule could be, and was, criminalized. Between 1961 and 1980, a total of 
6,135 individuals were arrested for the violation of the NSL and the AL alone.43 In 
particular, the Park regime took particular care to depoliticize workers—a social group 
that was rapidly growing in size due to Korea’s swift industrialization.44 The Park 
regime’s anti-labor policies, especially its ban on the political activities of organized 
labor, continued under the rule of Chun Doo Hwan, who filled a power vacuum 
created by Park’s assassination in 1979 through another coup, and even after the 
democratic transition. 
While violently repressing the politicization of various social groups, Park 
created the capitalist class through his state-led economic development. Unlike in 
                                                 
41 “Text of Korean Rebels’ Communique,” The New York Times, May 17, 1961. 
42 Quoted in William Shaw, Human Rights in Korea: History and Policy Perspectives (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), 184. 
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Yuksa Pipyong-sa, 1992), 31. 
44 Hagen Koo, Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation (Ithaca: Cornell 
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Chile and Latin America more generally, the bourgeoisie as a social class was almost 
non-existent in South Korea after its independence. After he came into power, Park 
personally chose a handful of businessmen who he believed were willing and able to 
execute his risky plan for export-driven industrialization, and rewarded their 
cooperation and loyalty with subsidized bank loans, state-guaranteed foreign loans, 
and favoritism in awarding licenses. Under the auspices of the state, these handpicked 
businessmen turned their companies into giant industrial conglomerates owned and 
managed by their family members (chaebol). In the 1970s, as Park switched the focus 
of the Korean economy from the light manufacturing to the heavy and chemical 
industry, the chaebol not only grew in size but also penetrated into every corner of the 
Korean economy.45 In 1982 staggering 82.1 percent of the total manufacturing was 
noncompetitive, namely, owned by a few chaebol groups.46 And the chaebol’s power 
expanded even more throughout the 1980s. Pressured by the United States and led by 
US trained Korean economists, the Chun Doo Hwan government “liberalized” the 
economy, namely, loosened the state’s protection of and control over the financial 
market. Gaining control over its financial resources hitherto monopolized by the state, 
business stopped being subservient to the state and began to act as an autonomous and 
powerful political actor. The symbolic event that illustrates this shifting power 
relationship between the state and business occurred in 1985, when Chung Chu-young, 
the owner of Hyundai and Korea’s most influential industrialist at the time, made a 
public plea for ending state interventionism, which would have been unimaginable 
under Park.47 
                                                 
45 For a detailed discussion of the development of the chaebol in the Park regime, see Eun Mee Kim 
and Gil-Sung Park, “The Chaebol,” in The Park Chung Hee Era, 265-294. 
46 Cited in Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), 173. 
47 Cited in ibid., 200. 
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Against this backdrop, we can now appreciate what was truly demanded in the 
democratization process in Chile and South Korea. In their long struggle for 
democratization, people aspired not simply to a set of institutions that would allow 
them to elect their leaders but to an alternative to the system of exclusion upon which 
authoritarian rule rested. Those who struggled for the end of authoritarianism surely 
varied in their aims and beliefs, but they were united in their opposition to the 
authoritarian regime’s shallow vision of democracy that benefited a few and silenced 
the vast majority. And it was through that united opposition a broad sense of what 
counts as genuine democracy emerged. Beneath what is conveniently called 
“democratic transition” was a long and arduous process through which the excluded 
under authoritarianism were identified and articulated, however incompletely, as a 
political subject that ought to be at the center of genuine democracy. 
As noted above, Pinochet violently suppressed and dissolved political parties 
and major social organizations such as labor unions. Facing extreme poverty, 
unemployment, economic insecurity and lacking the social safety net traditionally 
provided by political parties, Chileans in poor neighborhoods (poblaciones) were 
therefore forced to resort to small local organizations such as handicraft workshops, 
wholesale food-buying cooperatives, soup kitchens, savings groups, and health care 
groups. A conservative estimate indicates that at least 223,795 people (out of 
estimated 1,208,910 people living in Santiago’s poblaciones) benefited directly from 
these organizations.48 While these organizations focused primarily on meeting short-
term economic needs, they also contributed to the formation of political consciousness 
and solidarity. For instance, soup kitchens (ollas comunes) were not charity 
organizations that provided food to the poor but cooperative groups in which women 
                                                 
48 Luis Razeto, “Popular Organizations and the Economy of Solidarity,” in Popular Culture in Chile: 
Resistance and Survival, eds., Kenneth Aman and Cristián Parker, trans. Terry Cambias (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1991), 83. 
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cooked together a single pot of food  from what was contributed by each member or 
donated, and distributed it one ladle per family member (the term “ollas communes” 
literally means “common pots”).49 Participating in such organizations not only made 
women realize that their difficulties were not an individual but social problem shared 
by others but also reminded them of the importance of acting collectively in 
addressing that problem.50 Also, many women whose family members “disappeared” 
after the coup came together in workshops and made burlaps (arpilleras) from scraps 
of cloth. Under the sponsorship of the Catholic Church, the only organization 
relatively protected from the military’s brutal repression, the arpilleristas voiced a 
critique of the authoritarian regime in a time when there was practically no room for 
political dissidence.51 Joined by youth groups, “interest groups” (short-term groups 
whereby people demanded housing or sought to alleviate their debt), and human rights 
organizations, these popular organizations served as a training ground for solidarity, 
participation, and cooperation, maintaining political space and nurturing new political 
actors. As Kenneth Roberts has noted, these organizations “provided space for the 
resumption of grass-roots political participation” and “became primary building blocks 
of popular resistance to the dictatorship.”52 
It is debatable how much internal coherence and political autonomy these 
popular organizations actually possessed. Philip Oxhorn argues that these popular 
organizations developed their own collective identity and competed with political 
parties for constituencies in poblaciones,53 while Cathy Schneider asserts that it was 
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Communist party activists that politicized and mobilized the otherwise passive popular 
sector.54 Resolving this empirical question is not essential to our discussion; it 
suffices to recognize that, when no other political and social groups were able, these 
popular organizations represented lo popular or el pueblo—meaning the 
“(marginalized) people”—as an aspirational category that provided a unifying symbol 
of the opposition to authoritarianism. As Kenneth Aman observes, “middle class 
intellectuals, artists, activists in the church, and other opponents of the military regime 
and even of its more moderate Christian-Democratic successor have increasingly 
discovered in popular culture a certain inspiration, so much so that some have warned 
of a kind of romanticism that imputes to el pueblo (the people) more coherence than it 
possesses or can sustain.”55 
When a major economic crisis hit the country in the early 1980s and a series of 
anti-Pinochet protests finally erupted in 1983 after a long period of terror and silence, 
the popular sector emerged as a major driving force of the anti-authoritarian struggle. 
In the early stages of the anti-authoritarian struggle, most opposition leaders 
considered popular mobilization a legitimate and viable way to overthrow the 
dictatorship (for different reasons, as will be discussed in the next section). They were 
strongly opposed to accepting the controlled procedures for democratic transition set 
out in the 1980 constitution and believed they should (and would be able to) press the 
Pinochet regime to immediately turn over power through popular protests. When 
Patricio Aylwin, future president of post-transition Chile, suggested in a 1984 seminar 
that the opposition explore ways to work within the constitution of 1980, one 
participant recalled, it was “enormously criticized within the [moderate-centrist] 
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Christian Democratic Party and, obviously, by the rest of the opposition.”56 Indeed, 
up until the mid-1980s, most political party leaders across the ideological spectrum 
were supportive of autonomous popular organizations as a crucial element of a more 
participatory, stable, and robust democracy. Leaders of the Socialist Party (both its 
more radical and moderate branches) argued, in stark contrast to their diagnosis just a 
few years later, that “democratizing society … make[s] it more difficult for the 
dictator to succeed” and that “if there had been real participation by the people, there 
would have been no military coup.”57 
However, the vision of democracy that incorporates el pueblo as its integral 
part would prove to be short-lived. As a sense of exhaustion set in after three years of 
intense protests and the Pinochet regime still seemed unshaken in its ability to survive 
and repress, major political parties would undergo a significant change in their 
strategy as well as ideology and, in so doing, grow increasingly distanced from the 
popular sector (this point will also be discussed in the next section). 
In South Korea, what served as a unifying symbol of the anti-authoritarian 
struggle was the concept of “minjung,” also meaning ordinary and oppressed people. 
Like el pueblo, minjung emerged from the experience of exclusion under 
authoritarianism and assumed a central place in the counter-discourse to the 
authoritarian regime’s instrumental vision of democracy. Like el pueblo, minjung, too, 
not only existed as an empirical segment of the population but was aspired as an ideal 
to be realized. As prominent Korean political scientist Jang Jip Choi states, “while the 
minjung exists objectively … [it] is not a fixed or limited sociopolitical entity, but 
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embodies a dynamic, liberating subjectivity that arises from a history of oppression.”58 
The term minjung was used as early as the 1920s during the struggle against Japanese 
colonialism, but it was in reaction to the yushin regime that it arose as a guiding 
concept of the democratic opposition. Grounded in the fact of political oppression and 
economic exploitation, the concept minjung was articulated by students and 
intellectuals as both a critique of and an alternative to the yushin regime. This duality 
of minjung is captured, for instance, in the account of Han Wansang, one of the most 
influential theorists of the minjung discourse. Applying the Marxian distinction 
between a class in itself and a class for itself, Han distinguished “the dormant minjung” 
and “the conscious minjung” and argued that the conscious minjung (e.g., students and 
intellectuals) had the social and moral responsibility to help the dormant minjung (e.g., 
workers and peasants) recognize their status as minjung and, as its flip side, the 
injustice of the yushin regime. When the duality of minjung is thus unified, minjung 
could “transform themselves from the object of history to the subject of history” that 
“determines [the course of] history and the structure [of society].”59 
Importantly, from the standpoint of minjung the yushin regime was perceived 
as an inseparably interrelated set of problems encompassing political dictatorship, 
economic injustice, and moral corruption. If the minjung movement demanded 
democracy as an alternative to authoritarianism, it did so in an attempt to overcome all 
those problems. This broad, minjung vision of democracy was clearly expressed in a 
declaration issued in 1979 by such opposition leaders as Yoon Bo-sun, Ham Seok-hun, 
and Kim Dae Jung. Characterizing the ruling elite as an “anti-minjung group” that 
“abolished the freedom and rights of minjung and refused to adopt democratic 
institutions by exploiting the Cold War logic,” they stated thus: “we object to the 
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annihilation of democracy under the pretense of anti-communism and national security. 
We reject the economic system that allows all the privileges to be monopolized by 
comprador capitalists under the name of economic development. We denounce the 
moral depravity and unfettered materialism of the privileged class thriving on the 
misery of the majority.” It was in order to redress these problems that they called for a 
“restoration of democracy” that would promote the “creativity and participation of 
minjung.”60 
From its inception, the minjung movement was closely intertwined with the 
formation of the Korean working-class.61 The defining event for the alliance between 
intellectuals (especially university students) and workers occurred in November 13, 
1970. Chun Tae-il, a young garment cutter in a textile factory, committed self-
immolation after his numerous attempts to petition to the Ministry of Labor about 
horrendous working conditions to which his fellow workers—mostly young girls 
(between the ages of fourteen and twenty) who had migrated from rural areas—were 
subject ended in vain. Chun’s death put the entire Korean society into a state of shock, 
dramatically and tragically revealing the dark side of industrialization. In particular, 
Chun’s wish, expressed in his diary, to have college friends who could teach him how 
to read Chinese characters so that he would be able to understand the labor laws left 
university students with an immense sense of shame and guilt. Following Chun’s 
death, many university students came to be involved in the labor movement by 
teaching at the night schools (yahak) that provided workers with the basic education or, 
sometimes, by becoming workers themselves—the trend which would accelerate in 
the 1980s. As in Chile, Christian organizations functioned as a protective umbrella for 
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intellectuals and labor activists and, in the prominent case of the Urban Industrial 
Mission, actively helped workers organize independent unions in opposition to the 
existing state- or company-controlled unions. While the labor movement in the 1970s 
remained, overall, scattered and unorganized, these efforts did materialize in a few 
momentous labor conflicts, including ones in Dong-il Textile in 1978 and YH Trading 
in 1979, the latter of which served as a catalyst for huge protests in Pusan and Masan 
(two major industrial cities in the southeastern region of South Korea) that eventually 
led to the demise of the yushin regime. 
The minjung movement took a decisively radical turn in 1980 when a brief 
political opening followed by the assassination of Park Chung Hee—the so-called 
“Seoul Spring”—was quickly and brutally closed in May 1980. Chun Doo Hwan, 
unwilling to give up the power he had acquired through a coup, ruthlessly trampled on 
the popular protest that broke out in the city of Kwangju (a city in the southwestern 
region of South Korea that had been marginalized throughout Park’s rule) demanding 
an end to the military dictatorship. Chun sent in paratroopers and had the army fire on 
civilians, killing hundreds. The Kwangju massacre set the tone of the Chun regime’s 
authoritarianism and, at the same time, pushed the minjung movement in a more 
radical direction. Through a long reflection on the “defeat” in the spring of 1980, 
many leaders of the minjung movement came to conclude that a moral critique of the 
government or a humanistic attempt to improve the conditions of individual workers 
was too meek and unsystematic to be a solution to the grave and complex problem 
plaguing South Korea; what was needed, they now believed, was a revolutionary 
movement that would allow minjung to seize power and radically transform the entire 
social system.62 Under the growing influence of Marxism-Leninism, many students 
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believed that the working class would be the principal agent of this radical 
transformation and entered the factory as a “disguised worker” (wijang chuiop-ja) in 
order to help raise workers’ consciousness, organize democratic unions, and make 
linkages to a broader political struggle against authoritarianism.63 
Based on the achievements of the minjung movement throughout the 1970s 
and the early 1980s, the democratization movement finally and triumphantly arose to 
the surface in the mid-1980s. It culminated in the “June 29 Declaration,” issued in 
1987 by Chun’s Democratic Justice Party, which announced the renewal of direct 
presidential election, thereby marking the symbolic end of authoritarian rule. As in 
Chile, however, in the actual process of democratization the vision of minjung 
democracy would be alienated and displaced rather than accommodated. 
 
The Specter of Instrumental Democracy: Post-Transition Politics in Chile 
and South Korea 
In the previous section, I tried to demonstrate that the democratization 
movement in Chile and South Korea developed its own vision of democracy in 
opposition to the circumscribed and instrumental democracy promoted by 
authoritarianism. That alternative vision of democracy, I argued, was based on the 
(incomplete and tension-filled) articulation of the excluded as a new democratic 
subject—el pueblo and minjung. The point here is not to romanticize el pueblo and 
minjung. The concepts el pueblo and minjung are important not only because they 
represent the victims of authoritarianism but because they enable us to recognize that, 
in the contexts of Chile and South Korea, democratization did not simply mean the 
adoption of electoral institutions but a rejection of authoritarianism’s system of 
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exclusion that instrumentalizes and hollows out democracy. Thus understood, el 
pueblo and minjung provide a useful lens through which to evaluate the direction of 
democratic development in post-transition Chile and South Korea. 
As noted at the outset, there is no denying that there are important qualitative 
differences between authoritarianism and electoral democracy. Nonetheless, there are 
signs that democratic politics in post-transition Chile and South Korea is 
overshadowed by the political structure as well as the social relations inherited from 
their authoritarian past. This, of course, is not to suggest that deeply entrenched social 
structures can change overnight (though it should also be noted that more than twenty 
years have passed since Chile and South Korea made a transition to electoral 
democracy). Rather, my concern is that the nature and the working of democracy in 
Chile and South Korea tend to reinforce, rather than challenge, instrumental 
democracy. This troubling development is due, in part, to the fact that the 
democratization process in Chile and South Korea was severed from the majority of 
the population and dominated by a small group of political elites. The result is a 
political system that manipulates and restructures people’s interest and dispositions 
rather than solicits and responds to popular demands. Combined with the elitist nature 
of democracy, structural changes dictated by neoliberalism contributed further to the 
instrumentalization of democracy. In the post-transition period, both Chile and South 
Korea accepted neoliberalism not simply as an economic model but as a regulative 
principle of society under the banners of “modernization” or “globalization.” The 
social structure produced by neoliberalism undermines the prospect of realizing el 
pueblo or minjung democracy envisioned and aspired during the struggle for 
democracy, as it redefines social problems as private matters and dissolves collective 
subjectivities into fiercely competing and yet politically deprived individuals. 
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In Chile, while most opposition leaders cohered in their rejection of the 1980 
constitution, they welcomed popular protests that began to erupt in 1983 for different 
reasons. On the one hand, the Democratic Popular Movement (Movimiento 
Democrático Popular, MDP)—a coalition of the Communist Party, the more radical 
Almeyda branch of the Socialist Party, and the Christian Left—sought to topple the 
Pinochet regime by relying directly on mass mobilization. On the other hand, the 
Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democrática, AD)—a coalition of the centrist Christian 
Democrat Party and the more moderate Núñez branch of the Socialist Party—viewed 
the protests as a tactical step that would bring the military regime to the negotiation 
table. The trouble was that, even by 1986, both strategies were not working. The 
Pinochet regime made a mockery of various requests to renegotiate the 1980 
constitution by pretending to consider them only until it passed its most vulnerable 
phase and rebuffing them as soon as it regained strength. The popular insurrection 
strategy, too, lost much of its momentum, as participation dwindled in the face of the 
Pinochet regime’s ruthless repression and the middle class, alarmed by violent protests 
led by increasingly smaller and more militant groups, withdrew its support. 
Hence starting in 1986, the opposition’s commitment to popular mobilization 
began to disintegrate. The tension within the democratic opposition between the rising 
level of violence and the growing concern with it had reached a breaking point on 
September 26, 1986, when the Mañuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front, an armed 
revolutionary force closely associated with the Communist Party, made a failed 
assassination attempt on Pinochet, inciting a new wave of repression from the regime. 
Immediately following the event, José Joaquín Brunner, one of the most influential 
sociologists then working with the opposition, leaked to a leading pro-government 
newspaper, La Segunda, a memorandum written for internal party discussion in which 
he criticized the opposition’s social mobilization strategy, proposed cutting ties with 
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the hard-left MDP, and called for a negotiation within the framework of the 1980 
constitution. While, at first, Brunner was roundly and vehemently criticized, major 
figures of the opposition moved to accept Brunner’s position in the ensuing debate.64 
This was a rather swift change of position.65 In May 1986, Ricardo Lagos, leader of 
the Socialist Party and future president, remarked that “there is no incompatibility 
between a political solution [negotiation with the military] and social mobilization.” 
Only about six months later, however, Ricardo Núñez of the same party made a sharp 
distinction between “political solutions” and “all forms of struggle [insurrectionary 
strategies espoused by the Communist Party],” arguing in favor of the former.66 Even 
the Almeyda Socialists within the MDP soon followed suit by distancing themselves 
from the popular insurrection strategy. By 1987 electoral participation in a plebiscite 
designed by the 1980 constitution became the predominant strategy of the democratic 
opposition. 
The constitution of 1980 stipulated that the transition to civilian rule take place 
through a two-step process. First, a plebiscite would be held in 1988 to decide 
people’s preference for a single candidate from the military (which everyone 
presumed, correctly, to be Pinochet). If Pinochet won, he would stay in power as the 
president for another eight years. Only if he lost, the transition process would proceed 
to the second phase and a presidential election would be held the next year. So once 
the opposition accepted this process, its only chance lay in securing as many votes as 
possible in the plebiscite and the subsequent presidential election. This meant that 
popular mobilization, which was becoming more violent and thus increasingly 
alienating the middle class, should be tamed and brought down to a less threatening 
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level. The need to manage the popular sector was only reinforced by the coalitional 
nature of the opposition. In order to show that it was a viable alternative to the military 
regime, some seventeen parties united into a coalition named the “Command for the 
No (Concertación por el No)”—which would later develop into the Command of the 
Parties for Democracy (Concertación de los Partidoes por la Democracia, 
Concertación). While the Concertación was dominated by the Christian Democrats 
and the Núñez Socialists, it could not afford to ignore smaller parties given the overall 
weakness of the opposition as compared to the military regime. Maintaining unity 
among these various parties was crucial and daunting, and the demands of the popular 
sector, which were often more radical than what was and could be agreed on within 
the Concertación, were considered to jeopardize that unity. Thus, throughout the 
transition process, the opposition dismantled the autonomy of the popular sector and 
subordinated it to the needs of political elites. In a revealing case, when the Unitary 
Command of the Pobladores (Comando Unitario de Pobladores, CUT)—an 
autonomous organization created in 1986 to represent the popular sector—organized a 
March Against Hunger in 1988 against the will of the Concertación, the Concertación 
replaced the leaders of the CUT with party loyalists.67 
The emphasis on unity is understandable within the strategic context of the late 
1980s. But “democracy by agreements (democracia de los acuerdos)” became the 
dominant discourse even after the transition, silencing various demands under the 
name of consensus that “only existed in order to end the dictatorship.”68 In part, this 
illusory consensus is maintained by the legacies of the Pinochet regime. The political 
presence of the military (with Pinochet as commander in chief) remained very strong 
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in post-transition Chile.69 Moreover, the constitution of 1980 that the Concertación 
accepted contained built-in institutional mechanisms that served to thwart attempts to 
modify the institutional framework or seek justice for the crimes perpetrated by the 
military—attempts that would presumably disrupt “the consensus.” One such 
mechanism was the appointment of nine “designated senators” in addition to thirty-
eight elected senators. The designated senators repeatedly transformed the 
Concertación’s majority in the Senate into a majority for the right, frustrating attempts 
to amend the constitution or to undertake fundamental reforms (this constitutional 
provision was abolished in 2006). Similarly, the 1980 constitution established a unique 
binomial electoral system that works to the advantage of the right. Under this system, 
each electoral district has two Chamber seats. Each party or coalition can run two 
candidates, but in order to win both seats, a party or coalition must win more than two 
thirds of the district vote. In other words, a second-place party (typically the right wing 
party Unión Democrática Independiente) can be guaranteed a seat with 33.4 percent of 
the vote, no matter how far it trails behind the Concertación (this system persists until 
today).70 These institutional devices give disproportionate power to the minority, 
thereby allowing them to preserve the authoritarian past as part of the consensus in 
post-transition Chile. 
But perhaps more important, the ideology of consensus is reinforced by the 
Concertación itself. The ideal of “democracy by agreements” arose within the 
democratic opposition through a long and painful reflection on the collapse of the 
“Chilean road to Socialism.” Many opposition leaders (including those of the Left) 
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became very wary of polarizing tendencies to set one segment of the population (e.g., 
the working class) against the other (e.g., the bourgeoisie), which was increasingly 
perceived to be responsible for the tragic demise of the Allende regime.71 Edgardo 
Boeninger, Aylwin’s Chief of Staff, summarized this mentality well in the following 
remark: “Should a government attempt to make drastic changes in the socioeconomic 
system—as was the case of Chile under Allende—the threatened sectors will decide 
that democracy is no longer able to protect their basic values and interests. A “coup 
mentality” is the likely result.”72 Alejandro Foxley, finance minister in the Aylwin 
government, went so far as to speak of advantages of the 1980 constitution. 
Institutional mechanisms such as designated senators and a binomial electoral system, 
Foxley argued, “forced us to reach broad agreements across the political spectrum 
instead of taking the narrow view of the parties in power … When you are forced by 
the rules of the game to play moderate politics, the process itself transforms people 
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into moderate politicians.”73 Referring to this powerful ideological convergence 
around the imperative for consensus, influential Chilean sociologist Tomás Moulian 
declared that “the consensus is the founding act of contemporary Chile.” According to 
Moulian, however, the consensus does not express wise moderation but constitutes the 
democratic opposition’s admission of “fault” on their part and of “the irrationality and 
utopianism” of popular aspirations in the period prior to the military coup—a gesture 
that effectively recognizes the existence of “basic rational nuclei (núcleos racionales 
básicos)” in the socioeconomic system established under Pinochet.74 In consequence, 
Moulain laments, in contemporary Chile “politics no longer exists as a struggle 
between true alternatives, as historicity (historicidad), but exists merely as a history 
(historia) of small variations, adjustments, changes in aspects of society that do not 
compromise the global dynamics [of capitalism].”75 
Indeed, the Concertación, which ruled Chile in four consecutive governments 
after the transition until 2010, continued to prioritize the preservation of consensus 
over the deepening of democracy. Instead of promoting popular participation that was 
abolished by the Pinochet regime and, after its brief resurgence, suspended during the 
transition process, the Concertación governments operated in a highly technocratic 
fashion, echoing, disturbingly, the Pinochet era.76 The way in which participation is 
marginalized is visible, for instance, in the case of Community Economic Social 
Councils (Consejos Económico-Social Communal, CESCO). While created in 1992 to 
promote participation at the local level, the CESCO was strictly advisory in its nature 
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and given no power to make any binding decisions or even hold the mayor 
accountable. Given that all people could do was to express their opinion on 
predetermined projects which the mayor could then choose to listen or ignore, it is not 
surprising that the CESCO was marked by extremely low membership and 
participation.77 But perhaps the Concertación might not have even considered the 
hollow nature of the CESCO as the marginalization of participation, because it 
conformed to its definition of participation. The Concertación’s unique view of 
participation was expressed in the first public assembly (cabildo communal) in 1991 
through which the Concertación reached out to the popular sector for the first time 
since the transition. One member of the local health group requested that the municipal 
government make greater effort to clean the garbage dumps in the población to 
prevent the spread of cholera. In response, Hernán Rojo of the Concertación argued 
that garbage disposal is not the responsibility of the government, complaining that 
“[w]hat is lacking here is knowledge of how to operate in democracy.” In democracy, 
Rojo asserted, “[e]veryone should participate. When it comes to garbage, and 
pavement, you are the ones who are going to propose the solutions and establish the 
projects. It is the very poblador organizations that execute them.”78 This encounter is 
suggestive because, as Julia Paley observes, it clearly shows how the Concertación 
understood popular organizations as “extensions of government services.”79 While, 
taken at face value, Rojo’s definition of democracy seems benign (“you are going to 
propose the solutions and establish the projects”), the real meaning became clear when 
he disapproved any attempt by the pobladores to make demands on the government, 
asserting that they are the root cause of the problem. “Why should we clean up the 
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fields, when it is the people of this población that dump garbage in them? The minute 
that field is cleared, you will just fill it with garbage again.”80 From this point of view, 
the pobladores were a problem to be solved, so they can “participate” in supporting 
and implementing programs designed by the government as patients of some sort but 
not in setting the goals, initiating programs, and evaluating consequences as citizens. 
While the Socialist governments of Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle 
Bachelet (2006-2010) did recognize the instrumental nature of participation, and the 
resulting gap between political parties and their social base, as a serious problem and 
tried to address it through major initiatives, their efforts barely went beyond an 
acknowledgement of the problem. As Philip Oxhorn observes, “the actual policies that 
have been implemented [by the Lagos and Bachelet governments] to increase 
participation have been minimal and largely limited to helping to employ policies 
decided by the political elite.”81 
The problem, however, might not just be a matter of failed or ineffective 
policies, insofar as the basis of participatory democracy is eroded more fundamentally 
by the neoliberal socioeconomic system that remains unchallenged in post-transition 
Chile. To be sure, the Concertación led steady economic growth and increased social 
spending, significantly reducing poverty. But it did little to transform the structure of 
the socioeconomic system, including the relationship between business and labor and 
between the state and society in general. The perpetuation of the neoliberal system can 
be explained, in part, by the factors discussed above—the military’s strong political 
presence and institutional mechanisms that practically give the right veto power. Also, 
the Concertación had been careful not to dismantle neoliberalism in fear of losing the 
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trust of powerful business sectors that were committed more to the economic model 
(which business tended to equate with the military regime) than to democracy.82 But 
as in the case of their acceptance of circumscribed and instrumental democracy, the 
Concertación itself came to approve neoliberalism as a viable development strategy 
and a regulative principle of society. Throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s, most 
opposition leaders were ardently critical of neoliberalism, highlighting both its 
ineffectiveness as an economic model and its negative social impact including 
economic instability and inequality. However, as the economy experienced solid 
growth after the 1982-1983 financial crisis and the opposition moved from a 
confrontational to a compromising stance, major figures of the opposition came to 
accept neoliberalism as the unavoidable, if not the only, path toward “modernization” 
they must tread. In this view, the Pinochet regime is given credit for initiating the 
modernization process, though not without regrettable social cost, and becomes 
legitimate part of democratic Chile. Eugenio Tironi, Socialist and minister of 
information in the Aylwin government, made this view vividly clear in the following 
remark: “Under Pinochet, especially after 1983-1985 crisis, Chile experienced a 
modernizing thrust of a very different nature than those unfolding before 1973—one 
that corresponds closely to modernization tendencies at the international level, 
including reduction of the state’s role; efforts to induce flexibility, specialization, and 
internationalization of productive structures; abandonment of the goal of full 
employment; privatization of public enterprises and services; multiplication of atypical 
employment and reduction of the mass of waged workers; public assistance of a 
minimalist and discretionary character (in opposition to the universalism of the 
                                                 
82 For the Concertación’s efforts to establish and maintain a close policy network with the business 
sector, see Eduardo Silva, “From Dictatorship to Democracy: The Business-State Nexus in Chile’s 
Economic Transformation, 1975-1994,” Comparative Politics 28(3) (1996), esp. 311-314; see also 
idem., The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats, and Market Economics (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1996). 
 207 
welfare state); and liberalization and new flexibility for labor markets. This has been 
the purpose of the Pinochet revolution in Chile … [T]his has also been the purpose of 
modernizing processes in all of the contemporary world, whether countries are 
developed or underdeveloped, capitalist or socialist.”83 
The social structure dictated by neoliberalism undermines prospects of a more 
inclusive and participatory democracy by effectively prohibiting the disadvantaged 
from cohering into collective actors so as to make effective political claims. Organized 
labor, for instance, remains fragmented and vulnerable in post-transition Chile. This 
weakness is reinforced, in part, by legal and institutional mechanisms inherited from 
the military regime, which epitomized in Pinochet’s 1979 Labor Plan. While the 
Concertación initially promised “profound” changes to the Labor Plan, the Aylwin 
government quickly withdrew its commitment when it came into office, saying that 
labor policy should be decided by the autonomous negotiation of business and labor 
with minimal intervention by the state. But the negotiation quickly ended in deadlock, 
as business refused to give up their advantages afforded by the Labor Plan while labor, 
decimated over the course of Pinochet’s sixteen-year rule, lacked power to pressure 
business to compromise. In the end, the Aylwin government had to negotiate 
separately with business and labor and passed only very modest reforms, most of 
which were more than offset by loopholes and deleterious aspects of the Labor Plan 
that remained unchanged.84 In a typical case, the new labor law required employers to 
provide cause for dismissal, raised the fine for unjust dismissal, and allowed workers 
to return to their jobs after the strike even if they were replaced during strikes—
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changes seemingly in the direction of more equal labor-business relations. But all 
these small changes were made practically ineffective because the definition of just 
cause for dismissal was so broad and vague “as to be virtually empty.”85 The modest 
reforms in the new labor law were undermined further by the remaining clauses of the 
Labor Plan, such as the restriction on permissible issues of bargaining, which, as we 
have seen above, prohibited workers from negotiating on matters that “may restrict or 
limit the employer’s exclusive right to organize, lead and administer the firm.”86 
The repeated failure of labor reform is symptomatic of (and reinforces) 
damaging effects of the neoliberal economic system on organized labor. Under the 
influence of neoliberalism that promotes the flexibility of the labor market as one of its 
central tenets, the growth of the Chilean economy was accompanied by the expansion 
of the informal sector (from about 20 percent of the workforce in 1993 to more than 30 
percent in 2006),87 where the absence of legal protection, low wages, and employment 
instability fragmented the workforce and created an acute sense of economic 
insecurity among individual workers, undercutting solidarity necessary for collective 
organization and action. This trend was not limited to the informal sector but pervaded 
Chilean society in general. Nearly one-third of the workforce was employed without a 
contract, and even a contract was not of much help in terms of employment stability as 
it rarely lasted more than a year. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that the 
rate of unionization remained essentially unchanged at 11.6 percent from 1980 to 2004, 
                                                 
85 The clause on firing states that “an employer can terminate a contract of work using as a cause the 
necessities of the firm, establishment or service; such as those deriving from rationalization, 
modernization, falls in productivity, changes in market conditions or in the economy, which make it 
necessary to dismiss one or more workers.” Louise Haagh, “The Emperor’s New Clothes: Labor 
Reform and Social Democratization in Chile,” Studies in Comparative International Development 37(1) 
(2002), 100. 
86 Ibid., 101. The reform of the Labor Plan made little progress in the subsequent governments of 
Eduardo Frei and Ricardo Lagos. See Volker Frank, “The Elusive Goal in Democratic Chile: Reforming 
the Pinochet Labor Legislation,” Latin American Politics and Society 44(1) (2002): 35-68. 
87 Figures cited in Roberts, Deepening Democracy, 154 and Oxhorn, Sustaining Civil Society, 111, 
respectively. 
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even after a modest surge in the early stages of transition (peaking at 15.1 percent in 
1991)—a far cry from 33.7 percent in 1973. In the same period, however, the size of 
unions dramatically shrunk (from 84 members per union in 1980 to 38 members in 
2004, as compared to 140 members in 1973), indicating growing fragmentation of the 
workforce.88 The social consequences of neoliberalism, in short, systematically 
eroded the structural basis of organized labor, hindering it from emerging as a 
collective, and thus politically viable, actor. 
The depoliticizing effects of neoliberalism are witnessed in broader state-
society relations as well. As discussed in the previous section, beginning in the late-
1970s the Pinochet regime extended neoliberalism into various sectors of society 
including social security, health, and education. The privatization of social welfare, 
which remains intact under the Concertación governments, proves to be damaging to 
democratic politics in various ways, as the exemplary case of the social security 
system clearly shows.89 Chile had a public social security system in which workers, 
their employers, and the state contributed to the public funds to be administered by the 
state. In 1981, the military regime replaced this system with a new one in which profit-
making entities known as the Administrators of Pension Funds (AFPs) managed the 
funds based exclusively on workers’ individual contributions. As noted above, the 
privatization of the social security system was a boon to business, especially to a small 
number of economic groups (the three largest AFPs covering 78 percent of all 
participants were owned by economic conglomerates). In 1985, the AFPs had 
accumulated funds totaling 9.73 percent of Chile’s GDP and by 2000 the figure has 
                                                 
88 Figures cited in Posner, State, Market, and Democracy in Chile, 44. 
89 My discussion of the Chilean social security system relies on the following works: Pilar Vergara, “In 
Pursuit of ‘Growth with Equity’: The Limits of Chile’s Free Market Social Reforms,” NACLA: Report 
on the Americas 29(6) (1996): 37-42; Silvia Borzutzky, Vital Connections: Politics, Social Security, 
and Inequality in Chile (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002); Carmelo Mesa-Lago, 
“Myth and Reality of Pension Reform: The Latin American Evidence,” World Development 30(8) 
(2002): 1309-1321. 
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risen to 52 percent. In contrast, privatization severely weakened the state that had to 
transfer massive amounts of resources to the private sector. This transfer alone 
accounted for a quarter of the state’s annual social budget and, as a result, the public 
social security system rapidly deteriorated, suffering from a staggering deficit (nearly 
5 percent of GDP) and the lack of resources. Privatization, in effect, creates a 
bifurcated welfare regime in which wealthier individuals increasingly switch to the 
private system, leaving those who cannot afford private services with the 
underfinanced state system. Having no stake in state services, high-income individuals 
are conditioned to care more about their own standing in the market than the politics 
of social rights and to be detached from the less privileged—which constitutes an 
increasingly large part of the population due to the rise of the informal sector and 
employment instability. The withdrawal of support from the middle class, in addition 
to the increasingly incapacitated and unwilling state, makes it exceedingly difficult for 
the disadvantaged to make claims that social welfare is their right as citizens, not 
private property. Taken together, the neoliberal restructuring of social relations vacates 
the core of democratic politics—the public articulation of political demands—by 
obscuring the locus at which demands are to be directed, displacing social connections 
based on mutual reliance and shared responsibilities, and undermining the legitimacy 
and efficiency of public enterprises. 
In South Korea, a similar combination of elitist politics and neoliberalism 
contributes to the instrumentalization of democracy. Although mass mobilization was 
more directly responsible for the collapse of the authoritarian regime in South Korea, 
the institutionalization of democracy was dominated, as in Chile, by political elites. 
After the June 29 Declaration in 1987, eight representatives from the ruling 
Democratic Justice Party and the opposing Reunification Democratic Party drafted a 
new constitution in a matter of three months, completely ruling out popular demands 
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represented, for instance, by the National Movement Headquarter for Democratic 
Constitution (Kukmin Woondong Bonboo)—a coalition of some twenty-six major civil 
society groups that played a major role in mobilizing protests leading up to the June 29 
Declaration. That the political opening in this “founding moment” was quickly 
transformed to closed-door negotiations between existing political parties is indicative 
of the deeply troubling relationship between political parties and the broader popular 
sector that would define Korean democracy in the years to come. It is troubling not 
only because one of the parties that were involved in the drafting of a new constitution 
represented the military regime. Rather, the real problem is that all the major political 
parties existing at the time were highly conservative in their structure as well as policy 
orientations. This is not surprising considering that all of them (or their forbears) came 
into being within the Cold War context and in the aftermath of a traumatic war with 
North Korea and that they had to survive under the authoritarian regimes whose raison 
d’être was anti-communism. Thus, at the time of transition political parties lacked the 
ability as well as the propensity to represent popular aspirations that had been forming 
throughout the struggle for democracy. 
The unresponsive nature of political parties manifested itself from the very 
beginning of the transition when the Reunification Democratic Party imploded before 
presidential election and, despite extraordinary pressure from its popular base, failed 
to produce a single opposition candidate. As a result, Roh Tae Woo, former general 
and a confidant of Chun Doo Hwan, was elected president with 36.6 percent of the 
popular vote, while two prominent opposition candidates, Kim Young Sam (YS) and 
Kim Dae Jung (DJ), won 28 percent and 27 percent of the vote, respectively. The 
growing rift between party elites and the popular sector was revealed, and 
institutionalized, most dramatically in 1989 when YS made a secret deal to merge his 
Reunification Democratic Party with Roh’s Democratic Justice Party and to create a 
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“grand conservative coalition.” Thanks to this coalition YS went on to be elected 
president in 1993. While the YS government successfully regained civilian control 
over the military and waged a notable anti-corruption campaign to the surprise of 
many worrying observers,90 its alliance with key members of the authoritarian regime 
cast a long shadow on the subsequent development of Korean democracy. Most 
importantly, the split within the democratic opposition between YS and DJ 
fundamentally transformed the political cleavage structure from a confrontation 
between authoritarianism and democracy to a competition between two regions 
represented by the two Kims. Instead of engaging in a sustained discussion of the 
direction of democracy in response to popular demands, political parties mobilized 
people through the manipulation of bias. In so doing, they diverted people’s focus and 
energy from the crucial task of overcoming legacies of the authoritarian past, present 
not just in the composition of political elites but entrenched more deeply in general 
social relations.91 
The separation of political elites and the popular sector—and the politics of 
regionalism as its blatant manifestation—served to perpetuate and reinforce 
profoundly unequal social relations inherited from the authoritarian regime. This 
problem is exemplified most vividly in business-labor relations. After its early efforts 
to rectify the Chun regime’s repressive labor law was met with fierce opposition from 
business that deliberately withheld investment threatening to send the already souring 
economy into recession, the YS government quickly abandoned its reform agenda and 
almost faithfully followed the Chun regime’s economic policies, combining anti-labor 
                                                 
90 Aurel Croissant, “Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea,” 
Armed Forces & Society 30(3) (2004): 357-81. 
91 For the politics of regionalism and the conservative bias of Korean democratization, see Jang Jip 
Choi, Minjuhwa ehu-ui Minjujuui [Democracy after Democratization] (Seoul: Humanitas, 2005), 95-
124; see also Hyug Baeg Im, “Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at the 
End of the ‘Three Kims’ Era,” Democratization 11(5) (2004): 179-198. 
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policies with the loosening of state control over business. This evidences, to be sure, 
how powerful business had become vis-à-vis the state by the early 1990s—the trend 
which, as noted above, was set in motion in the 1980s. But it also shows the 
consequences of the decoupling of political elites and the broad democratic movement. 
Mired in the divisive politics of regionalism, no political party could form a unified 
coalition for democratic reform that was able to challenge the size and coherence of 
business. While labor took full advantage of the political opening by waging 3,749 
strikes in 1987 alone (the total number of strikes throughout the authoritarian regimes, 
1964-86, was approximately 2893),92 they were isolated from political parties and 
reform-minded middle classes and failed to be incorporated into the representative 
structure of a new democracy. The YS government continued to exclusively recognize 
and mobilize the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (Hankuk Nochong)—a state-
sponsored labor organization created in 1963 by the Park government in an attempt to 
control workers—while ruthlessly suppressing efforts to form independent unions. 
Even as labor achieved considerable progress in such matters as wage increases and 
the improvement of the working conditions, as a political group they were dismissed 
as parochial, militant, and thus illegitimate.93 
The marginalization of labor within the structure of political representation had 
far-reaching consequences on the dynamics between social forces, especially after the 
financial crisis in 1997-98 when South Korea had to restructure its economy in 
accordance with the neoliberal doctrine under the guidance of the IMF. The crisis, and 
the ensuing neoliberal restructuring, came at a time that may have well been a turning 
point in the history of Korean democracy. Kim Dae Jung, who, unlike Kim Young 
Sam, was isolated from existing elites and retained a closer tie to broader segments of 
                                                 
92 Figures extracted from Koo, Korean Workers, 159. 
93 Sunhyuk Kim, “State and Civil Society in South Korea’s Democratic Consolidation: Is the Battle 
Really Over?” Asian Survey 37(12) (1997), 1143. 
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the democratic opposition, won the presidential election in the midst of the unfolding 
crisis. Also, the financial crisis occurred on the heels of two major events that 
expressed the solidarity and social recognition that organized labor had achieved: a 
long-delayed and still illegal foundation of independent national labor organization 
(Minju Nochong, MN) in 1995, and a remarkably successful general strike in the 
winter of 1996-97 that led to the withdrawal of the new labor law that ruling party 
legislators passed at dawn in the absence of the opposition party. Together, these 
events offered a rare opportunity to transform the constricted structure of political 
representation, but the neoliberal restructuring of the economy prohibited the 
realization of such a transformation. As discussed above, one of the central tenets of 
neoliberalism is the enhancement of labor market flexibility, which, in practical terms, 
means massive layoffs and the proliferation of highly unstable employment. In the 
face of national crisis, labor was forced to accept that consequence with little to no 
social protection. In a Tripartite Commission that the DJ government established 
between labor, business, and the state in an attempt to find a consensual solution to the 
economic crisis, organized labor ended up giving employers the right to fire workers 
for “legitimate managerial reasons” and to hire contingent workers in exchange for the 
legal recognition of the MN—the right to which workers are entitled in any 
democratic society. This was a self-defeating “deal” on the part of organized labor, 
insofar as the rapid increase in the number of contingent workers who are fragmented, 
insecure, and constantly shifting jobs structurally undermined its basis, thereby 
rendering legal recognition increasingly empty. Not surprisingly, the rate of 
unionization, having peaked at 18.6 percent in 1989, continued to decline and went 
below 10 percent in 2005.94 
                                                 
94 Kwang-Young Shin, “Globalization and the Working Class in South Korea: Contestation, 
Fragmentation, and Renewal,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 40(2) (2010): 211-229, 224. 
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The political structure skewed toward business thus remains unchallenged, 
which affects not just workers but broader state-society relations. Its impact is felt, for 
instance, in the perpetuation of the extremely weak social welfare system even as 
economic volatility and deepening inequality are emerging as reality. Social welfare 
expenditures under the authoritarian regimes were virtually negligible (under six 
percent of the GDP throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as compared to other countries of 
a similar level of economic development, such as Brazil and Chile, that spent way over 
30 percent). While the DJ government did significantly raise social welfare 
expenditures to about 10 percent of the GDP, it was largely in response to the social 
unraveling caused by the financial crisis (between 1997 and 1998 the number of 
unemployed persons soared from 672,000 to 1.81 million) and hardly initiated a 
structural change. The structure of South Korea’s social welfare system is still 
overwhelmingly private, meaning individuals purchase their insurance as their income 
allows. One can get a sense of this structure by dividing the amount of money 
individuals spend to purchase various types of insurance by the amount of money the 
state spend on social welfare policies. The result roughly shows the distribution of 
responsibilities between the state and the private sector in the realm of social welfare 
(the bigger the ratio, the larger role that “the market” plays in social welfare). While 
the ratio varies from 13 percent (Sweden) to 52.4 percent (United States), it is 
staggering 138.7 percent in South Korea (in 2002).95 As we have seen in the case of 
Chile, the privatized welfare system marginalizes the disadvantaged who cannot afford 
private services, exacerbates social segmentation, and displaces social problems to the 
private domain—thereby making it increasingly difficult for people to articulate their 
needs into public demands. 
                                                 
95 Hochul Sonn, Haebang 60 Nyunui Hankuk Jeongchi, 1945-2005 [The Sixty Years of Korean Politics 
after Independence, 1945-2005] (Seoul: Imagine, 2006), 231, 246-257. 
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In Chile and South Korea, there are worrying signs that post-transition politics 
may be degenerating into instrumental democracy. While it is certainly no small 
achievement that both countries succeeded in securing a transition from some of the 
harshest authoritarian regimes to a stable electoral democracy, Chile and South Korea 
seem to be moving away from an inclusive representative structure and equal social 
relations conducive to participation, eroding the basis of a more robust democracy 
envisioned and aspired under the authoritarian regime. As democratic governments 
define more issues as technical or private and push them out of the political realm, 
people are bound to feel that a rotation of elites—which, they are told, is democracy—
makes little difference to their lives. Any attempt to substantiate democracy in Chile 
and South Korea must acknowledge this sense of irrelevance as a serious threat that 
has deep roots in tendencies toward instrumental democracy that both countries have 
so far reinforced or, at least, failed to challenge. 
 
Democracy’s Century and Its Predicaments 
Democratization in Chile and South Korea preceded the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the wave of democratization spread, at an 
almost explosive pace, to farther corners of the world. While domestic demands for 
democracy was certainly strong in all democratizing countries, they were under the 
extraordinary pressure of international forces I have identified in the first section—the 
United States and multilateral lending institutions such as the IMF and the World 
Bank—in determining the course and nature of their democracies. These international 
agents almost unanimously modeled their understanding of democratization upon the 
Third Wave and prescribed a combination of electoral politics and the neoliberal 
strand of the capitalist economy as a universal solution. As Thomas Carothers noted 
(though without including the effective imposition of neoliberalism as the constitutive 
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element of the Third Wave), “[a]s the third wave spread to Eastern Europe, the Soviet 
Union, sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere in the 1990s, democracy promoters 
extended this [Third Wave] model as a universal paradigm for understanding 
democratization. It became ubiquitous in U.S. policy circles as a way of talking about, 
thinking about, and designing interventions in processes of political change around the 
world.”96 
Democracy promotion, which is growing in size and becoming more 
systematic after the end of the Cold War, has caused a great deal of uneasiness among 
observers. The obvious danger lies in the possible abuse of democracy promotion as 
the pretext for enhancing U.S. interests. Nowhere was this danger revealed more 
manifestly than in George W. Bush’s “freedom agenda.” In his second inaugural 
address, Bush remarked that “[t]he survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends 
on the success of liberty in other lands” and pledged to “seek and support the growth 
of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the 
ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”97 While democracy promotion is “not 
primarily the task of arms,” he continued, the United States will “defend ourselves and 
our friends by force of arms when necessary” and “persistently clarify the choice 
before every ruler and every nation, the moral choice between oppression, which is 
always wrong, and freedom, which is eternally right.”98 It is hard to see how 
democracy “clarified” by the external force as the only moral option corresponds to 
the ideal of the “rule of the people.” And what happened in Iraq shortly afterwards has 
done little to lend credence to the claim that the United States’ commitment to 
democracy promotion is principled, not strategic. Critics are also worried that 
                                                 
96 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13(1) (2002), 6. 
97 George W. Bush, “[Second] Inaugural Address,” January 20, 2005, Public Papers of the Presidents 
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98 Ibid., 66-67. 
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democracy promotion, equating democracy and capitalism, might be appropriated as 
an excuse that shields neoliberal capitalism from challenges. The unilateral imposition 
of the neoliberal model by plutocratic and undemocratic organizations such as the IMF 
and the World Bank that often accompanies democratization in developing countries 
severely constrains individual countries’ power with regard to their major economic 
policies and their social impact. 
My analysis of the Chilean and South Korean experience points to yet another 
danger of democracy promotion modeled upon the Third Wave. The combination of 
elite-centered electoral politics and the neoliberal restructuring of social relations has 
systematic tendencies to instrumentalize democracy, which is fundamentally at odds 
with people’s democratic aspirations. Ivan Krastev finds a similar trend in the Central 
and Eastern European contexts. The desire to be “normal,” Krastev argues, made 
Central and Eastern European leaders too readily equate democracy with both 
liberalism and capitalism, ignoring people’s rising dissatisfaction. In doing so, 
however, they lost an integral element of democracy. As he puts it: 
 
“Democracy is a federation whose constituent republics constantly 
squabble over and renegotiate their shared borders. Democracy is a 
self-correcting regime that is sustained by its own contradictions … 
Democracy’s advantage over authoritarianism lies not in some inherent 
democratic ability to offer citizens instant gratification of their needs 
and desires, but rather in democracy’s superior institutional and 
intellectual readiness to cope with the dissatisfaction produced by its 
citizens’ choices … By defining democracy as the natural state of 
society while limiting the sanctioned policy choices available to the 
public, the post-1989 consensus paradoxically undercut this very basic 
advantage of democratic regimes.”99 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Toward a Theory of Democratic Disaffection: Arendt between 
Heidegger and Marx 
 
 
“Insofar as totalitarian movements have sprung up in the non-
totalitarian world (crystallizing elements found in that world, since 
totalitarian governments have not been imported from the moon), the 
process of understanding is clearly, and perhaps primarily, also a 
process of self-understanding.” 
--Hannah Arendt (1954)1 
 
My inquiry in preceding chapters indicates that, as opposed to the rationalist 
paradigm’s presumption, the affective basis of democracy is seriously undermined in 
the postwar era as instrumental democracy penetrates into the concept and practice of 
democracy. Instrumental democracy places power to determine political goals beyond 
the reach of democratic contestation and instead within the hands of elites and 
technocrats who lack democratic legitimacy as well as accountability; it represses 
collective organization and action, dissolving the demos into manageable individual 
units; and it identifies democracy with a self-regulating mechanism, effectively 
eliminating the need for human agency. Troubling signs of disaffection plaguing both 
old and new democracies today compel us to recognize and challenge the working of 
instrumental democracy that circumscribes the scope of democratic politics and 
ultimately renders the working of democracy irrelevant to ordinary people who are 
increasingly forced to address vital issues of their life as isolated individuals rather 
than members of the community. 
                                                 
1 Hannah Arendt, “Understanding and Politics,” in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954, ed. Jerome 
Kohn (New York: Schocken, 1994), 310. 
 221 
In this chapter, I bring my empirical analysis of postwar democracy into 
theoretical focus and conceptualize the relationship between instrumental democracy 
and democratic disaffection by reinterpreting the work of Hannah Arendt in light of 
the genealogy of postwar democracy.2 Although Arendt’s political theory was 
profoundly shaped, like Cold War theories of democracy, by the traumatic experience 
of totalitarianism, it offers a powerful critique of instrumental democracy. In direct 
opposition to her contemporaries’ claims, she identified a specific kind of 
depoliticization—the disappearance of the public sphere, the dissolution of 
collectivities, and crucially the decline of people’s democratic dispositions—as the 
essential characteristic of totalitarianism and the most serious threat to democratic 
politics. Believing such depoliticization is not peculiar to totalitarianism but inherent 
in modernity itself, Arendt set out to understand the nature and the origin of that 
depoliticization with her concepts of “world alienation” and “the social,” respectively. 
This chapter aims to elucidate these two crucial concepts. 
As noted in the Introduction, by reinterpreting the concepts of world alienation 
and the social I attempt to navigate the tension at the center of Arendt’s political 
theory (reflected in a rather bifurcated reception of her theory) between, on the one 
hand, her unique concept of “action” characterized by spontaneity and unpredictability 
and, on the other hand, her emphasis on the political stability guaranteed by public 
institutions. I suggest that, in Arendt’s political thinking, public institutions and public 
actions are not fundamentally opposed but mediated by public sentiments and 
dispositions. For Arendt, both institutions and actions are sustained and animated by 
the same set of dispositions to preserve and recreate publicness, which she variably 
calls “the common world,” “the public sphere,” or “the space of appearance.” From 
                                                 
2 References to Arendt’s works given as follows: to The Origins of Totalitarianism as OT; to The 
Human Condition as HC; to Between Past and Future as BPF; to On Revolution as OR; to Lectures on 
Kant’s Political Philosophy as LKPP. 
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this perspective, the counterproductive opposition between institutions and actions are 
not a theoretical necessity but a historically contingent phenomenon caused by the 
decay of public sentiments and dispositions, namely, democratic disaffection. And as I 
will demonstrate, Arendt’s critique of the “the social” points to a historically specific 
structural dynamic that produces democratic disaffection—a dynamic inherent in 
modernity and manifesting itself aggressively in the postwar period. 
For reasons elaborated in the Introduction, my contention that Arendt offers a 
critique of democratic disaffection and an account of its structural origin might appear 
counterintuitive. She notoriously dismissed one of the most influential affective 
concepts in the history of political thought, namely, Rousseau’s “compassion.” Nor is 
she known for her attention to structural problems. Thus, I should emphasize that I 
intend my interpretation of Arendt in this Chapter to be the work of reconstruction. I 
collect a set of ideas on which Arendt implicitly relies in developing her political 
theory and give shape to those ideas in a way that enables us to conceptualize the 
affective basis of democratic politics. As these ideas exist in Arendt’s thinking only in 
a vague and underdeveloped fashion, I enlist two external sources to flesh out and 
articulate them: Martin Heidegger and Karl Marx. While there is ample reason to 
believe Arendt develops some of her crucial insights through her engagement with, 
and critical appropriation of, Heidegger and Marx, my primary concern is not to trace 
the intellectual influence of these two thinkers on Arendt in a comprehensive manner.3 
My use of Heidegger and Marx is limited to elucidating Arendt’s concepts of world 
alienation and the social. I hope, however, that my attempt to link their insights in the 
                                                 
3 There are numerous works that examine Heidegger’s influence on Arendt. See Seyla Benhabib, The 
Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), esp. 51-61, 102-122; Dana 
R. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); 
Jacques Taminiaux, The Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker, trans. and ed. Michael Gendre 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997). It is more difficult to trace Marx’s influence, 
especially because Arendt often drew a sharp distinction between her ideas and Marx’s. For an attempt 
to find resonances between Arendt and Marx, see Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: 
Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), chap. 7. 
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work of Arendt initiates a fruitful dialogue that has rarely been conducted between 
intellectual traditions inspired by the two extremely influential and complex thinkers. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first section discusses Arendt’s 
influential account of totalitarianism. I demonstrate that her arguments are 
diametrically opposed to the Cold War strand of anti-totalitarianism in analyzing the 
masses not as the ontologically dangerous entity to be depoliticized but as the 
historically specific mode of political existence emerging from a particular kind of 
depoliticization. Arendt believed that this depoliticization was not the exclusive 
attribute of totalitarian governments and made major efforts to understand it in the 
non-totalitarian context. The second and third sections trace and reconstruct these 
efforts, focusing on her concepts of world alienation and the social, respectively. The 
second section analyzes the concept of world alienation to illuminate the nature of 
depoliticization. Arendt tends to equate the destruction of the common world with the 
decay of what she calls “common sense” without sufficient explanation. I address this 
interpretive puzzle by examining Arendt’s claims in light of Heidegger’s idea that our 
existence relies on primary affective attunement, and suggest that world alienation 
does not simply refer to institutional change but to a dispositional and affective 
transformation. The last section reconstructs the concept of the social as a historical 
critique of the origin of depoliticization. While suggesting that the decline of care for 
the world and the concomitant rise of care about the self is the outcome of historically 
specific processes, Arendt never develops this insight and, worse, sometimes harbors a 
purely conceptual criticism that contradicts the implication of her own ideas. Despite 
her almost oddly misguided rejection, I suggest Marx’s critique of capitalism helps 
elucidate the dynamic of the social—how it at once subsumes all human actions under 
the imperative of wealth accumulation and suppresses the realization of political 
freedom. 
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Totalitarianism and the Fate of Politics 
It is difficult to understand Arendt’s unique—and at times enigmatic—political 
theory without examining how profoundly her experience of totalitarianism shaped her 
thinking.4 But since totalitarianism cast a powerful spell on Cold War political theory 
in general, it is important to stress that Arendt’s critique of totalitarianism was 
completely different from hardheaded anti-totalitarianism predominant at the time. To 
be sure, much fanfare surrounded The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) because 
Arendt’s argument was understood to confirm a thesis that there exist inherent 
affinities between totalitarianism and the masses—a thesis that, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, was gathering enormous momentum in Cold War America. And some of 
the passages in Origins did highlight a close connection between totalitarianism and 
the masses. Arendt argued, for instance, that “[t]otalitarian movements are mass 
organizations of atomized, isolated individuals” characterized by their demand for 
“total, unrestricted, unconditional, and unalterable loyalty of the individual member” 
and that “[s]uch loyalty can be expected only from the completely isolated human 
being … without any other social ties to family, friends, comrades, or even mere 
acquaintances” (OT 323; see also 311). Citing Hitler, she went so far as to portray the 
relationship between the totalitarian leader and the masses as one of inextricable 
interdependence. “All that you are, you are through me; all that I am, I am through you 
alone” (OT 325). 
But unlike her contemporaries who dismissed the masses as inherently 
irrational and violent on an ontological basis, Arendt viewed the masses as the 
                                                 
4 In this respect, I agree with Margaret Canovan that Arendt’s experience of totalitarianism sets the 
agenda of her entire political thought and that many of her arguments become more intelligible only 
when her conceptualization of totalitarianism is precisely understood. Margaret Canovan, Hannah 
Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 7. 
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historical outcome of the disintegration of social structures and political institutions. 
In particular, she placed great emphasis on the breakdown of the class structure after 
the First World War and the failure of the party system to integrate and represent the 
majority of the population. As she puts it, “[t]he fall of protecting class walls 
transformed the slumbering majorities behind all parties into one great unorganized, 
structureless mass of furious individuals.” Totalitarian movements mobilized these 
once politically indifferent people “whom all the other parties had given up as too 
apathetic or stupid for their attention … [and] who had reason to be equally hostile to 
all parties” (OT 315, 311-312). “Stand[ing] outside all social ramifications and normal 
political representation,” like “the mob” in nineteenth-century France, the masses were 
conditioned to hate “society from which it is excluded, as well as Parliament where it 
is not represented” and directed, at the smallest nudge, their resentment at whatever 
group (e.g., Jews) that was believed to enjoy the privileges of inclusion and 
representation (OT 314, 107). Arendt suggests, in direct opposition to the claims of 
many Cold War intellectuals, that the political ignorance and apathy was neither the 
primary source of totalitarianism nor the inherent attribute of the masses. “Indifference 
to public affairs,” she wrote, is “no sufficient cause for the rise of totalitarian 
movements.” Indeed, “apathy and even hostility toward public life” was the main 
feature of the bourgeois society in which a way of life was “so insistently and 
exclusively centered on the individual’s success or failure in ruthless competition that 
a citizen’s duties and responsibilities could only be felt to be a needless drain on his 
limited time and energy” (OT 313). Rather, the real danger lay in the way in which the 
masses’ apathy was left unattended and exploited. 
In “Ideology and Terror,” which was written in 1953 and added to all 
subsequent editions of Origins, Arendt provided a more general account of how the 
masses emerged as the driving force of totalitarianism. Her analysis relies on two 
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major concepts, “isolation” and “loneliness,” which correspond to the political sphere 
and broader social relations, respectively. First of all, Arendt argues that 
totalitarianism—and “terror” that operates as the governing mechanism in place of 
positive law—is predicated upon “isolation” as its “most fertile ground.” Isolation 
paves the ground for totalitarianism by destroying the public sphere where people “act 
together in the pursuit of a common concern.” Since “power always comes from men 
acting together,” Arendt writes, “isolated men are powerless by definition” (OT 474). 
But isolation, and powerlessness as its effect, is characteristic of all tyrannies; what 
makes totalitarianism a truly new form of political life is that it is based on 
“loneliness,” on the “experience of not belonging to the world at all, which is among 
the most radical and desperate experiences of man” (OT 475; see also 478). Loneliness 
is fundamentally different from isolation. While politically debilitating, a certain level 
of isolation is required for men’s creative, productive activities through which they 
“add something of their own to the common world.” In this temporary state of 
isolation, people are still “in contact with the world” even as they are distanced from 
other people (OT 474-475). Loneliness, however, undermines the deepest root of 
human existence by destroying a “common world” that provides stability and meaning 
to the moderns’ uprooted and superfluous being—the state of being which is “the 
curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution” (OT 475). 
What Arendt calls the “common world” proves to be a complex concept that 
undergirds her political theory, and I will examine it more closely in the next section. 
For now it is important to note two related consequences of the loss of the common 
world. First, the worldless and homeless state of the masses caused by the 
disappearance of the common world gave rise to a peculiar psychological state. As all 
social connections and common bonds disintegrated, people came to view structural 
problems exclusively in terms of individual failure or specific injustice. Failing to find 
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channels for public articulation, people’s discontent with the political and social 
system thus became “self-centered bitterness” which, “although repeated again and 
again in individual isolation,” was “not a common bond” (OT 315). Numbed by the 
repeated experience of helplessness, the masses finally came to lose the very instinct 
for their own welfare and self-preservation. They became, as Arendt described, 
“selfless” in the sense that “oneself does not matter … [and is] expendable” (OT 315). 
Second, because they could not identify with existing political and social institutions, 
the masses were strongly drawn to ideologies that promised, in the name of the 
infallible law of Nature or History, a total transformation—the inevitable demise of 
the existing world and the emergence of a new one. Combined with their peculiar 
selflessness, the masses’ hatred toward the existing social order drove them to 
willingly lose and sacrifice themselves for a violent cause. “The peculiar selflessness 
of the mass man appeared here as yearning for anonymity, for being just a number and 
functioning only as a cog, for every transformation, in brief, which would wipe out the 
spurious identifications with specific types or predetermined functions within society. 
War had been experienced as that “mightiest of all mass actions” which obliterated 
individual differences so that even suffering, which traditionally had marked off 
individuals through unique unexchangeable destinies, could now be interpreted as “an 
instrument of historical progress” (OT 329). 
While enthusiastically receiving Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism, many Cold 
War intellectuals treated her account of the masses as a description of the ontological 
fact, losing sight of her broader argument that the masses were a historical state 
challenging us to reflect critically on political choices made and social processes 
involved. But as we have seen, Arendt’s critique was directed not simply at the masses 
as such but, more fundamentally, at the process through which the masses came into 
being as a dominant mode of political existence. Seen from this point of view, what is 
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as crucial as her analysis of totalitarianism is her insights into Weimer democracy’s 
self-destructive failure to rectify historically produced social relations that bred the 
masses—namely, the uprooted and superfluous mode of existence generated, over 
time, by the industrial revolution, the imperialist expansion of capitalism, and the 
collapse of the class structure after the First World War. Indeed, Arendt pointed out 
that the unexpected success of totalitarianism shattered two “illusions” about 
democracy. The first illusion presumed that in a democracy the majority of the 
population would actively participate in politics through the medium of political 
parties. Totalitarianism showed, however, that “the politically neutral and indifferent 
masses could easily be the majority in a democratically ruled country.” The second 
illusion held that “these politically indifferent masses did not matter” and that “they 
constituted no more than the inarticulate backward setting for the political life of the 
nation.” But again, totalitarianism laid bare the fact that “democratic government had 
rested as much on the silent approbation and tolerance of the indifferent and 
inarticulate sections of the people as on the articulate and visible institutions and 
organizations of society” (OT 312). The experience of totalitarianism warns us, in 
other words, that democracy is in grave danger when the majority of the population is 
detached from its institutions and social functions—namely, when people are 
disaffected with democracy. 
Arendt’s concern with the failure of politics also informs her diagnosis of the 
working of totalitarianism, which, like her analysis of the masses, departs markedly 
from her contemporaries’. While Cold War political theory often portrayed 
totalitarianism as a total politicization of all aspects of life, Arendt understood it as the 
exact opposite: a total destruction of politics. It is important to emphasize her primary 
concern was the fate of politics, because her critique of totalitarianism powerfully, 
though in a completely different sense, invoked the same terms that figured most 
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prominently in the Cold War indictment of totalitarianism, namely, “individuality” 
and “spontaneity.” For example, in her disturbing account of the concentration camps 
(“laboratories in which the fundamental belief of totalitarianism … is being verified”), 
Arendt argued that “[t]he [concentration] camps are meant not only to exterminate 
people and degrade human beings, but also serve the ghastly experiment of 
eliminating, under scientifically controlled conditions, spontaneity itself [which is] 
man’s power to begin something new out of his own resources, something that cannot 
be explained on the basis of reactions to environment and events.” The outcome, as 
described by Arendt, is almost too outrageous to accept: “Nothing then remains but 
ghastly marionettes with human faces, which all behave like the dog in Pablov’s 
experiments, which all react with perfect reliability even when going to their own 
death, and which do nothing but react. This is the real triumph of the [totalitarian] 
system” (OT 436, 438, 455). 
Terminological resonances notwithstanding, Arendt’s defense of individuality 
and spontaneity cannot be farther from the Cold War consecration of individual 
freedom promoted, most notably, by Hayek. For starters, her critique of isolation and 
loneliness as the breeding ground of totalitarianism should clarify that she does not 
champion individuality in the exclusive sense of separation from other people. But 
more importantly, we need to take into account Arendt’s broader argument in which 
her defense of individuality is situated. In her analysis, the annihilation of 
individuality is understood as the final stage of totalitarian domination closely 
intertwined with two preceding stages. The first stage is the dissolution or 
transmutation of the laws. By operating the concentration camps outside the normal 
penal system, totalitarianism constructed an arbitrary legal order that abolishes the 
need for people’s consent on the law. The “arbitrary arrest,” Arendt states, “destroys 
the validity of free consent” and, in doing so, destroys the civil rights not simply of 
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“criminals, political opponents, Jews, homosexuals” but of “the whole population” 
that “ultimately become[s] just as outlawed in their own country as the stateless and 
homeless” (OT 451). In this respect, totalitarianism’s true “criminality” lies not in 
“simple aggressiveness, ruthlessness, warfare and treachery” but in “a conscious break 
of that consensus iuris which, according to Cicero, constitutes “a people”” (OT 462). 
Totalitarianism, then, marks a fundamental shift in the nature of law. According to 
Arendt, positive laws have traditionally served a double function of both allowing 
individuals to freely initiate new, unpredictable events in the political world and 
providing stability to the constant flux caused by such initiations. As she puts it, “[t]he 
laws hedge in each new beginning and at the same time assure its freedom of 
movement” (OT 465). Under totalitarianism, however, “all laws … become laws of 
movement”—inexorable and superhuman laws executed in the form of race war or 
class struggles (OT 463). Now in place of positive laws, “terror” governs in 
totalitarianism in order to ensure that “the force of nature or of history … race freely 
through mankind, unhindered by any spontaneous human action” (OT 465). In 
detaching the legitimacy of the laws from people’s consent, moreover, totalitarianism 
divorces the realization of the laws from human action. As Arendt argues, if 
totalitarianism can function “without the consensus iuris,” that is because it “promises 
to release the fulfillment of law from all action and will of man” (OT 462).  
The realm of human action is further reduced, in the second stage, by what 
Arendt calls the “murder of the moral person in man.” The “great accomplishment” of 
totalitarianism, she writes, lay in the fact that they had made “martyrdom, for the first 
time in history, impossible.” As Arendt remarks, citing David Rousset’s Les Jours de 
Notre Mort on which she heavily draws in her discussion of the concentration camps, 
acts of resistance such as martyrdom “must have social meaning” in order to take 
effect. Totalitarianism destroyed the precondition for that social meaning by 
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“corrupt[ing] all human solidarity” (OT 451). It is to be noted that these two stages of 
totalitarian domination, which paved ground for the destruction of individuality as 
such, are centered on collectivity or solidarity (in the first stage, consensus iuris is 
presented not as an aggregation of individual consent but as a collective subjectivity; 
in the second stage, what happens is not simply a weakening of individual courage or 
will but a corruption of solidarity). Arendt’s confrontation with totalitarianism, in 
other words, led her to the conclusion fundamentally opposed to the exclusive concern 
with individual freedom and the dismissal of collective subjectivities characteristic of 
Cold War theories of democracy. 
While discussing the mob in the context of the Dreyfus affair as the excluded, 
“homeless,” segment of the population like the masses, Arendt once spoke of the 
“fundamental error of regarding the mob as identical with rather than a caricature of 
the people” (OT 106-107). This error was committed by disgruntled young 
intellectuals who, despite their contempt for people, saw in the mob primitive 
“strength” which they believed was necessary for the fervent nationalism they 
championed. But the same error also plagued defenders of Dreyfus like Clemenceau 
who condemned the mob and the people alike as “a collective tyrant” (OT 112-113). 
In falling prey to this error, Arendt laments, Clemenceau let his “despair of the people” 
and his belief “that he and he alone could save the republic” overtake his belief in the 
republican ideal and, in doing so, “cut the ground from under his feet, and forced 
himself into that grim aloofness which thereafter distinguished him” (OT 115). What 
both nationalists and republicans missed, in Arendt’s logic, was the fact that the mob 
was not an inherent characteristic of people but a mode of existence produced by 
historical conditions and political failures. Startled by the destructive force of the 
masses, Cold War intellectuals made a similar mistake of criticizing the masses as a 
naturally violent entity while losing sight of the historical process through which 
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people came to assume the “mass mode.” If, as Arendt argues, the masses arise from a 
specific kind of depoliticization, the crucial task is not to continue but to reverse such 
a depoliticizing tendency. 
Thus viewed, Arendt’s account of totalitarianism constitutes a powerful 
critique of instrumental democracy that places crucial issues outside democratic 
politics and suppresses the formation of collectivities, perpetuating the root cause of 
the “massification” of people. Of course, one might protest that this reading is an 
unacceptable stretch. Arendt discussed totalitarianism and its depoliticizing tendencies 
within specific contexts of Nazism and Stalinism. How can we apply her critique of 
totalitarianism to the postwar development of democracy without committing serious 
categorical errors? I answer that, first, the chief concern of Arendt’s political theory is 
not the form of government but the form of experience and, second, central themes of 
Origins—especially the destruction of the common world—reappear in her later works 
as a key and perilous tendency of modernity. In this respect, it is suggestive that 
Arendt ends Origins by warning that “totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall 
of totalitarian regimes (OT 459).” In “Ideology and Terror,” she reiterates the very 
same point by saying that the “crisis of our century” manifested in totalitarianism is 
“no mere threat from outside” and “will no more disappear with the death of Stalin 
than it disappeared with the fall of Nazi Germany.” The “true predicaments of our 
time,” Arendt proclaims, “will assume their authentic form ... only when 
totalitarianism become a thing of the past” (OT 460)—a thing of the past, she could 
have added, that is forgotten, misunderstood, and most dangerously, exploited for 
political purposes.5 
 
                                                 
5 Writing in 1954, Arendt recognized the fact that “[t]he popular use of the word “totalitarianism” for 
the purpose of some supreme political evil is not much more than about five years old.” Arendt, 
“Understanding and Politics,” 311. 
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World Alienation: Arendt and Heidegger 
Arendt’s concern was not that totalitarianism would reappear in the exact same 
form; she repeatedly emphasized that totalitarianism was a unique experience tied to 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin. Rather, the danger lies in relegating 
totalitarianism to “a thing of the past” while believing that the “crisis of our century” 
disappeared along with it. The decline of the common world—and, concomitantly, the 
rise of the masses as the dominant mode of political existence—was certainly 
accelerated and exploited by totalitarian movements, but it was caused first of all by 
structural changes inherent in modernity. Unless we develop a precise understanding 
of those changes and find ways to properly address them, the “true predicaments of 
our time” persist, waiting to take “their authentic form.” As the epigraph I cited at the 
beginning of this chapter makes clear, Arendt was concerned primarily with 
understanding and overcoming “crystallizing elements” of totalitarianism in the non-
totalitarian world. Not the reappearance of totalitarianism per se but the persistence of 
its breeding ground (which could give rise to various forms of political pathologies), I 
would suggest, is the central concern that guides and motivates Arendt’s political 
theory. 
In The Human Condition (1958), often regarded as the most systematic 
account of Arendt’s political theory, she introduces the term “world alienation” to 
discuss the loss of the common world as a more general phenomenon. What is 
immediately clear about Arendt’s concept of the common world—which she also calls 
the “public realm” or the “space of appearance”—is that it refers to commonly shared, 
stable, and lasting institutions and objects constructed by human beings. This aspect of 
the world is already clear from her emphasis on legal institutions in Origins: “[positive 
laws] guarantee the pre-existence of a common world” (OT 465). She makes a similar 
point in The Human Condition: “The world … is common to all of us and 
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distinguished from our privately owned place in it. This world … is not identical with 
the earth or with nature … It is related, rather, to the human artifact, the fabrication of 
human hands, as well as to affairs which go on among those who inhabit the man-
made world together. To live together in the world means essentially that a world of 
things is between those who have it in common” (HC 52). 
This, however, is but one aspect of the common world. The other, possibly 
more important, aspect of the common world is our sense of reality or what she calls 
“our feeling for reality” (HC 51, 50). Arendt’s invocation of affective categories 
(“feeling”) as the defining quality of reality will receive a more detailed discussion 
shortly, but we first need to examine why she emphasizes the significance of reality or, 
more basically, what she means by reality. Her emphasis on the political significance 
of reality comes from her recognition that the completely unprecedented nature of 
totalitarianism renders categories of traditional political philosophy fundamentally 
inadequate. As she states, totalitarianism “constitute[s] a break with all our traditions ... 
[and] ha[s] clearly exploded our categories of political thought and moral judgment.”6 
The core problem is that conventional classifications such as tyranny, aristocracy, and 
democracy are centered almost exclusively on the question of sovereignty (who rules?) 
without attending to the fundamental experience upon which political systems are 
founded. For Arendt, traditional political philosophy’s obsession with sovereignty, 
accompanied by its tendency to equate freedom with sovereignty, is reflective of its 
failure to consider plurality as the most fundamental condition of politics. “Under 
human conditions, which are determined by the fact that not man but men live on the 
earth, freedom and sovereignty are so little identical that they cannot even exist 
simultaneously” (BPF 164). This critical awareness leads Arendt to highlight non-
                                                 
6 Ibid., 309-310. 
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sovereign, experiential dimensions of politics throughout her works—a relentless 
position that would provoke a good deal of confusion, controversy, and criticism. 
In her attempt to shift the focus of political inquiry, Arendt draws on 
Montesquieu’s distinction between the “nature” and the “principle” of government.7 
In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu wrote: “There is this difference between the 
nature of the government and its principle: its nature is that which makes it what it is, 
and its principle, that which makes it act. The one is its particular structure, and the 
other is the human passions that set it in motion.”8 According to Montesquieu, while a 
tyranny is defined by the fact that power is concentrated in one person, actions (of 
both tyrants and subjects) in a tyrannical political system are inspired by fear. 
Likewise, honor inspires actions in a monarchy, and virtue in a republic. Seen from the 
Montesquieuian perspective, then, lawfulness that Arendt emphasizes as the essence of 
government at once allowing and “hedging in” political freedom is only partially 
significant. As she summarily states, “Lawfulness sets limitations to actions, but does 
not inspire them.” Thus politics relies additionally on a “principle” that “would inspire 
government and citizens alike in their public activity and serve as a criterion, beyond 
the merely negative yardstick of lawfulness, for judging all action in public affairs” 
(OT 467). As the “positive” foundation of action, principle shares a tragic fate with its 
negative counterpart (laws) in totalitarianism’s brutal war against all elements of 
action. As conventional laws are replaced with laws of Nature or History, “in 
totalitarian governments Montesquieu’s principle of action is replaced by ideology.”9 
Now, ideology is a peculiar thing. Ideologies, Arendt argues, claim to “explain 
                                                 
7 Arendt argues that Montesquieu’s distinction shows that “[t]he concrete actions of each government 
and of the citizens living under the various forms of government cannot be explained in accordance 
with the two conceptual pillars of traditional definition of power as the distinction between ruling and 
being ruled, and of law as the limitation of such power.” Hannah Arendt, “Montesquieu’s Revision of 
Tradition,” in The Promise of Politics, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken, 2005), 63-64. 
8 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and eds. Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and 
Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), bk. 3, ch. I. 
9 Hannah Arendt, “On the Nature of Totalitarianism,” in Essays in Understanding, 355. 
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everything, past and future, without further concurrence with actual experience.” She 
calls this tendency of ideologies the “arrogant emancipation from reality” which, in 
turn, necessitates reliance on terror. Unlike principle that inspires actions and thus 
embraces unpredictability inherent in such actions, ideology tries to fit everything into 
predetermined “laws” of Nature or History and to incorporate everyone into the 
internal logic of those laws as standardized and unthinking cogs. Since such a 
totalitarian project is in conflict with the “unpredictability … of man, on the one hand, 
and the curious inconsistency of the world, on the other,” totalitarianism needs terror 
which, as discussed above, “freezes men in order to clear the way for the movement of 
Nature or History.”10 Seen in this light, Arendt’s emphasis on reality can be seen as a 
protest and a warning against the danger of ideology which, with its abstract logicality, 
insulates totalitarian governments from actual human actions and events.11 
But why does Arendt speak of our “feeling for reality”? To anticipate my 
conclusion, I suggest that for Arendt our affective attunement with the “space of 
appearance” is reality. This is somewhat at odds with the common use of the term 
“reality,” which tends to emphasize more immediate and tangible qualities. 
Nonetheless, there is abundant evidence attesting to the importance of affective 
categories to Arendt’s conception of reality. It is, for instance, already indicated in her 
account of Montesquieu. Examining his concept of principle, Arendt takes special note 
of Montesquieu’s claim that principles such as virtue and honor arise from the 
“fundamental experience” described to be affective in its nature. “Virtue … springs 
from the love of equality, and honor from the love of distinction … [T]his “love,” or, 
as we shall say, the fundamental experience from which the principles of action spring, 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 350, 342. 
11 Arendt argues that, in addition to terror, it is logicality provided by ideology that sustains 
totalitarianism. “Logicality is what appeals to isolated human beings, for man—in complete solitude, 
without any contact with his fellow-men and therefore without any real possibility of experience—has 
nothing else he can fall back on but the most abstract rules of reasoning.” Ibid., 357-358. 
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is for Montesquieu the binding link between the structure of a government represented 
in the spirit of the laws and the actions of its body politic.”12 While her invocation of 
“love” here is largely suggestive and left unexamined, Arendt makes more specific 
claims in Origins, where she often equates the common world with what she calls 
“common sense.” Consider the following passages: 
 
“Even the experience of the materially and sensually given world 
depends upon my being in contact with other men, upon our common 
sense which regulates and controls all other senses and without which 
each of us would be enclosed in his own particularity of sense data 
which in themselves are unreliable and treacherous. Only because we 
have common sense, that is only because not one man, but men in the 
plural inhabit the earth can we trust our immediate sensual experience” 
(OT 475-476). 
 
“What makes loneliness so unbearable is the loss of one’s own self 
which can be realized in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by 
the trusting and trustworthy company of my equals. In this situation, 
man loses trust in himself as the partner of his thoughts and that 
elementary confidence in the world which is necessary to make 
experiences at all. Self and world, capacity for thought and experience 
are lost at the same time” (OT 477, emphasis added). 
 
It is clear from these passages that, for Arendt, tangible qualities of the world (“the 
materially and sensually given world”) are not sufficient for our experience of reality. 
We perceive various fragments of the world through our five senses. But without our 
affective attunement with other people (“common sense” established through “trust” in 
our equals and the “elementary confidence” in the world), those sense data remain 
“unreliable and treacherous” and thus are unable to help us actually register the world. 
Here it is important to emphasize that by such terms as “trust” and “confidence” 
Arendt does not promote submission to the status quo, especially because she 
                                                 
12 Arendt, “Montesquieu’s Revision of Tradition,” 66. 
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sometimes cites the conservative thinker Edmund Burke in discussing the crisis of 
common sense. She speaks, for instance, of “the revolt of the masses against “realism,” 
common sense, and all “the plausibilities of the world” (Burke)” (OT 352). Taken out 
of context, passages like this encourage a conservative reading of the concept common 
sense. Below I will challenge such a reading and argue that Arendt advances a 
distinctly dynamic theory of common sense. Before doing so, however, let us examine 
the affective dimension of Arendt’s common sense more closely. 
In later works such as The Human Condition and Between Past and Future 
(1962), Arendt reiterates her claims about common sense, revealing, however, a 
possible intellectual source that could help elaborate her ideas. In a typical formulation, 
Arendt states: “It is by virtue of common sense that the other sense perceptions are 
known to disclose reality” (HC 208-209; see also BPF 221). Arendt’s use of the term 
“disclose” in this passage is unmistakably suggestive, as it is the concept at the center 
of Heidegger’s ontology to which Arendt has a complex and troubled relationship.13 
Heidegger’s project is to dismantle what he perceives to be the very core of 
Western philosophy, namely, the Cartesian subject that stands separate from and in 
opposition to the world (the object) and shapes that world through its reason and will. 
Challenging this dominant notion, Heidegger posits that our “Being” lies in “Reality” 
or in “Dasein (literally “being-there”),” meaning that we are who we are due to the 
fact of our being always already situated in (“thrown into”) a specific time-place and 
surrounded by things and people.14 Dasein, in turn, is defined as “an entity which, in 
its very Being, comports itself understandingly toward that Being” (BT 78). The 
seeming circularity of this argument is resolved given that, as noted, Dasein is always 
                                                 
13 For an extended discussion of Arendt’s intellectual relationship with Heidegger, see Villa, Arendt 
and Heidegger and Taminiaux, The Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker. 
14 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962), 26. Hereafter cited in the text as BT. 
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already embedded in a web of relationships, which exists within “the world” 
(Heidegger terms the basic state of Desein “Being-in-the-world”). These relations are 
“disclosed” to us (albeit in an incomplete and somewhat hidden fashion), and we 
discover and appropriate those relations not by cognition but by practical involvement 
(“the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use 
it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it 
encountered as that which it is—as equipment,” BT 98). Thus when Heidegger says 
that “Dasein is its disclosedness (BT 171),” he does not attempt to replace reason with 
disclosedness as our “human nature.” Rather, he suggests that we have no such 
transcendental nature whatsoever except for the one we can (and thus can fail to) work 
out of our partially disclosed relations. Our Being, in short, is given to us not as a 
predetermined quality, but as an open possibility that requires our efforts to recognize 
and realize it. “Dasein always understands itself … in terms of a possibility of itself … 
[Dasein] is not yet” (BT 32-33, 185-186). Seen in this light, the crucial question is not 
to obtain a preconception of the essence of our Being, such as reason, but to 
understand and realize the “disclosedness” of our Being in which we already “reside” 
and “dwell” (BT 80). Not knowing but actually doing something about constitutive 
elements of our existence is where the meaning of our life lies. As Heidegger writes 
somewhat obscurely, “Dasein ‘has’ meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-
the-world can be ‘filled in’ by the entities discoverable in that disclosedness” (BT 193). 
While, as we will see shortly, Arendt is vehemently critical of many aspects of 
Heidegger’s thought, she seems to have recognized some of the significant 
implications of his ontology.15 For our purposes, the most important point is that 
                                                 
15 The fundamental shift, effected by Heidegger’s ontology, in the focus of philosophical inquiry from 
human nature to human existence seems to be reflected in the very premise of The Human Condition. 
“Whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately assumes the 
character of a condition of human existence. This is why men, no matter what they do, are always 
conditioned beings … The impact of world’s reality upon human existence is felt and received as a 
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Heidegger’s ontology gives freedom a radically different meaning. From the 
Heideggerian point of view, freedom is not a matter of willing or choosing; rather, we 
are free to the extent that we are keenly aware of, not oblivious to, constitutive 
elements of our existence and creatively appropriate those elements. As Heidegger 
puts it, “[f]reedom is not merely … the caprice, turning up occasionally in our 
choosing, of inclining in this or that direction. Freedom is not mere absence of 
constraint with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor is it on the other hand mere 
readiness for what is required and necessary … Prior to all this (“negative” and 
“positive” freedom), freedom is engagement in the disclosure of being as such.”16 
Given that facts of our existence are disclosed to us only incompletely, freedom as the 
discovering of their disclosedness always takes an active form (“engagement”), but 
amounts not merely to executing our particular goals (hence distinguished from 
positive freedom) but to creating a context in which we can begin to form our goals. 
Freedom, in other words, is tantamount to a creation of the “world,” not as a 
determinate entity but as an open field in which we sow and reap our possibilities. 
Through our “engagement,” Heidegger writes, “the openness of the open region, i.e., 
the “there” (“Da”), is what it is.”17 Arendt places this “disclosive” conception of 
freedom—freedom as the creation of the condition of possibility for human 
existence—at the heart of her political theory. Criticizing the “equation of freedom 
with the human capacity to will,” long dominant in political philosophy, causes us to 
“almost automatically equate power with oppression or, at least, with rule over others,” 
she redefines freedom as the capacity to “act” or to “call something into being which 
                                                                                                                                            
conditioning force. The objectivity of the world—its object- or thing-character—and the human 
condition supplement each other; because human existence is conditioned existence, it would be 
impossible without things, and things would be a heap of unrelated articles, a non-world, if they were 
not the conditions of human existence” (HC 9). 
16 Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David 
Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 126. 
17 Ibid. 
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did not exist before,” which importantly includes the founding of the public sphere as 
a context for human action—the point she drives home in On Revolution (BPF 162, 
151). 
Insofar as Arendt appropriates Heidegger’s insight that human beings and the 
world are always open to and intertwined with each other in a disclosive fashion, a 
closer look at Heidegger’s analysis of the nature of our relationship to the world 
(“Being-in”) helps elucidate the affective dimension of that relationship, which Arendt 
suggests but never explicitly theorizes. As noted above, Heidegger argues that we 
discover and appropriate our disclosedness via practical involvement with people and 
things by which we are surrounded. While our practical involvement is motivated in 
part by particular instrumental reasons (e.g., we use a hammer in order to hit the nail), 
Heidegger suggests there is a more general and fundamental factor that precedes and 
underlies those particular reasons. Crucially, this underlying factor is posited to be of 
affective nature. A set of closely related terms, “disposition (Befindlichkeit),”18 “mood 
(Stimmung),”19 and “care (Sorge)” illustrate this point. Arguing that Dasein cannot 
“know” its disclosedness because “the possibilities of disclosure which belong to 
cognition reach far too short a way,” Heidegger claims that we are brought to the fact 
of our disclosedness more basically through a mood. As he puts it, “mood is a 
primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all 
cognition and volition” (BT 175).20 And mood is manifested in dispositions. “In a 
                                                 
18 Befindlichkeit is translated as “a state-of-mind” by Macquarrie and Robinson in their translation of 
Being and Time. This translation is misleading as it fails to convey the bodily, pre-cognitive, and 
affective meaning of the term as used by Heidegger. I use the term “disposition” throughout my 
discussion. 
19 Recall that, as noted in Chapter 1, Stimmung is also a central concept in Kant’s account of aesthetic 
judgment. In this chapter, I follow Macquarrie and Robinson and translate Stimmung as “mood,” as it 
correctly highlights the affective dimension of the term. 
20 See also: “Moods … are something which in advance determine our being with one another. It seems 
as though a mood is in each case already there, so to speak, like an atmosphere in which we first 
immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and through.” Martin Heidegger, The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas 
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disposition,” Heidegger writes, Dasein “finds itself in its thrownness … not in the 
sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in 
the mood that it has” (BT 174). We experience the world only to the extent that we 
“become affected in some way (Betroffenwerdens),” but we can become affected only 
when our existence has already been conditioned “in such a manner that what it 
encounters within-the-world can “matter” to it” (BT 176). Mood is precisely what 
serves to do this preliminary conditioning by “making it possible” to “direct oneself 
towards something” (BT 176). 
It is with reference to this affectively conditioned nature of our existence that 
Heidegger declares “Being-in-the-world is essentially care” (BT 237). Put differently, 
our existence is not something which we come or fail to know but which we 
affectively tune ourselves in or out (“turning towards or turning away,” BT 174). But 
the affectivity of our existence is ambivalent, and even dangerous, in its impact on our 
engagement with the world. While care makes it possible for us to interpret our 
disclosedness and thus to be free for our potentialities, sometimes (in fact, most of the 
time, according to Heidegger) it submerges us completely in the world and, in effect, 
makes us forget our disclosedness. Dispositions, as Heidegger states, “disclose Dasein 
in its thrownness—proximally and for the most part—in the manner of evasive turning 
away” (BT 175). Because the recognition that our existence has no foundation and 
requires our constant vigilance is burdensome, we are constantly tempted to “turn 
away” from that fact and, instead, to find easy comfort in the company of others or, in 
Heidegger’s terms, the “they” (das Man). “[T]he particular Dasein in its everydayness 
is disburdened by the “they”” (BT 165). The trouble, for Heidegger, is that the “they” 
has “averageness” as its “essential characteristic,” which results in the “levelling down 
                                                                                                                                            
Walker (Bloomington, IN: Indiana State University Press, 1995), 67. McNeill and Walker translate 
Stimmung as “attunement,” which is modified here to “mood.” 
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(Einebnung) of all possibilities of Being” (BT 164-165). Clearly invoking Christian 
theology, he describes the individual’s immersion in publicness (die Offentlichkeit), 
constituted by the “they,” as the “falling (Verfallen).” In falling, “Dasein has … fallen 
away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the 
‘world’” (BT 220). Heidegger’s concern is that, as publicness increasingly dominates 
modern life, the “authentic” affective quality (“anxiety” in the face of our mortality)—
which is supposed to bring us, if not comfortably, to encounter our own disclosedness 
(the “Self”) distinguished from public criteria that efface individual differences (the 
“they-Self”)—becomes rarefied. “Under the ascendancy of falling and publicness, 
‘real’ anxiety is rare” (BT 234). 
Heidegger’s insight that our involvement in the world requires primary 
affective attunement helps us make sense of Arendt’s otherwise enigmatic claim that 
our experience of reality depends on “common sense” or our “feeling for reality” as a 
precondition. For one thing, the meaning of the phrase from The Human Condition 
cited above (“It is by virtue of common sense that the other sense perceptions are 
known to disclose reality”) should now be clearer. Heidegger’s affective ontology, 
moreover, sheds light on Arendt’s puzzling account of the space of appearance. Arendt 
states that “[t]he space of appearance comes into being wherever men are together in 
the manner of speech and action, and therefore predates and precedes all formal 
constitution of the public realm and the various forms of government, that is, the 
various forms in which the public realm can be organized” (HC 199). But if the space 
of appearance is neither a physical place nor concrete institutions, what, exactly, is 
coming into being? In light of Arendt’s equation of the common world with common 
sense and her claim (extrapolated via Heidegger) that we can act in the common world 
only when we are affectively attuned with it, it is possible to think that, for her, what 
people create in acting and speaking is none other than such affective attunement, on 
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the basis of which they can then build various forms of political institutions. And 
when she says that “power,” as opposed to “strength” as the attribute of an isolated 
individual, “springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment 
they disperse” and “keeps the public realm” (HC 200), an important aspect of that 
unique concept of power may well consist in people’s confidence in the possibility of 
such a form of power and their disposition to create it together. 
Here it is crucial to return to the point noted above: Arendt’s conception of 
common sense is not static à la Burke but most distinctively dynamic. Her dynamic 
view seems to grow out of her quarrel with Heidegger’s apolitical ontology. Even as 
she appropriates Heidegger’s concern with affect, Arendt overturns virtually all the 
other aspects of his theory. Most important, she attempts to recover publicness, which 
Heidegger condemns as the major obstacle to disclosive freedom, as the condition of 
possibility for human freedom. Some of her remarks on Heidegger clearly reveal this 
intention. In a 1954 speech, for instance, she said that Heidegger’s ontology, by 
acknowledging that the chief characteristic of human existence is “being together with 
others,” constitutes “a step out” of traditional political philosophy that “deal[s] with 
the man in the singular” and thus has not been able to conceive of politics at all.21 
However, she went on, “despite its obvious closeness to the political realm,” 
Heidegger “never reaches but always misses the center of politics—man as an acting 
being,” due in no small part to “the old hostility of the philosopher toward the polis” 
found in his “analyses of average everyday life in terms of das Man.”22 In Arendt’s 
view, this hostility toward people in the plural even as he recognizes them as the 
fundamental human condition leads Heidegger to accept, paradoxically, death (i.e., the 
end of the individual) as the only affirmation of individuality. As Arendt put it in one 
                                                 
21 Hannah Arendt, “Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought (1954),” in 
Essays in Understanding, 443. 
22 Ibid., 432-433. 
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the first essays she wrote after her arrival at the United States, “The essential character 
of the Self is … its radical separation from its fellows. Heidegger introduced the 
anticipation of death … in order to define this essential character, for it is in death that 
man realized the absolute principium individuationis. Death alone removes [the Self] 
from connection with those who are his fellows and who as “They” constantly prevent 
his being-a-Self. Though death may be the end of Dasein, it is at the same time the 
guarantor that all that matters ultimately is myself.”23 It is hard not to see Arendt’s 
central concept of “natality”—our existence as a new beginning and our capacity to 
bring something new into the world—as a direct challenge to Heidegger’s notion of 
mortality. “[S]ince action is the political activity par excellence, natality, and not 
mortality,  may be the central category of political, as distinguished from 
metaphysical, thought” (HC 9). In stark contrast to Heidegger’s insistence that 
confronting our mortality requires isolation and produces supposedly authentic 
individuality, Arendt contends that the realization of our natality is predicated on 
common sense (e.g., trust in our equals, confidence in the world) and (re)creates 
common sense. Put differently, whereas Heidegger’s mood is presumed to exist ex 
nihilo, Arendt’s common sense is generated de novo by people’s appearance in the 
presence of their peers. Unlike mood, common sense is not given as a shared setting 
but emerges from the “sharing of words and deeds” (HC 197, emphasis added).24 
The dynamic as well as affective nature of Arendt’s common sense is 
exemplified in her innovative reading of Kant’s third Critique, especially his account 
of aesthetic judgment. According to Arendt, Kant’s account of judgment constitutes a 
                                                 
23 Hannah Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy? (1946),” in Essays in Understanding, 181. 
24 To be fair, there are moments when Heidegger indicates that moods can be mastered. “[W]hen we 
master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods” (BT 175). At one 
point, he even seems to recognize the public’s potentially active role in creating moods. “Publicness ... 
not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and ‘makes’ them for itself” 
(BT 178). But the dynamic dimension of mood remains a marginal issue in Heidegger’s thinking. 
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significant contribution to political philosophy, because it draws our attention to the 
fact that judging requires “the ability to see things not only from one’s own point of 
view but in the perspective of all those who happen to be present” (BPF 221). Here 
Arendt invokes Kant’s concept of “common sense (sensus communis),” which, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, he introduces in order to address the conundrum at the center 
of his theory of aesthetic judgment. To recall, Kant argues that aesthetic judgment 
requires both a subjective principle grounded in individual feeling and universal 
validity; and he brings in the concept common sense to alleviate the tension between 
subjective and universal dimensions of aesthetic judgment. As I have also noted, 
however, Kant conceptualizes common sense in highly cognitive terms, anticipating 
Rawls’s account of the original position. In his words, “[we] put ourselves in the 
position of everyone else, merely by abstracting from the limitations that [may] 
happen to attach to our own judging; and this in turn we accomplish by leaving out as 
much as possible whatever is matter, i.e., sensation, in the presentational state, and by 
paying attention solely to the formal features of our presentation or of our 
presentational state.” Even as he concedes that this formulation may seem “too artful,” 
Kant nonetheless maintains that “nothing is more natural than abstracting from charm 
and emotion when we seek a judgment that is to serve as a universal rule” (CJ 160). 
But the cognitive conceptualization of common sense is unsatisfactory, insofar as 
cognition is preceded by affect—the insight which is brought to the fore by Heidegger 
but admitted, if implicitly, by Kant as well.25 
It is easy to conclude that Arendt simply reiterates Kant’s cognitive and 
individualistic account of common sense when she speaks about “the ability to see 
things in the perspective of all those who happen to be present” as the integral part of 
                                                 
25 Recall: Kant wrote that “Attunement (Stimmung) is the subjective condition of cognition, and 
without it cognition could not arise” and that “the only way this attunement can be determined is by 
feeling” (CJ 88). See Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion. 
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judgment. Our preceding discussion, however, should prepare us for her innovative 
appropriation of Kant. Introducing the concept of “imagination,” which, like Kant’s 
common sense, serves to put us in the position of everyone else, Arendt emphasizes 
that imagination has the function of “having present what is absent” so that “I now can 
be affected by it as though it were given to me by a nonobjective sense” (LKPP 66-67, 
emphasis added). Moreover, Arendt argues that, in judging, we attempt neither to 
prove our propositions nor to settle the argument once and for all. As she puts it, “one 
can never compel anyone to agree with one’s judgments … [O]ne can only “woo” or 
“court” the agreement of everyone else” (LKPP 72; see also BPF 222). Our judgment 
“appeals to common sense” and, in doing so, “decides how this world, independently 
of its utility and all our vital interests in it, is to look and sound, what we will see and 
what we will hear in it” (BPF 222). Since we come into this world as a new beginning, 
our “appeal to common sense” demands that existing common sense (how the world 
“looks and sounds” at the present moment) be questioned and reconfigured. Contra 
Habermas, Arendt’s common sense is therefore oriented not toward forging consensus 
but toward creating the context in which diverse perspectives become visible and 
audible to us—the context in which we can feel their presence and become affected by 
them. Put another way, not communication but communicability is what is at stake. As 
Arendt stated, “The condition sine qua non for the existence of beautiful objects is 
communicability; the judgment of the spectator creates the space without which no 
such objects could appear at all. The public realm is constituted by the critics and the 
spectators, not by the actors or the makers” (LKPP 63).26 As Linda Zerilli has aptly 
                                                 
26 That Arendt discusses artworks in this passage should not distract us. She is quite explicit about the 
strong connection she draws between artworks and political acts. She argues that political activities 
would “come and go without leaving any trace in the world,” if it is not supported by “beauty” which is 
“the very manifestation of imperishability.” “The fleeting greatness of word and deed can endure in the 
world to the extent that beauty is bestowed upon it. Without the beauty, that is, the radiant glory in 
which potential immortality is made manifest in the human world, all human life would be futile and no 
greatness could endure” (BPF 218). 
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summarized, “[s]pectators … create the space in which the objects of political 
judgment, the actors and actions themselves, can appear, and thus alter our sense of 
what belongs in the common world.”27 
Against this backdrop, we can see Arendt’s concept of world alienation as 
referring not simply to the decline of public institutions but to the decay of common 
sense—people’s shared affective disposition to create and sustain the space of 
appearance. Indeed, when Arendt comes closest to the definition of world alienation, 
she says it is “the atrophy of the space of appearance and the withering of common 
sense.” She goes so far as to remark that a “noticeable decrease in common sense in 
any given community” is the “almost infallible” sign of “alienation from the world” 
(HC 209). This is of course neither to downplay the significance of lasting institutions 
in Arendt’s thought nor to suggest that institutional and affective dimensions of world 
alienation are mutually exclusive. But as I have sought to demonstrate, it is extremely 
difficult to make sense of many of her central arguments without taking into account 
the central, if implicit, place that affect occupies in Arendt’s theory of world alienation. 
Now, the remaining question is how world alienation, characterized by the affective 
decline, becomes such a pervasive experience not just in totalitarianism but in modern 
society in general. Let us take up this question in the next section. 
 
The Rise of the Social: Arendt and Marx 
In the previous section, I argued that “crystallizing elements” of totalitarianism 
in the non-totalitarian world—the primary concern running through Arendt’s 
thought—can be understood as a specific kind of depoliticization characterized not 
simply by the institutional breakdown but by the affective decline. But if examining 
                                                 
27 Linda Zerilli, “‘We Feel Our Freedom’: Imagination and Judgment in the Thought of Hannah 
Arendt,” Political Theory 33(2) (2005), 179. 
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the nature of that depoliticization is one pillar of Arendt’s political theory, the other 
pillar is understanding its origin. In Origins she examined the breakdown of the class 
structure and the failure of the political representative system in the Weimar republic 
as an exemplary origin of world alienation, the danger of which found an atrocious 
form in totalitarianism. But as noted, Arendt also believed that totalitarianism was 
only one of various political pathologies that could grow out of those depoliticizing 
tendencies and tried to understand the emergence of that depoliticization more 
generally. In The Human Condition, she seems to develop such a general 
understanding of a dynamic that undermines the common world qua common sense 
with her concept of “the social.” But as in the case of the common world, her account 
of the social is often vague and puzzling. This section aims to elucidate it. 
According to Arendt, the transition from the ancient to the modern world is 
characterized by the rise of the social (“the emergence of the social realm … is a 
relatively new phenomenon whose origin coincided with the emergence of the modern 
age,” HC 28). The ancient world, she claims, was predicated on a “decisive division 
between the public and private realms, between the sphere of the polis and the sphere 
of household and family, and, finally, activities related to a common world and those 
related to the maintenance of life” (HC 28). And it is thanks to this distinction that the 
ancients could understand and practice political freedom in its genuine sense. In the 
ancient world reconstructed by Arendt, the private realm was the household where 
men exercised power (in the conventional sense) and ruled over family members and 
slaves in mastering “the necessities of life.” This unequal and “prepolitical” household, 
then, functioned as “the condition for freedom of the polis”—the public realm which 
was defined, in stark contrast to the private realm, by the existence of “equals” that 
guarantee the experience of freedom in the unique Arendtian sense of being seen and 
heard by peers (HC 30-31). So when Arendt blames the rise of the social for the 
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decline of genuine political freedom, she seems to argue that the problem is the 
blurring of the strict separation formerly maintained between the public and private 
realms. To this effect, at one point Arendt equates the rise of society with the “rise of 
“household (oikia)” or of economic activities to the public realm” and describes the 
changing relationship between the public and private realms as follows: 
“housekeeping and all matters pertaining formerly to the private sphere of the family 
have become a “collective” concern. In the modern world, the two realms indeed 
constantly flow into each other like waves in the never-resting stream of the life 
process itself” (HC 33). 
Upon this reading, one is led to conclude that Arendt categorically rejects the 
political relevance of economic matters. Indeed, she has often been criticized for her 
neglect, if not outright dismissal, of pressing socioeconomic concerns in favor of 
keeping the political realm “pure.” This line of criticism has solid textual ground. 
Arendt is insistent on the threat to the political realm posed by what she variably calls 
“economic matters,” “wants and needs,” or the “life process.” As she puts it in a 
typical statement, “the term “political economy” is a contradiction … [W]hatever was 
“economic,” related to the life of the individual and the survival of the species, was a 
non-political, household affair by definition” (HC 29). Perhaps most notoriously, in 
On Revolution Arendt points specifically to the intrusion of economic matters into the 
political realm as the cause of the perceived failure of the French Revolution, 
lamenting the French Revolution was overwhelmed by widespread poverty that “puts 
men under the absolute dictate of their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictate of 
necessity” and, in Robespierre’s words, “missed the moment to found freedom” (OR 
60-61). Here Arendt genuinely seems to place blame on “the multitude of the poor and 
the downtrodden” appearing in the public realm for the first time in history (OR 48). 
“It was under the rule of this necessity that the multitude rushed to the assistance of 
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the French Revolution, inspired it, drove it onward, and eventually sent it to its doom, 
for this was the multitude of the poor. When they appeared on the scene of politics, 
necessity appeared with them, and the result was that … freedom had to be 
surrendered to necessity, to the urgency of the life process itself” (OR 60). 
There is something odd and puzzling about Arendt’s seemingly categorical 
dismissal of the poor and the downtrodden. As we examined in the first section, in 
Origins she showed a keen sense that the masses (their exploitable and destructive 
tendencies) were a mode of political existence historically produced by structural 
changes and political failures. Consider, for example, the following passage: 
 
“The masses’ escape from reality is a verdict against the world in which 
they are forced to live and in which they cannot exist, since coincidence 
has become its supreme master and human beings need the constant 
transformation of chaotic and accidental conditions into a man-made 
pattern of relative consistency. The revolt of the masses against 
“realism,” common sense, and all “the plausibilities of the world” 
(Burke) was the result of their atomization, of their loss of social status 
along with which they lost the whole sector of communal relationships 
in whose framework common sense makes sense. In their situation of 
spiritual and social homelessness, a measured insight into the 
interdependence of the arbitrary and the planned, the accidental and the 
necessary, could no longer operate. Totalitarian propaganda can 
outrageously insult common sense only where common sense has lost 
its validity” (OT 352). 
 
Passages like this clearly suggest that Arendt by no means lacks an understanding that 
collectivities of people—whether it be the people, the masses, or the poor—are the 
outcome of political processes and the symptom of social structures. We, then, cannot 
but wonder: why, in such works as The Human Condition, Between Past and Future, 
and On Revolution, does Arendt seem to treat the masses more as a conceptual 
construct than as a historical entity? Why does she seem to be preoccupied more with 
excluding the general category of the masses from the public realm than with 
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addressing specific problems that produce the masses in the first place, perilously 
resembling her Cold War contemporaries?28 
Insofar as Arendt’s critique of the introduction of economic concerns into the 
public realm marks a subtle yet significant shift in focus in her thinking, we can begin 
to understand that shift by examining how Arendt developed a conceptual framework 
integral to her most sustained works on political theory (The Human Condition, 
Between Past and Future, and On Revolution) in contradistinction to Marx’s ideas. 
Thanks to Young-Bruehl’s authoritative biography, it is now well known that, after 
finishing Origins, Arendt conceived of her second project as a critique of Marxism. In 
an application letter she sent to the Guggenheim Foundation in 1952, Arendt proposed 
to fill the “most serious gap” in Origins, which was the “lack of an adequate historical 
and conceptual analysis of Bolshevism,” in her new book project entitled “Totalitarian 
Elements in Marxism.”29 Although the proposed Marx book never materialized, 
various pieces Arendt had written for that project between 1952 and 1956 ultimately 
found their way into the three books mentioned above, all of which were published 
between 1958 and 1962. While Arendt ended up paying far less attention to Marx than 
she had initially intended, it is fair to say that her engagement with Marx played a 
formative role in the development of her thinking in this period. In particular, Arendt 
discovered the crucial distinction between “labor” and “work,” to which she later 
                                                 
28 Margaret Canovan argues that Arendt distinguishes “the people” and other collectivities such as the 
mob and the masses and only endorses the action undertaken by the people. According to Canovan, le 
peuple in the French Revolution were, for Arendt, not the people in the genuine sense, because they did 
not share political institutions like their American counterparts. Margaret Canovan, “The People, the 
Masses, and the Mobilization of Power: The Paradox of Hannah Arendt’s ‘Populism’,” Social Research 
69(2) (2002): 403-422. While Canovan’s exposition is useful and has the advantage of giving 
consistency to Arendt’s arguments, it places too much emphasis on institutions and advances a 
conceptual distinction that is, in my judgment, too rigid and clear-cut to sustain in the real world. I 
suggest that Arendt’s treatment of collectivities in The Human Condition and On Revolution is in 
important tension with the implication of her approach in Origins—a tension that creates moments of 
confusion and indeterminacy. 
29 Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1982), 276. 
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added “action” to complete her famous conceptual triad in The Human Condition, in 
the early stage of her Marx project. In a letter written in January 1953, Arendt first 
spoke of the distinction between labor and work as “the distinction between man as 
homo faber and man as animal laborans.”30 In the same letter, she asserted that 
“Marx’s dignification of labor as an essentially creative activity constitutes a decisive 
break with the entire Western tradition for which labor had represented the animal, not 
human, part of man.” She went on: “I think that unless one realizes how much the 
modern world, after the political revolutions of the 18th and the industrial revolution of 
the 19th centuries, has changed the entire balance of human activities, one can hardly 
understand what happened with the rise of Marxism and why Marx’s teaching, 
nourished by the great traditions as it was, could nevertheless be used by 
totalitarianism.”31 Considering that the changing “balance of human activities” in the 
modern world constitutes the core of The Human Condition, it is crucial to recognize 
Arendt’s approach to this problem was influenced, and possibly inflected, by her 
reading of Marx. 
From the 1953 letter cited above, it is clear that Arendt viewed Marx’s theory 
as an expression, not a critique, of the distinctive characteristic of the modern world, 
namely, the social. Arendt reiterates this point time and again. In a particularly 
succinct phrase in The Human Condition, she claims that the “purely social viewpoint,” 
which “takes nothing into account but the life process of mankind,” receives “most 
coherent and greatest expression in Marx’s work” (HC 88-89). More specifically, 
Arendt criticizes Marx on two related grounds. First, she charges that Marx 
confounded activities for mere subsistence and day-to-day consumption (labor) with 
activities to fabricate and build the physical world that provides a sense of stability and 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 277. In the 1952 application letter, Arendt simply stated that Marx understands man as a 
“working animal,” without making the distinction between labor and work. Ibid., 276. 
31 Cited in ibid., 277-278. 
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permanence (work). This is a very odd charge, because Arendt’s distinction between 
labor and work is, on her admission, “unusual.” “[T]here is hardly anything in either 
the pre-modern tradition of political thought or in the large body of modern labor 
theories to support it,” she frankly states (HC 79-80). Her only evidence is the alleged 
fact that “every European language … [has] two etymologically unrelated words” for 
labor and work. But at least in the case of Arbeiten, the word Marx used, it refers to 
both labor and work because, as Arendt notes, the verb form of the word “work” 
(Werk) has become “rather obsolete” (HC 80-81).32 Second, and more important, 
Arendt argues that Marx elevated labor as the essence of human beings at the expense 
of action. Claiming that the “creation of man through human labor” was one of the 
most persistent ideas of Marx since his youth, Arendt announces, with surprisingly 
little evidence, that Marx “actually defined man as an animal laborans” (HC 86n14, 
102). Behind the celebration of labor was Marx’s fascination, shared with other 
modern thinkers such as Adam Smith, with the incredible productivity of labor (HC 
87). Fixated on productivity, Arendt goes on, Marx subscribed to the characteristically 
modern ideal of “the unhampered pursuit of more property or of appropriation” and, 
worse yet, “wished to see the process of growing wealth as a natural process, 
automatically following its own laws and beyond willful decision and purposes” (HC 
110-111). Arendt accuses Marx of envisioning a society where individuals are reduced 
to “the gigantic subject of the accumulation process,” interpreting his concept of 
“species-being (Gattungswesen)” as a mass of individuals with a homogeneous 
disposition to serve the “law” of wealth-accumulation and with no freedom (HC 116). 
As far as this society is concerned, Arendt concludes, Marx was correct to predict “the 
withering away” of “the public realm” (HC 117).33 
                                                 
32 See also Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob, 133-134. 
33 Arendt is aware that Marx spoke of the withering away of the state, not the public realm. Her 
argument is that Marx’s vision of post-capitalist society is but an acceleration of the trends already 
 255 
This is a shockingly simplistic and, in many respects, blatantly false reading of 
Marx. In all of her major charges against Marx, Arendt attributes to him ideas which 
he explicitly criticized. Just to take one prominent example, Arendt’s central claim that 
Marx defines human beings as the animal laborans is utterly erroneous. In the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844, Marx distinguishes human labor 
specifically from animal-like labor Arendt has in mind with the concept of animal 
laborans. “[Animals] produce only when immediate physical need compels them to do 
so, while man produces even when he is free from physical need and truly produces 
only in freedom from such need … Animals produce only according to the standards 
and needs of the species to which they belong, while man is capable of producing 
according to the standards of every species and of applying to each object its inherent 
standard; hence, man also produces in accordance with the laws of beauty.” It is in this 
respect that Marx characterizes human labor as “free activity” and human beings as a 
“species-being.”34 In direct opposition to Arendt’s claim, Marx does not endorse but 
criticizes wealth accumulation—which, for him, is the driving force of capitalism—
that distorts this genuine labor/work and forces people to make all their actions (their 
“being [Wesen]”) “a mere means for his existence.”35 
But if Arendt’s reading of Marx is so flagrantly inaccurate, why should we 
dwell on it? Why can’t we just bracket it and focus on Arendt’s critique of the social? 
We can, but considering her engagement with Marx conceivably played a formative 
role in her thinking in this period, only at the peril of leaving her account of the social 
as confusing and indeterminate as it is. That is not just dissatisfying but possibly 
                                                                                                                                            
present in the bourgeois society. “Marx’s “withering away of the state” had been preceded by a 
withering away of the public realm, or rather by its transformation into a very restricted sphere of 
government” (HC 60). Still, her argument is premised on her assertion (which, in my view, is 
profoundly misguided) that Marx’s post-capitalist society is like a gigantic production camp where 
individuals mindlessly seek to accumulate wealth. Below I will discuss this point in more detail. 
34 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844),” in Karl Marx: Early Writings, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York: Penguin, 1992), 328-329.  
35 Ibid., 328. 
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dangerous, as evidenced in Arendt’s rigid rejection of the political relevance of 
economic matters and her dismissal of the poor. Thus in order to resist dangerous 
tendencies and to elucidate productive insights in Arendt’s account of the social, we 
need to know where the confusion and indeterminacy of her discussion originates. I 
contend it arises from the fact that she oscillates between, on the one hand, a 
sophisticated critique of modern social relations and, on the other, an impatient 
condemnation of the category of labor. In misinterpreting Marx, it seems to me, 
Arendt gave momentum to the latter while missing the opportunity to develop the 
former even as she suggested it. 
To elaborate this point, let us revisit Arendt’s account of the social. As noted 
above, Arendt sometimes does seem to criticize the social for blurring the distinction 
between the public and private realms and, more specifically, making private qua 
economic matters public concerns. However, she also says something different about 
the pathological effect of the social, which challenges the “blurring thesis.” Stating 
that the social is “neither private nor public” (HC 28), she argues thus: “The 
emergence of society … has not only blurred the old borderline between private and 
political, it has also changed almost beyond recognition the meaning of the two terms 
and their significance of the life of the individual and the citizen” (HC 38). She also 
states that the modern world is characterized not by the spread of the hierarchical 
model of the household but by the rise of a completely new kind of rule. “[O]ne-man, 
monarchial rule, which the ancients stated to be the organizational device of the 
household, is transformed in society … into a kind of no-man rule. … As we know 
from the most social form of government, that is, from bureaucracy, … the rule by 
nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may indeed, under certain circumstances, even 
turn out to be one of its cruelest and most tyrannical versions” (HC 40). Moreover, 
unlike the private realm based on inequality among its members, the social establishes 
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and reinforces a certain kind of equality—equality that promotes conformism instead 
of natality. “[S]ociety expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, 
imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to “normalize” its members, 
to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement. … 
[W]ith the rise of mass society, the realm of the social has finally … reached the point 
where it embraces and controls all members of a given community equally and with 
equal strength” (HC 40-41). What is suggested in these passages is that the social does 
not simply change the relationship between the public and private realms but 
transforms the nature of both realms. Seen from this perspective, Arendt’s critique of 
the social can be understood not as a conceptual rejection of the private realm in favor 
of the public realm but as a historical critique of the specific social system that 
transforms both the political and economic realms. 
In reconstructing Arendt’s account of the social as a historical critique of 
modern social relations, we may begin by recalling that she understands the crisis of 
modernity (produced by the rise of the social)—world alienation—in terms of the 
decline of people’s affective disposition to create and sustain the space of appearance. 
Instead of this public disposition, she argues, the modern world is dominated by a 
different disposition: “[M]odern men were not thrown back upon this world but upon 
themselves … The greatness of Max Weber’s discovery about the origin of capitalism 
lay precisely in his demonstration that an enormous, strictly mundane activity is 
possible without any care for or enjoyment of the world whatever, an activity whose 
deepest motivation, on the contrary, is worry and care about the self. World alienation, 
and not self-alienation as Marx thought, has been the hallmark of the modern age” 
(HC 254, emphasis added).36 Below I will examine Arendt’s invocation of capitalism 
                                                 
36 Here again, Arendt threatens to give the impression that she points to a specific group of people as 
the culprit of this lamentable situation. “The new laboring class, which literally lived from hand to 
mouth, stood not only directly under the compelling urgency of life’s necessity but was at the same time 
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and her assertion that Marx was concerned only with self-alienation. But for now, this 
passage offers an argument completely different from the one that insists upon, if not 
nostalgically romanticizes, the strict division between the public and private realms. 
What Arendt criticizes is not so much the public dealing of private matters as people’s 
disposition to approach public issues solely in terms of self-interest and to treat 
politics exclusively as an instrument to satisfy their wants through the obtaining and 
exercise of sovereign power. In other words, she is concerned not about the fading of 
spatial demarcation but about the rise of a new subjectivity. 
It is telling, in this respect, that Arendt relies on two concepts specifically 
denoting subjectivities in discussing the crisis of political freedom or, in her terms, 
vita activa: homo faber and animal laborans. Her criticism is easier to understand in 
the case of the animal laborans, because it refers to a subjectivity obsessed with the 
production of wealth for mere subsistence and consumption without any regard to 
individuality or relationship with others. What is more interesting and puzzling is her 
account of homo faber. On the one hand, Arendt recognizes the important role of 
homo faber in ensuring and sustaining political freedom. “The vita activa … is always 
rooted in a world of men and of man-made things which it never leaves or altogether 
transcends … [Y]et this environment, the world into which we are born, would not 
exist without the human activity which produced it, as in the case of fabricated things” 
(HC 22; see also 136). On the other hand, however, she argues that homo faber has a 
dangerous tendency. The work of homo faber is “entirely determined by the categories 
of means and end” (HC 143): whatever he does, he does to attain a predetermined end. 
As she puts it, “[t]o have a definite beginning and a definite, predictable end is the 
mark of fabrication,” in the process of which “everything is judged in terms of 
                                                                                                                                            
alienated from all cares and worries which did not immediately follow from the life process itself” (HC 
255). This line of argument, undeniably present in Arendt’s writings, is at odds with aspects of her 
thought I am reconstructing. 
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suitability and usefulness for the desired end, and for nothing else” (HC 143-144, 153). 
This “utilitarian standard inherent in the very activity of fabrication” is problematic, 
because “the relationship between means and end on which it relies is very much like 
a chain whose every end can serve again as a means in some other context. In other 
words, in a strictly utilitarian world, all ends are bound to be of short duration and to 
be transformed into means for some further ends” (HC 153-154). Without the public 
realm in which people can establish the meaning of human activities and their 
products, homo faber “gets caught in the unending chain of means and ends without 
ever arriving at some principle which could justify the category of means and end, that 
is, utility itself” (HC 154). From here it is only a short step to the “perversion of ends 
and means in modern society,” the situation in which people become unable to use 
tools for the goals they have determined but instead subsumed under those tools to 
produce what (they think) they need. Homo faber, in other words, has a tendency to 
become the animal laborans (HC 145). 
While it is tempting to see Arendt as arguing that this degeneration necessarily 
happens, such an interpretation is difficult to sustain since, as noted, she assigns homo 
faber a crucial role of building a stable world that people need in order to lead a vita 
activa. This does not make much sense if homo faber is doomed to become the animal 
laborans and completely unreliable. Thus the key question is under what historical 
conditions homo faber degenerates into the animal laborans and, more specifically, 
how the social effects that degeneration. Arendt herself notes the historical specificity 
of the transition from homo faber to the animal laborans: “homo faber, the toolmaker, 
invented tools and implements in order to erect a world, not—at least, not primarily—
to help the human life process. The question is therefore not so much whether we are 
the masters or the slaves of our machines, but whether machines still serve the world 
and its things, or if, on the contrary, they and the automatic motion of their processes 
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have begun to rule and even destroy world and things” (HC 151; emphasis added). 
Also: “The ideals of homo faber, the fabricator of the world, which are permanence, 
stability, and durability, have been sacrificed to abundance, the ideal of the animal 
laborans” (HC 126; emphasis added). 
But even as she suggests it, Arendt never fully explores how the social forges a 
linkage between homo faber and the animal laborans. Instead, she tends to take her 
discussion in a purely theoretical and transhistorical direction, possibly because she 
views Marx’s thought as the expression of the ideal of the animal laborans and tries to 
expose proto-totalitarian elements within (her version of) Marx’s theory. This 
tendency, I think, is what sometimes leads her to focus more on condemning the 
theoretical category of labor or of collectivities such as the poor and the laborers 
rather than investigating the historical mechanism through which labor becomes a 
dominant form of human activity with a detrimental impact on political subjectivities. 
Resisting this tendency, I want to reconstruct a different, more historically attentive, 
perspective, which is also present in Arendt’s account of the social. This aspect of her 
thought, I suggest, can be fleshed out and articulated when we read her critique of the 
social alongside, not against as she did, Marx’s ideas. 
Recall that, in the passage cited above, Arendt points specifically to capitalism 
(siding with Weber and distinguishing herself from Marx) while discussing world 
alienation in terms of the decline of “care for the world” and the rise of “care about the 
self.” Indeed, she makes numerous remarks throughout The Human Condition to the 
effect that capitalism is responsible for the degeneration of homo faber into the animal 
laborans. As noted, the triumph of the animal laborans as the dominant subjectivity 
means that people’s disposition comes to be defined by two related characteristics: 
first, they are disposed to approach their life almost exclusively in terms of the 
“necessities of life.” And second, since all they care about is securing perceived “basic” 
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goods for their subsistence, they are obsessed with producing more without regard to 
the purpose and meaning of production. In a highly suggestive discussion, Arendt 
traces these changes to the transformation of the nature of private property. Lamenting 
that the moderns mistakenly tend to equate property and wealth, which are “of an 
entirely different nature” (HC 61), she claims that “[p]rior to the modern age … 
[private] property meant no more or less than to have one’s location in a particular part 
of the world and therefore to belong to the body politic” (HC 61; see also 70, 72, 29-
30). In this respect, “[t]he wealth of a foreigner or a slave was under no circumstances 
a substitute for this property” (HC 62). This understanding of property, however, is 
lost to the modern age. Instead of ensuring public life, property came to penetrate, 
overtake, and ultimately redefine the public realm, but—and this is crucial—only after 
it was completely transformed. Private property, once the condition for political 
freedom, became “wealth” that serves no external purposes (i.e., public life) but itself 
or, more precisely, its own expansion. The notion of endless accumulation is so 
foreign to the ancients, Arendt writes, that “[i]f the property-owner chose to enlarge 
his property instead of using it up in leading a political life, it was as though he 
willingly sacrificed his freedom and became voluntarily what the slave was against his 
own will, a servant of necessity” (HC 65). 
According to Arendt, the transformation of property into wealth was initiated 
by “expropriation,” namely, by depriving certain groups of the population (e.g., 
peasant classes) of their property, a stable place of their own in the world. In this sense, 
she writes, “expropriation and world alienation coincide” (HC 253). And once it 
became synonymous with private property, wealth came to constitute the basis of 
permanence that used to be provided only by the common world—permanence, 
however, of an entirely different kind. “Only when wealth became capital, whose chief 
function was to generate more capital, did private property equal or come close to the 
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permanence inherent in the commonly shared world. However, this permanence is of 
different nature; it is the permanence of a process rather than the permanence of a 
stable structure. Without the process of accumulation, wealth would at once fall back 
into the opposite process of disintegration through use and consumption” (HC 68-69). 
At this point, Arendt seems to imply that the rise of the animal laborans and the 
destruction of the common world—which, as I have argued, converge in terms of 
people’s dispositional turning away from public concerns toward private interest—are 
caused by a system in which wealth accumulation does not end with “the satisfaction 
of wants and desires” and “spread[s] throughout the society and initiate[s] a steadily 
increasing flow of wealth” (HC 255). She seems to imply, if without realizing or 
intending it, that the shift in subjectivity and disposition is not a private matter but is a 
social problem deeply embedded in structural conditions. 
Though Arendt never explicitly acknowledges (as she rarely does with regard 
to sources of her ideas), it seems indisputable that her brief discussion of the rise of 
wealth or capital as the dominant form of property in the modern age is indebted to 
Marx’s analysis of capitalism. More curious, and of more relevance to our discussion, 
is Arendt’s claim that her diagnosis of this process is fundamentally different from 
Marx’s: world alienation as opposed to self-alienation. In my view, Arendt 
misinterpreted the focus of Marx’s theory as self-alienation and, in doing so, missed 
the opportunity to develop her own account of world alienation and, in particular, 
exactly how the unending process of capital accumulation effects the degeneration of 
“care for the world” into “care about the self.” 
Arendt seems to touch upon the mediating mechanism that links wealth 
accumulation and world alienation in her brief account of the “exchange market.” In 
the ancient world, she argues, the exchange market was the “hallmark” of “non-
political communities,” where homo faber (i.e., craftsmen) emerges from their 
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isolation to meet other citizens and to show and exchange their products (HC 160). 
Existing as marginal, if permanent, part of the polity, the exchange market of the 
ancient world did not compromise homo faber’s commitment to the shared world. In 
the modern world, however, the exchange market became the very center of society, 
forcing everyone to produce exclusively for the market and, consequently, in 
accordance with “exchange value” rather than the “intrinsic worth” of things (HC 163-
164). Now, the ascendance of exchange value—as opposed to, say, craftsmanship or 
public esteem—as the regulating principle of social relations creates trouble. Since 
exchange value “exists only in relation to other things” and lacks “an “objective” 
value independent of the ever-changing estimations of supply and demand,” it disrupts, 
as it were, the ontological basis of homo faber. As Arendt writes, in a society 
dominated by exchange value homo faber, “whose activity is determined by the 
constant use of yardsticks, measurements, rules, and standards,” suffers “the loss of 
“absolute” standards or yardsticks” (HC 166). But this is just a glimpse of insight; 
Arendt never explains how, exactly, exchange value makes homo faber vulnerable to 
the ideal of the animal laborans. Instead, she once again obscures her own insight by 
describing the transition from homo faber to the animal laborans as if it is a logical 
necessity. “[The loss of universal standards under the reign of exchange value] shows 
how closely the relativity of the exchange market is connected with the instrumentality 
arising out of the world of the craftsman and the experience of fabrication. The former, 
indeed, develops without break and consistently from the latter” (HC 166). 
A critique of exchange value, of course, is at the center of Marx’s analysis of 
capitalism, and Arendt is aware of that. But she rejects his critique of exchange value 
because she thinks it lands us, as noted, in affirmation of the ideal of the animal 
laborans. In the stead of exchange value, Arendt asserts, Marx “put the function things 
have in the consuming life process of men which knows neither objective and intrinsic 
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worth nor subjective and socially determined value. In the socialist equal distribution 
of all goods to all who labor, every tangible thing dissolves into a mere function in the 
regeneration process of life and labor power” (HC 165). Above I have briefly noted 
that this is a serious misreading of Marx. Here we need to clarify Marx’s theory in a 
little more detail because, liberated from Arendt’s misinterpretation, it actually 
provides crucial insights for elucidating the problem she left underdeveloped—the 
social mechanism by which the animal laborans becomes the dominant subjectivity 
attuned exclusively with self-interest. 
Contra Arendt, I argue that Marx’s theory is not the expression but a critique of 
the general social relations created by capitalism and their damaging impact on 
subjectivity. By saying that the focus of Marx’s critique of capitalism is “general 
social relations,” I am suggesting that his analysis goes far beyond exposing economic 
exploitation. Marx’s intention is already clear in the passage from the 1848 
Manuscripts cited above. There he criticizes capitalism not simply for taking material 
products away from workers but for suppressing the ability as well as disposition of 
“man (Mensch)”—not just workers—to reflect upon and determine the goals of their 
own life and to pursue those goals by creating an “objective world” or fashioning 
“inorganic nature.” Here it is important to note that the “creation of an objective 
world,” which, for Marx, constitutes the core of human freedom, is not simply a crude 
manipulation of nature. Rather, it refers to people’s effort to construct a context in 
which they form objectives of their shared life. As Marx states, “[i]t is … in his 
fashioning of the objective [cf. objects] that man really proves himself to be a species-
being.”37 And as opposed to Arendt’s claim, Marx never treats this essential, goal-
determining, aspect of human freedom as a matter of the self; he is quite emphatic 
about the social or solidary nature of labor as free activity. Writing that “[c]ommunism 
                                                 
37 Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” 328-329, bracketed insertion is mine. 
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is … not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] 
have to adjust itself … [but] the real movement which abolishes the present state of 
things,” Marx highlights that this movement “is not possible without the 
community.”38 He goes on: “Only in community [with others has each] individual the 
means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is 
personal freedom possible. … In the real community the individuals obtain their 
freedom in and through their association [with others].”39 Seen in this light, Marx’s 
concept of labor does not uncritically succumb to the ideal of productivity and 
abundance as Arendt suggests. It pursues, instead, what he calls the “objectification of 
the species-life of man,” which can be understood as the collective attempt at affirming 
and realizing our subjectivity that is able and disposed to determine the purpose of our 
activities.40 
Marx argues that this goal-determining subjectivity takes an estranged or 
alienated form in capitalism, and his discussion of alienated subjectivity has important 
resonances with Arendt’s account of world alienation. Suggestively, Marx 
acknowledges, if not fully develops, the affective or dispositional dimension of 
alienation. While discussing the detrimental effect of private property (which, as the 
outcome of alienated labor, serves capital accumulation and is similar to Arendt’s 
notion of wealth), he deplores that, as people are incorporated into the process of 
capital accumulation, “all the physical and intellectual senses have been replaced by 
the simple estrangement of all these senses—the sense of having. The human being 
had to be reduced to this absolute poverty in order that he might yield his inner wealth 
to the outer world.”41 Similarly, Marx characterizes the supersession (Aufhebung) of 
                                                 
38 Karl Marx, “The German Ideology (1846),” in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker (New 
York: Norton, 1978), 162, 197. 
39 Ibid., 197. The bracketed insertion is Tucker’s. 
40 Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts,” 329. 
41 Ibid., 352. I used Tucker’s translation in the second sentence. 
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private property as “the complete emancipation of all human senses and attributes.” 
By the term “human senses,” he does not refer to private feeling or sensitivity or, as he 
puts it, “a musical ear, an eye for the beauty of form, in short, senses capable of human 
gratification.” Rather, he has in mind a far more fundamental affective state, which, 
like Arendt’s “common sense,” constitutes the foundation of other particular senses. 
The “human sense” is Marx’s term and it enables members of the community to 
experience (become affected by) the world beyond the terms of private ownership.42 
Thus, the post-capitalist society he envisions does not mark the final victory of the 
animal laborans but the inauguration of a history that is open to people with the 
human sense. “[T]he society that is fully developed produces man in all the richness of 
his being, the rich man who is profoundly and abundantly endowed with all the senses, 
as its constant reality.”43 In other words, post-capitalist society is structured in such a 
way that subjectivities bearing the human sense flourish and that people determine, 
through their collective endeavor, the common good freed from the imperative of 
capital accumulation. 
His vision of post-capitalist society notwithstanding, Marx’s primary concern 
is to show how the alienation of the human sense is structurally generated by 
capitalism. While he does have some preliminary insights into this structural dynamic 
in his early works, Marx develops a more systematic account of this problem in his 
later works. And at the center of his discussion is the concept of exchange value, 
which, as we have seen, Arendt too points out—and yet fails to analyze in detail—as a 
crucial social mechanism that produces world alienation. According to Marx, capitalist 
society is distinguished from various non-capitalist societies by the fact that exchange 
becomes the dominant form of human action (cf. HC 162), thereby making social 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 353. 
43 Ibid., 354. 
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relations abstract and homogeneous. In societies where social interaction is based on 
direct personal ties, social relations take various forms with different meanings and 
values attached to them (e.g., family ties, friendship, sense of duty, loyalty, patriotism, 
etc.44). In contrast, in capitalist society social relations are divested of these various 
meanings and regulated exclusively by exchange value—regulated, in other words, as 
commodities. As Marx put it in the Grundrisse (1857-58), people’s “reciprocal 
dependence” in capitalist society is “expressed in the constant need for exchange, and 
in exchange value as the all-sided mediation.”45 
The trouble is not simply that the system of exchange value is premised on 
economic exploitation (Marx argues that surplus value, which is essential to increasing 
the exchange values of commodities and accumulating capital, stems from workers’ 
extra time of labor appropriated by the capitalist class). More fundamentally, the 
problem is that exchange value has a systematic tendency to become the universal 
term of social relations, because turning everything—natural environment, human 
artifacts, activities, ideas, and even relations—into “property” that can be privately 
owned and sold is the precondition for capital accumulation. And this unversalization 
of exchange value, or the commodification of social relations, undermines people’s 
ability and disposition to critically reflect upon the consequences of the regime of 
capital accumulation, importantly including economic exploitation, as socially 
produced and thus reversible problems. This political acquiescence is created as 
commodified social relations alienate people from each other or, more precisely, from 
the human sense that they could “freely” determine the objective and meaning of their 
                                                 
44 Needless to say, this does not mean that pre-modern social relations were all desirable. The pre-
modern world was full of unjustifiably hierarchical or explicitly violent relations of domination. As 
Marx recognizes, the bourgeois revolution played an emancipatory role in dissolving these relations of 
domination. 
45 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus 
(New York: Penguin, 1993), 156. 
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activities through “association with others.” Alienation from the human sense occurs, 
first of all, through social fragmentation. In capitalist society, social interdependence 
remains just as strong and even deepens and yet it becomes difficult to recognize and 
consciously appropriate it. Few things are produced in isolation in modern society, but 
people “sell” their labor in exchange for wages separated from each other as well as 
from the production process as a whole. Likewise, people produce things not for their 
own use but for the market, namely, to exchange their products for money in order to 
purchase the goods produced by the process in which they are not involved.46 As both 
producers and consumers, people are conditioned to become oblivious and indifferent 
to each other’s presence as co-participants of the production as well as the distribution 
process. This fragmenting effect is at once obscured and accelerated due to the fact 
that exchange value is externalized in seemingly neutral objects such as commodities 
and money. Due to the money form, exchange value assumes an “objective” status and 
naturalizes the notion of “private interest,” which is in fact a “socially determined 
interest” that “can be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society and 
with the means provided by society.”47 Moreover, as value is abstracted from the 
purpose of production and money functions as the universal means for all “necessities 
of life,” the maximum acquisition of money becomes the single purpose of human 
activities, putting people in a competitive, if not antagonistic, relationship with each 
other. Marx describes this situation in the following passage, which is worth quoting at 
length: 
 
                                                 
46 The universalization of the commodity form and the consequent fragmentation of social relations are 
discussed in Georg Lukács’s classic essay, “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” in 
History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1971), 83-222. While I am inspired by Lukács’s analysis, I do not share his perspective 
that posits the proletariat as the Hegelian Subject that makes history by realizing itself. I will discuss 
this point shortly. 
47 Marx, Grundrisse, 156. 
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“The reciprocal and all-sided dependence of individuals who are 
indifferent to one another forms their social connection [in capitalist 
society]. This social bond is expressed in exchange value, by means of 
which alone each individual’s own activity or his product becomes an 
activity and a product for him; he must produce a general product—
exchange value, or … money. On the other side, the power which each 
individual exercises over the activity of others or over social wealth 
exists in him as the owner of exchange values, of money. The 
individual carries his social power, as well as his bond with society, in 
his pocket. Activity, regardless of its individual manifestation, and the 
product of activity, regardless of its particular make-up, are always 
exchange value, and exchange value is a generality, in which all 
individuality and peculiarity are negated and extinguished. … The 
social character of activity … appear[s] as something alien and 
objective, confronting the individuals, not as their relation to one 
another, but as their subordination to relations which subsist 
independently of them and which arise out of collisions between 
mutually indifferent individuals.”48 
 
Here Marx clearly indicates the true pathology of the universalization of exchange 
value lies in its broad impact on social relations and subjectivity. Exchange value 
displaces “social bond” into “collisions” between “mutually indifferent individuals.” 
All members of society—both workers and capitalists—are subordinated to this 
antagonistic mode of social relations and subjectivity and, to that extent, their freedom 
is severely circumscribed. They can determine only how they can maximize surplus 
value but not whether they ought to do so; they are completely subsumed under the 
imperative of capital accumulation. As Marx states in Capital (1867), “[i]f … the 
proletarian is merely a machine for the production of surplus-value, the capitalist too is 
merely a machine for the transformation of this surplus-value into surplus capital.” It 
is in this respect that he speaks of “[a]ccumulation for the sake of accumulation, 
production for the sake of production” as the essence of capitalism.49 Seen in this light, 
both the danger and resilience of capitalism cannot be explained simply by the 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 156-157. 
49 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 
1990), 742. 
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disproportionate power of the capitalist class. Rather, it can be found in the fact that 
commodified social relations deprive human activity of its goal-determining “freedom” 
and reduce it to a means for the predetermined end of capital accumulation. The 
unversalization of exchange value does not merely conceal or facilitate class 
domination; it is a new kind of rule.50 This instrumentalization, not economic 
exploitation alone, arguably constitutes the crux of Marx’s most penetrating critique of 
capitalism. 
Marx’s analysis of capitalism, then, can be seen as a systematic elaboration of 
his own claim in The German Ideology (1846) that the community in a capitalist 
society is not only “illusory” but a “new fetter” to real association of people. The 
working of capitalism structures a society in such a way that people belong to a 
community only as members of a class, namely, only to suppress and dominate other 
classes exclusively with a view to increasing their share of social wealth and without 
questioning the purpose of, or conditions for, the accumulation of wealth. In other 
words, under capitalism instrumentalized social relations replicate themselves in the 
realm of politics. Up till now, Marx argues, “the conditions of the free development 
and movement of individuals” were “abandoned to chance and had won an 
independent existence over against the separate individuals just because of their 
separation as individuals.” The “combination of people,” which is supposed to deal 
with those conditions, has merely been an “agreement upon these conditions, within 
which the individuals were free to enjoy the freaks of fortune.” “This right to the 
undisturbed enjoyment, within certain conditions, of fortuity and chance has up till 
now been called personal freedom.”51 Seen in this light, the class division (in which 
                                                 
50 For an extended discussion of this aspect of Marx’s theory, see Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and 
Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993). 
51 Marx, “The German Ideology,” 197-198, emphasis added. 
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the proletariat class is clearly at a disadvantage) is not the essence but a symptom of 
capitalist social relations, just as egotism and mutual indifference are. Thus, what 
Marx envisions is not the reversal of class relations (i.e., domination by the proletariat 
class) but the abolition of the class as such through the overcoming of 
instrumentalized social and political relations.52 
Thus understood, Marx’s theory helps elucidate the crucial gap in Arendt’s 
account of the social: why does homo faber no longer serve the vita activa and 
degenerate into the animal laborans in the modern world? The Weberian viewpoint 
that highlights the rise of secularism and bureaucracy—which Arendt sometimes 
adopts—cannot provide a fully satisfactory answer to this vital question. Secularism 
might show how people’s belief in the permanence of the world (to come) declines, 
but it falls short of explaining what actively motivates them in place of that belief. The 
theory of bureaucracy might portray the instrumentalization of politics but it fails to 
explicate precisely how broader social relations and subjectivities are also 
instrumentalized in relation to the imperative of wealth accumulation. In light of 
Marx’s theory, we can see how capital accumulation and the universalization of 
exchange value—historically specific dynamics that Arendt points to but never 
analyzes in depth or connects—operate, in a mutually reinforcing fashion, to produce a 
specific form of social relations that structurally conditions people to care exclusively 
about their private interest at the expense of their relations with others. If, as I have 
argued, this socially disconnected disposition is precisely what Arendt tries to warn us 
about with her concept of world alienation, the double-sided structural dynamic of 
                                                 
52 As noted, here I depart from Lukács’s position. Lukács argues that capitalist social relations can be 
overcome only when the proletariat becomes conscious of its status as a commodity (object) and forms 
itself into a class (subject). By acquiring such a conscious, Lukács claims, the proletariat becomes the 
“identical subject-object of history whose praxis will change reality.” Lukács, “Reification,” 197, 168-
172. But if, as I have suggested, the class division is one (surely major) symptom of capitalist social 
relations, the site of transformation does not have to be located exclusively in the proletariat class. 
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capitalism illustrates the origin of that disposition—the origin that Arendt traced, 
vaguely and enigmatically, in her account of the social. 
 
Conclusion 
As postwar democracy was instrumentalized in opposition to totalitarianism 
and in correlation with capitalism, Arendt was deeply concerned that instrumental 
democracy (still in formation) would exacerbate, rather than redress, dangerous 
tendencies of modernity toward world alienation—tendencies which manifested 
themselves most horrifically in totalitarianism but by no means disappeared with the 
demise of Nazism and Stalinism. I have suggested that a fuller understanding of her 
political theory is possible when we pay more sustained attention to her insightful yet 
underdeveloped critique of instrumental democracy and its consequences. Her 
concepts of world alienation and the social contain the gist of this critique, and I have 
sought to reinterpret those concepts by reading Arendt’s sometimes enigmatic claims 
in light of the insights of Heidegger and Marx. By considering Heidegger’s claim that 
our existence is premised on primary affective attunement, we can understand in what 
sense Arendt’s concept of world alienation denotes not simply the dissolution of 
institutions but the decline of people’s disposition to create and preserve shared 
contexts which are, for her, the condition of possibility for the realization of political 
freedom. Arendt traces the origin of this dispositional or affective decay in her account 
of the social. She argues that, with the rise of the social, care about the self takes over 
care for the world, as the public sphere is subordinated to the predetermined goal of 
wealth accumulation and collective subjectivities are dissolved into isolated 
individuals merely serving that goal. But she fails to analyze how wealth accumulation 
becomes such a formidable social ideal, how collective subjectivities are fragmented 
in the regime of wealth accumulation, and how both processes facilitate the 
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ascendance of self-care as the dominant disposition. This failure can be attributed, I 
have contended, partly to the fact that she rejects Marx’s theory too readily as a 
representation of the ideal of the social. Contrary to Arendt’s assertion, Marx’s 
critique of capitalism actually elucidates Arendt’s account of the social by showing 
how capital accumulation and the universalization of exchange value—two essential 
dynamics of capitalism—produce a specific form of social relations that structurally 
turn people’s disposition away from the cultivation of their collective power to the 
endless and purposeless expansion of their private interest. 
Arendt lamented the experience of political freedom had become so rare in the 
modern world. One of those rare events, which she said gave her “joy,” was the 1956 
Hungarian Revolution.53 While Arendt’s well-known enthusiasm about the Hungarian 
Revolution is often recognized as an inspiration for her valorization of the council 
system, her other suggestive observations on this momentous event have received less 
attention. For one thing, she singles out the Hungarian Revolution as the only modern 
revolution that successfully avoided being overwhelmed by the social question (OR 
112). By this she does not mean that economic issues were simply disregarded; what 
makes the Hungarian revolution truly inspiring, she implies, is the fact that 
revolutionaries did not succumb to trade unionism seeking an “increase in their 
economic security, social prestige, and political power” over and against other classes 
and, instead, combined their economic demands with “their own ideas about the 
possibilities of democratic government under modern conditions” (HC 216). This 
suggests, in line with the interpretation I advanced above, that if Arendt’s theory 
authorizes a criticism of certain political movements, it is not simply because those 
movements are centered on economic issues or waged by “economic agents” such as 
the poor or the workers but because they reproduce the terms of the social. Moreover, 
                                                 
53 Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt, 298. 
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she discusses the legacy of the Hungarian Revolution specifically, if somewhat 
ambiguously, in affective terms. “If the tragedy of the Hungarian revolution achieved 
nothing more than that it showed the world that, all defeats and all appearances 
notwithstanding, this political élan has not yet died, its sacrifices were not in vain” 
(HC 217). This might as well be Arendt’s elegiac tribute to the tragically short-lived 
revolution. But to the extent that my analysis of the affective dimension of world 
alienation holds validity, her remarks might also contain a more substantial argument. 
Rekindling political élan—invoking people to actually feel that political freedom is 
possible and meaningful—is indeed important because, in our world, such a mood is 
structurally conditioned to fade. 
Arendt died in 1975, right before the Third Wave of democratization began to 
emerge. Had she lived to see its unfolding, she would have been thrilled to witness the 
eruption of democratic aspirations and the holistic vision of democratization that 
combines political and economic demands. As we know, however, instrumental 
democracy would soon divert and overwhelm the creative energy of the Third Wave. 
That she would have found deeply troubling. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
In recent years, renewed and vigorous demands for democracy seem to be on the rise. 
A wave of popular demonstrations for democracy swept the Arab world—which came 
to be called the “Arab Spring”—where the prospect of democratization appeared 
remote just a few years ago. At the same time, those in established democracies, both 
old and new, expressed their frustration and anger at the present working of 
democracy. In the United States, the Occupy Wall Street movement broke out, 
bringing to light—with its powerful slogan “We are the 99%”—the ironic situation in 
which a democracy is increasingly swayed by a small fraction of the population 
without regard to the concerns of the majority. Just a few months before the beginning 
of the Occupy Wall Street Movement, an extraordinary number of people in Spain 
staged similar protests, demanding “Real Democracy NOW! (¡Democracia Real YA!).” 
While deeply troubling economic problems such as rising unemployment, growing 
inequality, and deepening poverty sparked these movements, protesters also seem to 
advance a critique of democratic institutions and practices currently in place. Instead 
of channeling their demands through conventional political institutions, participants in 
the Occupy Wall Street and the Real Democracy NOW movements experimented with 
more direct forms of democracy. Even in Chile and South Korea, large-scale protests 
recently erupted after a long period of relative political quietude. These movements, 
which, despite their differences, share strong aspirations for a different kind of 
democracy, may be signaling that democratic disaffection—the systemic effect of 
instrumental democracy—can no longer be contained within the system of 
instrumental democracy and starts becoming a disrupting force. 
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Our interrogation into postwar democracy, however, cautions us that people’s 
democratic aspirations, no matter how strong, are vulnerable to forces of instrumental 
democracy. One is compelled to think about this vulnerability, for example, observing 
the precarious political development of Egypt, the most populous country that 
experienced the Arab Spring. There, the presidential election following the exuberant 
toppling of Hosni Mubarak’s dictatorship produced two runoff candidates—Ahmed 
Shafiq, a former air-force general who served as Mubarak’s last prime minister and 
Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood—who are deemed by many Egyptians 
to be contrary to their vision of democracy. Speaking volumes of their disillusionment, 
out of the 23 million voters who cast ballots in the first round of elections, 12 million 
did not vote for either of the runoff candidates.1 Moreover, the military, which had 
controlled the country behind the scenes since 1952 (its private-sector investments are 
estimated to account for one-third of the country’s GDP), maintains overwhelming 
power over such democratic institutions as Congress and the President. The Supreme 
Constitutional Court dissolved the popularly elected Parliament just two days before 
the presidential run-off,2 in order to support the military’s plan to not “relinquish 
authority before supervising a new Constitution.”3 And even before the election 
committee announced Mohammed Morsi as victor, the military decreed a severe 
constriction of the powers of the presidency. The new president, as Time magazine 
reports, “will have no real control over the budget and no decisive role in foreign 
policy, defense or national-security matters. He won’t even have the symbolic status of 
                                                 
1 Abdel-Rahman Hussein, “Egypt’s Presidential Election Turns Toxic amid Anger over ‘Stolen 
Revolution’,” Guardian, June 16, 2012. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/16/egypt-
presidential-election-stolen-revolution. 
2 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Blow to Transition as Court Dissolves Egypt’s Parliament,” New York Times, 
June 14, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/middleeast/new-political-showdown-in-
egypt-as-court-invalidates-parliament.html?pagewanted=all. 
3 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Judge Helped Egypt’s Military to Cement Power,” New York Times, July 3, 
2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/world/middleeast/judge-helped-egypts-military-to-cement-
power.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp. 
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commander in chief of the armed forces. By fiat, the junta has kept all those functions 
for itself.”4 The situation is hardly better in democracies. The Occupy Wall Street 
movement is quietly fading, if retaining its profound symbolic force, with little 
noticeable change. In Spain, Chile, and South Korea, even after waves of 
demonstrations criticized their policies, conservative parties still won elections. 
To be sure, it remains to be seen whether tendencies of Egypt’s inchoate 
democracy toward instrumentalization will deepen or be reversed with time or to what 
extent such instrumentalizing tendencies are driven by, or even consonant with, forces 
of instrumental democracy identified in previous chapters. Nonetheless, there seem to 
be some signs that global forces of instrumental democracy—especially neoliberalism 
which we examined in Chapter 4—are at work, likely deepening democratic 
disaffection that has already begun to form. 
One of the principal underlying causes of the Arab Spring is arguably 
disastrous consequences of neoliberalism that has been aggressively implemented over 
the past three decades in the Arab world. The deregulation of capital flow created a 
weak and highly volatile economy characterized by low public investment and high 
dependence on short-term private capital. This skewed economic structure left Arab 
countries deindustrialized, disproportionately reliant on the export of oil, and few jobs 
(the region has experienced the highest unemployment rate in the world for more than 
three decades).5 Thus, when oil prices fall as they often do, throwing the economy 
into recession, social consequences are exceedingly dire because those left outside the 
system, which account for up to half of the labor force, has virtually no social safety 
net. 
                                                 
4 Jay Newton-Small and Abigail Hauslohner, “How the Military Won the Egyptian Election,” Time, 
July 9, 2012. 30-34, 30. 
5 United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Summary of the Survey of Economic and Social 
Developments in the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia Region, 2007-2008,” esp. 2, 
9-10, 12. http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=E/2008/20. 
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In Egypt, the neoliberal restructuring of the economy got underway since 
Mubarak signed structural adjustment agreements with the IMF and the World Bank 
in 1991 and adopted a number of radical measures under the direction of USAID. The 
blind adoption of the neoliberal regimen devastated the lives of many Egyptians and 
created a highly unequal class structure. For example, the Mubarak regime, pressured 
by USAID, undertook a “commercialization” of agriculture which shifted the policy 
focus away from the local production of staple foods (e.g., wheat) to the large-scale, 
mechanical production of export crops (e.g., cotton). The concentrated mode of 
agricultural production proved to be a boon for a small class of wealthy landlords, 
whereas reduced subsidies pushed many local farmers to bankruptcy. Unmoved by 
these consequences, USAID representatives insisted that the displaced rural population 
would flock to cities and “help keep real urban wages low and industry more 
profitable.”6 But this optimistic projection, based less on substantial evidence than on 
abstract economic models, was contradicted by another set of neoliberal policies that 
undercut the very industries supposed to absorb excess labor. Under the slogan of 
“privatization,” the Mubarak regime sold state-owned industries to a small group of 
oligarchs (including, as noted, high-ranking military officers) which, in turn, led to a 
massive layoff. The workforce of the Egyptian textile industry, for example, was 
slashed from half a million to a quarter-million.7 At the same time, the 
commercialization of agriculture destabilized and degraded the life of most Egyptians, 
including shrinking groups of workers. The price of basic food items soared due to 
almost eviscerated local production and the rising costs of imported foods. Since 
wages were not fully indexed to the inflation rate, workers were forced to endure more 
                                                 
6 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, and Modernity (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 2002), 266-267. 
7 Austin Mackell, “The IMF versus the Arab Spring,” Guardian, May 25, 2011. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/25/imf-arab-spring-loans-egypt-tunisia. 
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hours and inhuman working conditions in desperate attempt to compensate for the 
widening gap between their wages and the cost of living. Under these circumstances, a 
wave of strikes began to break out in the mid-2000s, notably among textile workers of 
Mahalla—a remarkable event which is considered by many Egyptian activists a 
crucial step towards the eventual toppling of the Mubarak regime.8 
Seen in this light, it is ironic that one of the first international responses to the 
Arab Spring was an offer from G8 leaders, the World Bank, and the IMF which 
promises billions of dollars in aid and credits. Behind this generous offer, of course, is 
the pressure that Egypt does not stray from the neoliberal economic structure that has 
been profitable for foreign investors. As Mike Froman, a deputy national security 
adviser at the White House, said, the offer is “not a blank cheque. … It’s an envelope 
that could be achieved in the context of suitable reform efforts. … This is largely a 
case of trade not aid, investment not assistance over time. It’s really about establishing 
the conditions under which the private sectors in these economies can flourish and the 
benefits of growth are broadly shared.”9 The bizarre scene in which foreign 
technocrats attempt to dictate one of the most significant aspects of Egypt’s transition 
to democracy well before Egyptians form their democratic institutions tells a great 
deal about the current state of democracy. 
The recalcitrant presence and working of forces of instrumental democracy 
makes us question the validity of prominent theories of democracy today. For example, 
one of the most influential recent accounts of democracy is the theory of social capital, 
popularized most notably by Harvard political scientist Robert D. Putnam.10 Defining 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 John Irish and Luke Baker, “G8 pledges $20 Billion to foster Arab Spring,” Reuters, May 27, 2011. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/05/27/us-g-idUKTRE74P00320110527/. 
10 While Putnam is largely responsible for the huge attention to social capital in the study of democracy, 
the concept social capital is not his invention. French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu is often considered to 
have first used the concept in its contemporary sense, and American sociologist James Coleman was 
instrumental in initiating its social scientific application. For a useful review of social capital research, 
see Michael Woolcock, “Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis 
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social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, 
that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions,”11 
Putnam argues that the health of democracy relies not only on public institutions but 
on “widespread participation in private voluntary groups—those networks of civic 
engagement that embody social capital.”12 In his famed book, Bowling Alone (2000), 
Putnam links the decline in political participation and trust—part of the problem I 
have traced—to the erosion of social capital, and calls for the proliferation of 
voluntary groups in all walks of life as a crucial way to revitalize democracy. 
“Voluntary groups are not a panacea for what ails our democracy,” Putnam writes. 
“But without social capital we are more likely to have politics of a certain type” driven 
more by polarizing ideological extremism than by measured deliberation.13 
The core insight of Putnam’s social capital theory is an essential one. As I have 
sought to show, and as astute theorists of democracy including Rousseau, 
Montesquieu, and Tocqueville have pointed out, democracy cannot work by political 
institutions alone; it is to be grounded in robust social relations and political 
subjectivities concerned about, and disposed to, public matters. But Putnam’s 
conceptualization of social capital—especially his focus on private, voluntary 
associations to the exclusion of democratic norms, public organizations, and political 
activities—radically reduces and regiments the realm of social relations and political 
subjectivities. In emphasizing civic skills and interpersonal trust cultivated by private 
                                                                                                                                            
and Policy Framework,” Theory and Society 27(2) (1998): 151-208. Gaining enormous currency in a 
remarkably short period of time, social capital has become one of the most prominent concepts in many 
fields of study. Woolcock groups the vast literature on social capital into seven substantive fields: 
families and youth behavior problem, schooling and education, community life, work and organizations, 
democracy and governance, general cases of collective action problem, and intangible assets. Ibid., 
155n20. 
11 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 167. 
12 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2000), 336. 
13 Ibid., 341-342. 
 281 
associations, Putnam never explains how those qualities translate into public 
dispositions and capabilities oriented to democratic politics.14 As Jean L. Cohen 
incisively points out, “it is entirely possible that without other mechanisms for the 
generalization of trust, participation in associations and membership in social 
networks could foster particularism, localism, intolerance, exclusion, and generalized 
mistrust of outsiders, of the law, and of government. Without other mediations, there 
is no reason to expect that the forms of reciprocity or trust generated within small 
groups would extend beyond the group or, for that matter, that group demands would 
be anything other than particularistic.”15 Moreover, as we will see momentarily, this 
curious reduction of civil society is combined with a twisted appropriation of 
Putnam’s above suggestion—which is surely an expression of modesty on his part—
that social capital is not a panacea but a complementary remedy, to the effect of 
diverting our attention away from institutional and structural defects to the behavior of 
citizens. 
In this respect, it is revealing to examine how social capital theory reverses 
Tocqueville’s account of civil society even as it invokes him as an intellectual 
inspiration. To be sure, Tocqueville greatly emphasized the significance of “civil 
associations” and went so far as to state that they “pave the way for political 
associations.”16 But even a quick glance reveals that, for Tocqueville, political 
                                                 
14 Putnam is aware of the possibility that certain types of social capital could undermine, rather than 
facilitate, democracy. “Social capital … can be directed toward malevolent, antisocial purposes, just 
like any other form of capital.” He even distinguishes “bridging (or inclusive)” and “bonding (or 
exclusive)” forms of social capital to register this point. But despite its significance, Putnam states, this 
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comprehensive, nationwide measures of social capital that neatly distinguish “bridgingness” and 
“bondingness.” In our empirical account of recent social trends in this book, therefore, this distinction 
will be less prominent than I would prefer.” Ibid., 22-24. 
15 Jean L. Cohen, “American Civil Rights Talk,” in Civil Society, Democracy, and Civic Renewal, ed. 
Robert K. Fullinwider (Lanham, MD: Lowman & Littlefield, 1999), 65. 
16 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Gerald E. Bevan, intro. and notes Isaac 
Kramnick (New York: Penguin, 2003), vol. II, pt. 2, ch. 7. All the citations in this paragraph are from 
here. 
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associations are what engender and cultivate civil associations, not the other way 
around as social capital theory posits. In a typical passage, he writes: “[P]olitics 
promotes the love of and practice of association at a general level; it introduces the 
desire to unite and teaches the skill to do so to a crowd of men who would always have 
lived in isolation.” In contrast to social capital theory, Tocqueville’s real concern is to 
defend the vibrant existence of political associations. This, however, is a challenging 
task, because “[p]resent governments … entertain a sort of instinctive abhorrence 
toward [political associations] and combat them whenever they meet,” as they view 
those associations as creating forces that would challenge their authority. On the other 
hand, Tocqueville suggestively observes, governments “feel a natural goodwill” 
toward the flourishing of civil associations as a means to naturally suppress political 
associations. The rulers “have quickly discovered that these [civil associations], far 
from directing citizens’ minds toward public affairs, do in fact turn attention from 
them and, by increasingly occupying citizens in enterprises which cannot be 
accomplished without a time of public tranquility, they divert them from revolutions.” 
But this depoliticization of associational life would ultimately be detrimental to the 
entire society, because without politics civil associations “will always be small in 
number, feebly conceived, incompetently run, and will never engage in plans on a vast 
scale or will fail in attempting to execute them.” “Thus,” Tocqueville memorably 
concludes, “it is by enjoying a dangerous [political] freedom that Americans learn the 
skill of reducing the risks of [individual] freedom.” 
The recent image makeover of the World Bank and the IMF raises concerns 
about the politically diverting effect of social capital theory. Facing mounting 
criticisms over the consequences of neoliberalism they had been relentlessly 
prescribing for developing countries, both institutions began to retreat from its rigid 
neoliberal position and adopt a more nuanced approach to development. And at the 
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center of this shift is the discourse of “civil society” and, especially, social capital. But 
the World Bank takes the concept of social capital exactly as Putnam recommends, 
namely, as a complement to neoliberal economic policies while evading a more 
fundamental reconsideration of neoliberalism itself. As a group of scholars have noted, 
surveying the debate over the adoption of social capital theory at the World Bank, the 
“thrust of much discussion” was centered on how to “create efficient and equitable 
exchange and service provisions” by increasing social capital. “In such uses of the 
concept [social capital] we do not see the idea that markets will inherently lead to 
unequal accumulation, that social inequality means that market models will aggravate 
poverty, or that the state has any role to play in leveling wealth through asset 
redistribution.”17 Instead of reflecting on the possibility that the imposition of 
neoliberal policies instrumentalizes democracy by severely constricting the domain of 
democratic contestation and undermining people’s democratic capabilities and 
dispositions, the World Bank appropriates social capital theory as a justification for 
expanding its control into the fabric of social relations and making those relations 
more amenable to the efficient operation of the market. The underlying assumption 
here is that the failure of the market stems from the immaturity of indigenous people 
rather than from institutional or structural flaws—the assumption inherited from the 
modernization project we examined in Chapter 4. 
If social capital theory effectively works to align social relations with the 
function of the capitalist market rather than genuinely bolstering democracy, another 
theory of democracy in vogue today anticipates and celebrates the coming of 
democratic movements. Over the past ten years or so, Michael Hardt and Antonio 
                                                 
17 Anthony Bebbington, Scott Guggenheim, Elizabeth Olson, and Michael Woolcock, “Exploring 
Social Capital Debates at the World Bank,” Journal of Development Studies 40(5) (2004): 33-64, 40. 
See also Ben Fine, “The Developmental State is Dead—Long Live Social Capital?” Development and 
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Negri have been producing probably the most influential account of what might be 
termed the “politics of immanence.” According to Hardt and Negri, the current world 
order is shaped by a new form of capitalism: a capitalism that is truly global and 
characterized, in its mode of production, no longer by the homogeneous mass 
production of standardized commodities (often called Taylorism or Fordism) but by 
the qualitatively diverse, increasingly immaterial production of knowledge, 
information, communication, and affect. While this evolution of capitalism 
undermines the sovereignty of nation-states, they claim, sovereignty as such is far 
from declining. Rather, what is in formation is a new “global form of sovereignty” 
which Hardt and Negri call “Empire.”18 Upon their portrayal, Empire defies 
traditional boundaries in three distinctive realms. First, in the spatial realm, Empire is 
not tied to a specific region but “rules over the entire “civilized” world.” “In Empire 
… all places have been subsumed in a general “non-place” [defined only by monetary 
value].”19 Second, in the temporal realm, Empire “presents its rule not as a transitory 
moment in the movement of history, but as a regime with no temporal boundaries and 
in this sense outside history or at the end of history.”20 Third, in the realm of rule, 
Empire does not simply manage a territory or a population but extends its rule “down 
to the depths of the social world,” producing social life itself (or, in their terms, 
engaging in the “biopolitical production”).21 
Overwhelming as it seems, Empire as a dominant form of sovereignty does not 
entirely devour politics. On the contrary, new possibilities of politics are immanent to 
Empire (hence the politics of immanence). Hardt and Negri believe the evolution of 
capitalism giving rise to Empire also creates a resistant subjectivity called the 
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19 Ibid., xiv, 353. 
20 Ibid., xiv-xv. 
21 Ibid., xv, 22-41. 
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“multitude.” Like Empire, the multitude is an all-embracing concept that knows no 
boundary; it encompasses “all those who work under the rule of capital and thus 
potentially as the class of those who refute the rule of capital.”22 Hardt and Negri 
predict the capitalist production increasingly organized around knowledge, 
communication, and affect would help overcome internal divisions within labor—
which is posited to be the major, though not exclusive, constituent of the multitude—
and consolidate it as a powerful force that can challenge Empire. As they put it, 
somewhat cryptically, “Producing communication, affective relationships, and 
knowledges, in contrast to cars and typewriters, can directly expand the realm of what 
we share in common. … [T]he many singular instances of labor processes, productive 
conditions, local situations, and lived experiences coexist with a “becoming common,” 
at a different level of abstraction, of the forms of labor and the general relations of 
production and exchange … This becoming common, which tends to reduce the 
qualitative divisions within labor, is the biopolitical condition of the multitude.”23 
Further, Hardt and Negri argue that the multitude includes not simply the working 
class but also the poor and the unemployed, because the “flexibility of the labor 
market” creates a “large gray area in which all workers hover precariously between 
employment and unemployment.”24 They assert the multitude provides raw materials, 
as it were, for building an “absolute democracy” as “the rule of everyone by everyone, 
a democracy without qualifications, without ifs or buts.”25 
While grounded in strong democratic commitment, Hardt’s and Negri’s 
sweeping theory of Empire and the multitude is deeply troubling. The problem is not 
just that their analysis is based on loose arguments and sparse evidence, though their 
                                                 
22 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: 
Penguin, 2004), 106. 
23 Ibid., 114. 
24 Ibid., 131. 
25 Ibid., 237. 
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theory does leave us with puzzles. They claim, for example, that although the present 
mode of capitalism is more decentralized and creates qualitatively diverse groups of 
workers, it also produces conditions—increased global communication for one—that 
enhance the solidarity of labor and all the other marginalized groups. They never 
explain why expanded communication would work in favor of the solidarity of 
marginalized people and, even if that is the case, how that solidarity would be strong 
enough to offset, let alone overcome, structural forces toward segmentation and 
fragmentation that they so amply highlight. This, then, reveals a more fundamental 
problem of Hardt’s and Negri’s theory, which is the frame of their analysis. They 
conceptualize the multitude as an ontological entity allegedly inherent to fixed 
historical conditions. Within their framework, both historical conditions and political 
subjectivities are presumed to be given independent of political practice. Put another 
way, Hardt and Negri bypass what I identified as one of the most pernicious 
tendencies of postwar democracy—the dissolution of collective subjectivities—and, as 
a result, fail to provide insights as to how we can counteract the working of 
instrumental democracy that suppresses the very formation of political subjectivities 
from within.26 In the end, their theory seems to work more as a prophetic gesture that 
calls the multitude into existence than as an analysis that helps us understand obstacles 
to, and possibilities for, deepening democracy—which might be what they intend.27 It 
is hard to foresee ramifications of prophesy. But in moving the vital question of 
political subjectivity from the political to the quasi-eschatological realm, Hardt’s and 
                                                 
26 To be fair, Hardt and Negri argue that the multitude is the “flesh” and “as yet forms no body,” and 
that it can be coopted as the “productive organs of the global social body of capital” or “organize 
themselves autonomously.” They go so far as to suggest “[t]he multitude needs a political project to 
bring it into existence.” Ibid., 159, 212. Still, their basic claim is that the multitude already exists as the 
effect of the current stage of capitalism, and all it needs is political organization. 
27 Recognizing the difficulty of determining the form of politics centered on the multitude would take, 
Hardt and Negri invokes Spinoza’s notion of the “prophet” that “produces its own people.” “Today a 
manifesto, a political discourse, should aspire to fulfill a Spinozist prophetic function, the function of an 
immanent desire that organizes the multitude.” Hardt and Negri, Empire, 63-66. 
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Negri’s theory seems to symptomatically announce the triumph of instrumental 
democracy that has been working to vacate the center of democracy, namely, to 
foreclose the quest for the demos. 
In important ways, the awareness of disaffection with the current form of 
democracy guides and motivates both social capital theory and the political theory of 
immanence. However, they fail to recognize the possibility that democratic 
disaffection might exist as a systemic effect of instrumental democracy, leaving their 
diagnosis as well as remedies incomplete and, worse, vulnerable to appropriations that 
reinforce tendencies of instrumental democracy. If, as I have argued throughout my 
dissertation, instrumental democracy works specifically to displace people’s affective 
orientation toward democratic politics into care about private matters, the exclusive 
focus on the private realm not only misses the core of the problem but, more 
importantly, effectively conforms to, and likely augments, the working of instrumental 
democracy. Tocqueville was acutely aware of the danger of decoupling public and 
private life and prioritizing the latter over the former, but this essential insight is lost 
to social capital theory. Similarly, the political theory of immanence fails to take into 
account the nuanced working of instrumental democracy, making its analysis of the 
political dynamic of global capitalism and its prediction of the rise of democratic 
subjectivity dubious. Democratic subjectivities are not automatically produced by 
technological or economic change but formed when people come to view themselves 
as part of the public or, more precisely, develop affective dispositions to make 
universal demands as part of the demos. By radically reducing the significance and 
relevance of the public and the demos, instrumental democracy seriously erodes the 
context for that formative process. Thus, any attempt to redress structural problems 
remains unviable unless it goes hand in hand with sustained efforts to restore the 
notion of the public and bring it back to the center of democratic politics. In this 
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respect, Arendt’s political theory we examined in Chapter 5 provides an important 
insight, but it is only an invitation for further analysis of our historical conditions and 
innovative experimentation with alternative ways of undertaking democratic politics. 
In a time when people are expressing strong yet elusive democratic aspirations, 
we urgently need to develop new ways of understanding and practicing democratic 
politics lest those aspirations degenerate yet again into democratic disaffection. And 
we can embark on that grave task by dismantling the imaginary hold and the material 
structure of instrumental democracy. It is long overdue. Instrumental democracy is too 
obsolete to outlive the Cold War. 
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